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Warren Zev Harvey
Foreword
Ehud Krinis is one of the finest interpreters of the philosophy of Judah Halevi. His
first book, God’s Chosen People: Judah Halevi’s Kuzari and the Shīʿī Imām Doctrine,1
continued the pioneering research of Shlomo Pines and gave us a profound and de-
tailed understanding of the Shiʿite influences on Halevi’s Kuzari. In the words of a
leading expert on Judeo-Arabic philosophy, Krinis’s book is “the most comprehen-
sive and bold project to date of situating Halevi’s Kuzari within its context in Islamic
civilization.”2 Krinis’s present book examines the sceptical motifs in Halevi’s Kuzari
and is the first extended study of Halevi’s scepticism.
Halevi was a brilliant poet in Hebrew. His philosophical book The Kuzari, writ-
ten in Arabic, also exhibits extraordinary literary skill. The book is composed in dia-
logue form and purports to record the discussions of the King of Khazaria, whose
kingdom has allegedly converted to Judaism, with a philosopher, a Christian
scholar, a Muslim scholar, and a Jewish scholar. Krinis shows how Halevi resource-
fully used the dialogue form in order to portray the tension between scepticism and
dogmatism in religion and science.3
In what sense was Halevi a sceptic? Pines, whose research did much to advance
the study of scepticism in medieval Jewish and Muslim philosophy, chose to avoid
the term “scepticism,” since he was not convinced that Greek scepticism had ex-
erted a significant influence on medieval Arabic philosophy.4 However, at least
since the studies of Saul Horovitz eleven decades ago,5 there have been authors
Open Access. © 2020 Warren Zev Harvey, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664744-001
1 Ehud Krinis, God’s Chosen People: Judah Halevi’s Kuzari and the Shīʿī Imām Doctrine, trans. Ann
Brener and Tamar Liza Cohen (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014). See Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the
Kuzari,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 21 (2013): 1–56; Krinis, “Galut and Ghayba: The
Exile of Israel and the Occultation of the Shīʿī Imām-Messiah: A Comparative Study of Judah Halevi
and Early Imāmī-Shīʿī Writers,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 40 (2013): 245–300. See also
Shlomo Pines, “Shiʿite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic
and Islam 2 (1980): 165–251.
2 Diana Lobel, review of God’s Chosen People: Judah Halevi’s Kuzari and the Shīʿī Imām Doctrine by
Ehud Krinis, Journal of Semitic Studies 61 (2016): 543.
3 See below, 30.
4 Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge according to Al-Fārābi, Ibn Bājja, and Mai-
monides,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 1, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979): 82–109; Pines, “Les limites de la métaphysique selon
Al-Fārābi, Ibn Bājja, et Maïmonide,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13, no. 1 (1981): 211–25.
5 Saul Horovitz, Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam (Bres-
lau: Schatzky, 1909); Horovitz, “Über die Bekanntschaft Saadias mit der griechischen Skepsis,” in
Judaica: Festschrift zu Hermann Cohens siebzigstem Geburtstage, ed. Ismar Elbogen, Benzion Keller-
mann, and Eugen Mittwoch (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912), 235–52; Horovitz, “Der Einfluss der
such as Carmela Baffioni6 and Giuseppe Veltri7 who have argued that there was in-
deed such an influence. Josef Stern, in his The Matter and Form of Maimonides’
Guide, presented a compelling sceptical interpretation of Maimonides’s book.8
To be sure, Krinis is well aware of all the arguments against the use of the term
“scepticism” with regard to medieval philosophers writing in Islamic lands. He ex-
plains his own view as follows:
The first gap between [the Greek sceptics and their Arabic successors] is that of knowledge. […]
No translation of any essay written by a Hellenistic sceptic was […] included in the […] transla-
tions […] from […] Greek […] or […] Syriac to Arabic during the eighth to tenth centuries. The
Academia and Pyrrho […] are rarely mentioned in [classical] Arabic literature […]. The channels
by which knowledge of ancient scepticism reached writers in Arabic culture in the [classical]
era […] were thus indirect […]. In Halevi’s case […], the place of direct exposure to […] Hellenis-
tic sceptics was filled by non-sceptical Hellenistic writers such as Galen […] and […] Ptolemy
[…]. A second gap between [the Greeks and the philosophers of Arabic culture] […] is that of
[religion]. From the pagan perspective […] the gods were an inseparable part of the natural or-
der [and] discussing them [was considered] part of the science of physics. By contrast, a
[monotheistic] religion […] posits […] a God whose existence […] [predates] that of the world
and nature […]. These [two] gaps […] provide an explanation as to why it is impossible to speak
of [the] continuity of scepticism […] in the transition from the classical world to the Muslim
era. […]
Nonetheless, this should not get in the way of [the] scholar […]. [Scepticism in Arabic philoso-
phy] […] would […] indicate a transformation rather than [a] replication. Gaps in knowledge
and cultural climate function as catalysts […]. Halevi’s thought provides us with highly instruc-
tive examples of the extent to which the transmission of sceptical concepts […] between eras
and cultures can be […] fascinating precisely because of the profound transformation they un-
derwent.9
Yes, Krinis admits, medieval philosophers in Islamic lands had only a meagre
knowledge of Greek scepticism. However, this meagreness was not only a disadvan-
tage; it was also an advantage! The literary and cultural gaps separating those
monotheistic philosophers from their Greek predecessors prevented them from be-
ing merely replicators and forced them to be transformers. They developed their
2  Warren Zev Harvey
griechischen Skepsis auf die Entwicklung der Philosophie bei den Arabern,” in Jahresbericht des
jüdisch-theologischen Seminars Fraenckel’scher Stiftung für das Jahr 1914 (Breslau: Schatzky, 1915),
5–49.
6 Carmela Baffioni, “Per l’ipotesi di un influsso della scepsi sulla filosofia islamica,” in Lo scetti-
cismo antico: Atti del Convegno organizzato dal Centro di Studi del pensiero antico del CNR, Roma 5–8
nov. 1980, ed. Gabriele Giannantoni (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981), 1:417–34.
7 Giuseppe Veltri, “Scepticism in Jewish Philosophy,” in Judaistik im Wandel: ein halbes Jahrhun-
dert Forschung und Lehre über das Judentum in Deutschland, ed. Andreas Lehnhardt (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2017), 211–22.
8 Josef Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2013). See my review (in Hebrew) of the 2017 Hebrew translation in Iyyun 66 (2017): 399–404.
9 See below, 14-17.
own brand of scepticism which was not a replication of Pyrrho, but which was “fas-
cinating” in its own right. True, as Pines insisted, there was no real continuity be-
tween Greek scepticism and the scepticism of the philosophers in the Islamic world.
However, there was something even better: creative discontinuity.
Halevi’s scepticism, according to Krinis’s analysis, is inextricably connected to
fideism. Krinis explains this connection as follows:
Fideism is the concept that permitted ideas rooted in the world of ancient Hellenistic scepti-
cism to enter into Halevi’s religious worldview. […] Fideism is a theory that maintains that faith
is independent of reason. In the fideist approach, intellectual pursuit is considered to be an
inappropriate foundation for religious belief. […] Pure or radical fideism […] utterly rejects the
need for intellectual inquiry, […] whereas moderate fideism distinguishes […] fields in which
intellectual inquiry is valid […] from fields in which [it] is invalid […]. The latter fields are those
with significance […] to religious belief.10
Krinis’s historical theory may be summed up as follows. When some Muslim and
Jewish philosophers writing in the classical era of Islam appropriated Greek scepti-
cism, they did so selectively. They were selective doubters. They did not doubt all
things across the board, as the Greek sceptics did; for example, they did not doubt
divine revelation or religious dogmas, but they did doubt “intellectual inquiry.”
Their doubts about intellectual inquiry were motivated by their fideism; that is, by
their conviction that “faith is independent of intellectual inquiry” and should not
be founded on it. Criticism of intellectual inquiry supported their fideism in that it
seemed to show that reason could not be a reliable foundation for religion. They
used scepticism, in other words, as a weapon against reason. Scepticism had no es-
sential value for them, but only instrumental value. It was thus due to his fideism
that Halevi was able to incorporate sceptical elements into his philosophy.
Krinis describes Halevi as a “moderate” fideist, not a “pure” or “radical” one.11
He did not reject the legitimacy of intellectual inquiry tout court, but only with re-
spect to certain theological subjects. In this regard, Krinis observes, Halevi was sim-
ilar to the great Muslim savant al-Ġazālī, who had a manifest influence on his
thought in general and on his scepticism in particular. Both al-Ġazālī and Halevi
were staunchly committed to logical demonstration, but they argued that reason is
severely limited in the areas of metaphysics and theology.12 This is essentially the
Foreword  3
10 See below, 19.
11 See below, 21.
12 See below, 80–81. According to Krinis, Halevi is more sceptical than al-Ġazālī regarding physics.
See also Taneli Kukkonen, “Al-Ghazālī’s Skepticism Revisited,” in Rethinking the History of Skepti-
cism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 29–59, and Ariel
Malachi, “Scepticism at the Service of Revelation? Preliminary Observations on Logic and Episte-
mology in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” in Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Medieval Jewish Philosophy
and Thought, ed. Racheli Haliva (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 23–40.
same position that was held by the rationalist Maimonides, who explained in his
Guide of the Perplexed I, 31 that wherever there are logical demonstrations, there are
no differences of opinion, and thus there are no divisions of opinion in mathemat-
ics, some in physics, and a great many in metaphysics.13 Halevi’s position is close to
the fideism of the rationalist Kant, who denied knowledge to metaphysics “in order
to make room for faith.”14
Truth to tell, it would be difficult to find a good example of a “true” or “radical”
fideist among the Muslim and Jewish philosophers who flourished in the classical
era of Islam. In general, the term “fideism” is more appropriate in Christianity,
which is a religion of fides, than in Judaism or Islam, which are religions of law. It
was the Christian Tertullian who dismissed philosophy, asking “What indeed has
Athens to do with Jerusalem?”,15 and it was he who allegedly cried out “Credo quia
absurdum est.”16
In any case, for Halevi, knowledge of God is not achieved by a leap of faith. It is
gained by means of direct sense experience or by a reliable tradition based on that
experience. As Krinis skillfully explains, it is the result of ʿiyān (“eyewitness percep-
tion”), mušāhadah (“direct sense testimony”), baṣīrah (“spiritual vision”), and
ḏawq (“taste”); or of al-tawātur (“concurrent tradition”) and taqlīd (“imitation, re-
liance on tradition”). Halevi’s philosophy was more a Gefühlsphilosophie than a
Glaubensphilosophie.
In Kuzari I, 5 (see also I, 8), the king remarks that the phenomenon of magnetic
attraction seemed to contradict the laws of physics, but that once they were con-
fronted with the eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān) of the phenomenon, scientists
were compelled to accept it and to try to explain it. Similarly, he says, divine mira-
cles seem to be impossible, but if we have an eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān) of
such miracles, we are compelled to accept them and to try to explain them. The rela-
tionship between al-ʿiyān and reason in physics and in theology is thus similar. Di-
rect experience cannot be denied either in science or in religion. Halevi also makes
this point in Kuzari II, 48: reason does not accept miracles until it is forced to do so
by direct experience (al-ʿiyān or mushāhadah).
4  Warren Zev Harvey
13 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963), 66.
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), preface to the 2nd edition (Bxxx), 116: “Ich mußte also das Wis-
sen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen.”
15 De Praescriptione Haereticorum, 7. English translation: “On Prescription Against Heretics,” in
Ante-Nicene Christian Library; Translations Of The Writings Of The Fathers Down To A.D. 325, vol.
15, The Writings Of Tertullian, vol. 2, trans. Peter Holmes (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1870), 9.
16 Compare Tertullian’s Treatise on the Incarnation, ed. and trans. Ernest Evans (London: SPCK,
1956), 18–19.
Halevi insists that theological propositions must answer to the same scientific
standards as scientific propositions. Krinis gives a lengthy discussion of the Jewish
scholar’s significant comments in Kuzari I, 67.17 The Jewish scholar exclaims: “God
forbid that the Law should teach something that repudiates [the testimony of] direct
sense experience (ʿiyān) or [the conclusion of] a demonstration (burhān).” As for the
question of the creation or the eternity of the world, he sceptically asks: “Who could
provide us with the demonstration (al-burhān) on this question?” The Jewish
scholar thus seems to be advocating a sceptical suspension of judgment (epochē)
here. However, he immediately adds that since reason leaves the question unde-
cided, one should accept the traditional view that the world is created. Nor is this
his last word. If one is forced by argument to accept the eternity a parte ante of mat-
ter, he concludes, one may do so without contradicting the Law, as long as one
holds that this world was created, as written in Genesis, and that the first human
beings were Adam and Noah, as also recorded there. One sees here Halevi’s sincere
determination to remain faithful to both the biblical text and to reason. However,
one also sees his “selective scepticism” – philosophy leaves us in a state of epochē,
but religion rescues us from it.
Krinis notes the close historical connection between the Arabic burhān and the
Hebrew mofet: both words bear the double meaning of a logical demonstration and
a miraculous sign.18 Already in the Qurʾān, the Arabic burhān translates the Hebrew
mofet in the sense of a miraculous sign (see Sura 28 [The Story], verse 32, together
with Exodus 4:21 and 7:9). This Quranic usage is subsequently found in Jewish au-
thors, such as Saʿadia Gaon (e.g., in the introduction to The Book of Beliefs and
Opinions and often in his biblical translations and commentaries). When burhān
later came to be used to designate a logical demonstration, medieval Arabic-to-He-
brew translators routinely translated it as mofet. The two words thus developed to-
gether, mutually influencing each other. Krinis points out how Halevi artfully com-
pares the two senses of burhān: the greatest burhān is not that of the logicians, but
that of the prophets (see Kuzari I, 15). Burhān preempts burhān.
According to Krinis’s analysis, Halevi seems to have seen his own scepticism as
Socratic.19 In Kuzari IV, 13, and again in V, 14 (and cf. III, 1, on the rare level at-
tained by Socrates), the Jewish rabbi approvingly cites a dictum of Socrates from
Plato’s Apology 20d–e: “O people, I do not deny this divine wisdom of yours. Rather,
I say that I don’t comprehend it. I am wise only in human wisdom.” Krinis sees this
twice-cited quotation of Socrates as corroborating Halevi’s own fideistic scepticism.
Socrates in effect asserts here that philosophy has nothing to say about the myster-
ies of religion. It has nothing to say about fides. Krinis makes yet another important
Foreword  5
17 See below, 61–74.
18 See below, 45–46.
19 See below, 82–85.
point about Halevi’s appreciation of Socrates: that Halevi identified with Socrates’s
“humble philosophical approach.” Scepticism goes hand in hand with humility.20
Ehud Krinis has written a perceptive, erudite, and lucid study of the sceptical
motifs in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari. He challenges us to read Halevi’s book in a new
and stimulating way.
6  Warren Zev Harvey
20 See also below, 100, n. 2.
Chapter 1 Classical Hellenistic Scepticism as a
Background to the Appearance of
Scepticism in Arabic Culture and The
Kuzari
In recent decades, academic research on sceptical trends in classical Greek and
Latin cultures has flourished.1 Similarly, there have been great advances made in
research into sceptical trends in Christian lands in the modern era.2 However, when
it comes to sceptical trends in the Middle Ages, research has yet to thrive. Despite
some interesting beginnings, research into sceptical manifestations in this period is
still awaiting scholars who will further enrich our understanding.3 This is particu-
larly true of Arabic culture and its Judeo-Arabic subculture,4 which blossomed dur-
ing the classical Islamic period (from the ninth to the thirteenth century), a period
parallel to the European High Middle Ages.5
Judah Halevi (aka Abū al-Ḥasan al-Lāwī, d. 1141) lived and worked in the
Iberian Peninsula from the end of the eleventh century to the first decades of the
twelfth century. His major literary output was poetry, a genre in which he ex-
celled and in which he gained renown in his own lifetime.6 In the last years of his
life, before he carried out his planned journey to the Land of Israel, Halevi wrote his
only prose work.7 This composition, whose official title is The Book of Refutation
Open Access. © 2020 Ehud Krinis, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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1 See Diego E. Machuca, “Ancient Skepticism,” Philosophy Compass 6, no. 4 (2011): 234–58.
2 Richard H. Popkin’s The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, first published in 1960,
usually receives the credit for initiating the study of early modern scepticism.
3 Henrik Lagerlund, “A History of Skepticism in the Middle Ages,” in Rethinking the History of Skep-
ticism, 1.
4 Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiry into Jewish Philosophy and Scepticism (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2018), 148–49, 153–54.
5 Throughout this study (unless stated otherwise), the term “Arabic culture” refers to the general
culture during the classical Islamic period. This culture, whose main language was Arabic, was
shared not only by Muslims, but also by Christian, Jewish, and other cultural elites who came under
the political domination of Islam during this period. For the relevant periodisation of Islamic his-
tory, see Shlomo Dov Goitein, “A Plea for the Periodization of Islamic History,” Journal of the Amer-
ican Oriental Society, 88, no. 2 (1968): 227.
6 For the course of Halevi’s life and his literary achievements, see Angel Sáenz-Badillos and Daniel
J. Lasker, “Judah Halevi,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica, ed. Fred Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum, 2nd
ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007): 11:492–501; Joseph Yahalom, Yehuda Halevi: Poetry and
Pilgrimage, trans. Gabriel Levin (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009).
7 Recent identifications of relevant Geniza documents unknown to previous scholars and techno-
logical advancements in reading Geniza materials have enabled Mordechai Akiva Friedman to pin-
point the composition of The Kuzari to Halevi’s last years in al-Andalus (1139–40). See Mordechai
Akiva Friedman, “Judah Ha-Levi on Writing The Kuzari: Responding to a Heretic,” in From a Sacred
Source – Genizah Studies in Honour of Professor Stefan C. Reif, ed. Ben Outhwaite and Siam Bhayro
and Proof on Behalf of the Despised Religion (Kitāb al-radd wa-l-dalīl fī al-dīn al-
ḏalīl), is known as The Book of the Kuzari or simply The Kuzari.8 In terms of its im-
pact over the centuries, The Kuzari stands alongside The Book of Beliefs and Opin-
ions ([al-Muḫtār fī] al-amānāt wa-l-iʿtiqādāt) by Saʿadia Gaon (aka Saʿīd ibn Yū-
suf al-Fayyūmī, d. 942), The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart (Kitāb al-
hidāyah ilā farāʾiḍ al-qulūb) by Baḥya ibn Paqudah (aka Ibn Baqūdah, fl. second
half of the eleventh century), and The Guide of the Perplexed (Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn) by
Maimonides (aka Mūsā ibn Maymūn, d. 1204) as one of the major compositions of
Judeo-Arabic theological literature.9
Of the theological works of these four central thinkers of Judeo-Arabic culture,
along with those of other authors, it is Maimonides’s thought that has received most
scholarly attention. It should therefore not come as a surprise that when it comes to
scepticism too, serious discussion of Maimonides’s thought has preceded any dis-
cussion of that of the other thinkers.10 Josef Stern’s recently published research,
which extensively discusses and analyses sceptical manifestations in The Guide of
the Perplexed, is the first comprehensive study devoted to scepticism in Judeo-Ara-
bic thought.11 The initial contribution to the study of sceptical aspects in Halevi’s
thought in particular was made by Nahum Arieli, who devoted several pages to The
8  Chapter 1 Classical Hellenistic Scepticism as a Background
(Leiden: Brill: 2010), 157–69; Friedman, “An India Trader’s Partnership in Almería (1139),” Sefarad
76, no. 1 (2016): 75–96; Friedman, India Book IV/A: Ḥalfon and Judah ha-Levi – The Lives of a Mer-
chant Scholar and a Poet Laureate according to the Cairo Geniza Documents [Judeo-Arabic and He-
brew] (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2013), 226, 242–43.
8 In a private letter found in the Cairo Geniza, Judah Halevi refers to it as “The Khazarī Book” (al-
Kitāb al-ḫazarī). See Moshe Gil and Ezra Fleischer, Yehuda Ha-Levi and His Circle: 55 Geniza Docu-
ments [Judeo-Arabic and Hebrew] (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 2001), 325; Mordechai
Akiva Friedman, India Book IV/B: Ḥalfon the Merchant Scholar and the Great Traveller according to
the Cairo Geniza Documents [Judeo-Arabic and Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2013), 277.
9 In the history of Jewish thought, these works became known to most readers not in their original
Judeo-Arabic, but in Hebrew translations. The more popular translations were made in the second
half of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century by Judah ibn Tibbon (d. 1190)
and his son Samuel (d. 1232).
10 A preliminary treatment of the acquaintance of Saʿadia Gaon – who ran second to Maimonides
in attracting the attention of academic scholarship – with Greek scepticism can be found in
Horovitz, “Über die Bekanntschaft Saadias mit der griechischen Skepsis,” 235–52. For an overview
of the subject of scepticism in Jewish philosophy, see Giuseppe Veltri, “Scepticism in Jewish Phi-
losophy,” 211–22.
11 Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide. In this volume, Stern incorporates his studies
from previous decades that tackle the sceptical aspects of Maimonides’s thought. See also Moshe
Halbertal,Maimonides: Life and Thought, trans. Joel Linsider (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014), 301–2, 304–11, 354.
Kuzari in a study focused on doubt in the thought of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (d. 1111)
and René Descartes (d. 1650).12
The current study seeks to follow the lead set by the pioneering work of Saul
Horovitz, Josef Stern, and Nahum Arieli and to expand on it by revealing more
about manifestations of scepticism in Judeo-Arabic thought, a direction that is still
underdeveloped in Judeo-Arabic studies. As Judeo-Arabic culture was a subculture
of Arabic culture in general, this study also offers a contribution to the study of the
manifestation of sceptical thinking in the broader context of that culture.
The concept of scepticism is in frequent use in nowadays language. As one may
expect of a concept with a long history and many applications, scepticism has taken
on different and, at times, wildly divergent meanings. In terms of its relevance for
this study – the perspective of Arabic culture – two diverse approaches presenting
the essence of scepticism are of particular interest. The first stresses the condition of
non-assent, or avoiding assent to any proposition as the essential state of intellec-
tual inquiry; the other approach places doubt at the core of that inquiry.
The approach stressing the condition of non-assent was typical of Hellenistic
culture. Hellenistic scepticism was designed to serve as a response to the formation
of concurrent philosophical trends (from the fourth century BCE on), such as the
Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian schools. The common starting point of these and
other schools was that the use of the intellect leads to dogmas: that is, proven truths
in various fields of knowledge. An embedded assumption of this starting point is
that human intelligence is characterised by its ability to decide, sorting the essential
and certain from the non-essential and uncertain and coming down on the side of
whatever is certain and true.13 This basic assumption guided the criticisms of the
sceptical Hellenistic thinkers, those who distinguished themselves by their constant
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12 Nahum Arieli, “Divine Light and Natural Light” [Hebrew], Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 7
(1988): 112–17. In addition, Richard Popkin and Luciano Floridi pointed to the relevance of both
Halevi and al-Ġazālī to medieval scepticism. See Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism
from Savonarola to Bayle, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17; Luciano
Floridi, “The Rediscovery and Posthumous Influence of Scepticism,” in The Cambridge Companion
to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 274. Two
other contributions to this subject were published after I completed my work on this study: see
Howard Kreisel, “Between Philosophic Optimism and Fideistic Scepticism: An Overview of Medieval
Jewish Philosophy,” in Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Thought,
12–14, and Ariel Malachi, “Scepticism at the Service of Revelation?”
13 For a detailed description of the process of reaching a dogmatic certainty via the intellect’s abil-
ity to discern it from the non-essential and uncertain, see Saʿadia Gaon, al-Muḫtār fī al-amānāt wa-l-
iʿtiqādāt, ed. Yosef Qāfiḥ (Jerusalem: Yeshiva University; New York: Sura Institute for Research and
Publication, 1970), 7–10 (= Saʿadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948], 9–13). See, in this context, Sarah Stroumsa, “Saadya and
Jewish Kalam,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and
Oliver Leaman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82–83.
skepsis (“search,” “investigation”). They found it necessary to examine each of the
arguments in favour of assenting to certain truths made by the various dogmatic
philosophers. This sceptical investigation usually involved raising counter-argu-
ments to the claims made by dogmatic thinkers, though the sceptical thinkers did
not consider themselves to be beholden to their own counter-claims. These were for-
mulated not in order to create new dogmas, but rather to show that against any ar-
gument that could be generated by an intellectual inquiry, that same intellectual
inquiry could generate different arguments inconsistent with the first, whose propo-
nents had rashly and impetuously considered it to be dogmatic. By constructing
counter-claims to dogmatic arguments, the sceptics created a situation of isos-
theneia; that is, an equipollence of counter-arguments. According to the sceptics, as
long as the intellectual inquiry persists – and it persists forever – the human intel-
lect must not be tempted to settle on any given position. The inevitable conclusion
of isostheneia is that epochē (the suspension of judgment) is the answer to the ques-
tion of which claim prevails over the others. According to the sceptics, the state of
epochē is not an end in itself, but a necessary step that enables truth-seekers to con-
tinue in their constant search for truth.14
The scepticism whose core consists of casting doubt differs from the scepticism
of non-assent. Scepticism positing non-assent as the perennial state of the intellect
rejects dogmas and the rationality of their proponents. The sceptic, as a rational hu-
man being, is one who takes steps to avoid falling into a dogmatic stance. The scep-
tical approach of non-assent does not necessitate the casting of doubt; one must
merely take the above-mentioned steps of the sceptical method. The equipollence of
counter-arguments (isostheneia) and the suspension of judgment (epochē) are the
essential components of the non-assent type of scepticism. According to this type of
scepticism, an equipollence of counter-arguments does not necessarily lead to cast-
ing doubt on any particular position involved in the issue at hand, but rather to a
suspension of judgment on all of the positions on the issue at hand.
In scepticism based on doubt, on the other hand, the dogma is the starting
point. Thinkers applying this type of scepticism begin from a position in which they
themselves are attached to some dogmas. The casting of doubt is the means that
thinkers use in order to engage in a rational investigation of the truth of the dogmas
that they have typically acquired uncritically, without intellectual questioning or in-
quiry. In casting doubt on conventional dogmas – that is, exposing them to the un-
biased criticism of the mind – inquirers lose the previous uncritical confidence that
they had placed in these dogmas as proven knowledge. Nonetheless, the casting of
doubt may lead thinkers to find intellectually based support through which they
can rebuild their dogmatic world atop its ruins. Two prominent examples of this
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type of scepticism are found in Discourse on the Method (Discours de la méthode) by
René Descartes and The Deliverance from Error (al-Munqiḏ min al-ḍalāl) by al-
Ġazālī.15
Nahum Arieli, in the work referenced above, discussed scepticism in Halevi’s
writing through the prism of a comparison of doubt as depicted in the essays of al-
Ġazālī and Descartes, devoting most of his attention to scepticism of that form. Paul
L. Heck, who a few years ago published the first monograph of its type on scepti-
cism among Muslim writers in the classical Islamic period, also approached scepti-
cism first and foremost as the casting of doubt.16 In this study, I will take a different
approach. A major assertion I will seek to prove is that despite the many differences
between ancient Hellenistic scepticism and Halevi’s thought in The Kuzari (as a
work that emerged from the Judeo-Arabic and general Arabic cultures of the classi-
cal Islamic period), there are also similarities between Halevi’s thought and this an-
cient tradition. The establishment of this claim is linked to issues that must be ex-
plained and resolved before beginning the discussion of the main topic.
It is first necessary to consider the development that occurred in the last gener-
ation of research into ancient Hellenistic scepticism, a development that signifi-
cantly changed the historiographical picture of how this brand of scepticism came
into being. To date, the prevelant view of the development of sceptical thinking in
the classical Hellenistic world has given much credence to the presentation of the
topic in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (active around 200 CE) and other ancient
sources. According to the common perception, ancient Hellenistic scepticism con-
sisted of two separate schools of thought operating in tandem. The first, whose sup-
porters viewed it as the only authentic undogmatic school of scepticism, was sup-
posedly founded by Pyrrho (c. 360–270 BCE). The second was founded by
Arcesilaus (316–241 BCE) as part of the Platonic Academy. However, contemporary
scholarship has shattered this picture. According to the current revisionist view,
promoted by prominent scholars of antique scepticism, the Pyrrhonian school was
not established by Pyrrho. Based on what we know about his opinions, Pyrrho does
not seem to have supported the sceptical approach which is named after him.17 The
so-called Pyrrhonian school was established by Aenesidemus in the first century
BCE, some 250 years after Pyrrho’s time. Aenesidemus was a member of the last gen-
eration of the Platonic Academy in Athens before it ceased its activities and its
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members scattered a few years before the death of Philo of Larissa (159–84 BCE), its
last head. Before the dispersal of the Academy, its last generation of teachers had
disagreed about the sceptical direction that had marked its path since Arcesilaus’s
time. Antiochus of Ascalon (d. 69 BCE), the most prominent philosopher of the last
generation of the Academy, deviated from the tradition of sceptical thought and
laid the foundations for what is now called Middle Platonism. In light of this history
of philosophical disagreements and the organisational breakdown of the
Academy,18 Aenesidemus founded a new sceptical school of thought that took its
inspiration and historic (albeit invented) ancestry from the long-dead Pyrrho.19
Based on the historical picture provided by the contemporary scholarly understand-
ing of the emergence of the Pyrrhonian school, it would seem that the Academic
schools and the Pyrrhonian school are in fact two chronological stages in the devel-
opment of ancient Hellenistic sceptical thought. The Academic sceptical stream
ceased its activity in the first half of the first century BCE just as the Pyrrhonian
sceptical stream began, taking the sceptical tradition from Academic scepticism and
maintaining it for about another 250 years.
Philosophically, the worldviews of the Pyrrhonian writers largely relied on
those of their Academic predecessors and their true relationship with their Aca-
demic forerunners (a relationship that was, at least in Sextus Empiricus’s case, be-
lied by polemical rhetoric designed to stress the originality of Pyrrhonian scepti-
cism) consisted mostly of continuity and expansion.20 Pyrrhonian sceptics took the
anti-dogmatic stance – which refutes the “rashness” (propeteia) manifested in mak-
ing any act of determination – from their precursors, from whom they also derived
the key sceptical tactic of the “equipollence of counter-arguments” (isostheneia), as
well as another central sceptical stance: that of “suspending judgment” (epochē).
The polemical agenda that determined the content of sceptical discussions was al-
most exclusively dictated by the Academic school. The Pyrrhonian sceptics aimed
their polemics not against the dogmatic schools that were flourishing in their day
(such as Neoplatonism), but rather against the schools (some of which were no
longer active) that their Academic predecessors had targeted in their debates.21 The
Pyrrhonists further inherited the ad hominem style of argument that adapts itself to
the assumptions of the particular dogmatic opponent being debated. The Pyrrho-
nian school introduced several innovations into the sceptical approach, including
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the systematisation of sceptical arguments collected into various lists of “modes”
(topoi),22 the refinement of “sceptical language” formulated in sceptical expres-
sions,23 the stress on the importance of appearances (phainomena), and “tranquil-
lity” (ataraxia) being the practical purpose of the sceptical theoretical undertak-
ing.24 As transmitted to us mainly via the writings of Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonian
sceptical thought is generally multifaceted and more sophisticated and developed
compared to the Academic sceptical thought chiefly transmitted through Cicero’s
writings. The above reconstruction of its historical course allows us to see that the
ancient Hellenistic sceptical tradition gained an early coherence of ideas as part of
the Platonic Academy and later refinements as part of the Pyrrhonian school.
The emphasis on the fundamental unity of the classical Hellenistic sceptical tra-
dition is related to efforts made by contemporary scholars to uproot a common mis-
perception propagated by past scholars. According to that notion, the fundamental
approach of the Academic school was not sceptical, but rather negatively dogmatic.
This mistaken opinion is based on an intentional distortion from the side of the
Pyrrhonian school: Sextus Empiricus begins his work Hypotyposis Pyrrhoniae (Out-
lines of Pyrrhonism) by distinguishing between the positive dogmatic approach com-
mitted to the intellectual goal of discovering truths, for which the Aristotelian, Epi-
curean, and Stoic schools are all noted, and the negative dogmatic approach com-
mitted to the intellectual goal of denying the possibility of discovering truth, for
which the thinkers of the Academy – Clitomachus (187–110 BCE), Carneades (214–
129 BCE), and their supporters – are noted. The sceptical Pyrrhonian approach dif-
fers from both dogmatic approaches in that it presents perennial inquiry as its intel-
lectual goal.25 At a later stage of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus admits that Arce-
silaus, the founder of the Academic school to which Carneades and Clitomachus be-
longed, was not a negative dogmatist and that his approach did not essentially
differ from that of the Pyrrhonists.26 The writings of Cicero (106–43 BCE), composed
two hundred or more years before those of Sextus, provide a much more reliable
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picture of this school of thought,27 demonstrating that Carneades, the other key fig-
ure in the Academic stream (after Arcesilaus), also rejected negative dogmatism.28
Another problem that must be addressed before discussing the relationship of
Halevi’s writings to classical Hellenistic sceptical thought is the historical and con-
ceptual gulf between Hellenistic culture and the Arabic culture in which Halevi
lived and worked in the classical Islamic period. The sceptical tradition in ancient
Hellenistic thought was created and developed in response to the consolidation of
the dogmatic streams, such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. The
Hellenistic sceptical tradition is a phenomenon so deeply embedded in the concep-
tual world of these streams, especially the Stoic stream,29 that it can only be under-
stood from within this world and in relation to it. In this context, we may ask if and
to what extent we can speak about manifestations of scepticism of the type that was
expressed in Hellenistic thought outside the historical realm of its cradle. This ques-
tion becomes more acute in light of the historical and conceptual gaps between an-
cient Hellenistic sceptical thought and the legacy of Arabic culture.
The first gap between these two disparate worlds is that of knowledge. The Ara-
bic culture of the classical Islamic period was the only pathway by which Halevi
could familiarise himself with ancient scepticism. Like his Judeo-Arabic cultural
contemporaries, Halevi only read scientific and philosophic literature in Arabic.30
However, unlike the Christian writers of the Middle Ages, who often had Cicero’s
Latin essays on Academic scepticism and sometimes also Sextus’s essays on Pyrrho-
nian scepticism at their disposal, as well as other valuable essays such as Augus-
tine’s polemics on scepticism,31 as far as we currently know, Arabic readers’ access
to the source of ancient scepticism was much more limited. To the best of our
knowledge, no translation of any essay written by a Hellenistic sceptic was ever in-
cluded in the mass of translations of Hellenistic philosophical literature from its
Greek sources or from Syriac to Arabic during the eighth to tenth centuries.32 The
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Academy and Pyrrho, who were generically identified with scepticism in the ancient
world, are rarely mentioned in the Arabic literature of the classical Islamic period.33
The channels by which knowledge of ancient scepticism reached writers in Arabic
culture in the classical Islamic period were thus indirect and selective. As this study
will demonstrate, in Halevi’s case (which seems representative on this point), the
place of direct exposure to the writings of the Hellenistic sceptics was filled by non-
sceptical Hellenistic writers such as Galen (129–c. 200 CE) and Ptolemy (c. 100–c.
170 CE), many of whose scientific treatises were translated into Arabic and dissemi-
nated widely, making a deep impression in Arabic cultural circles. In their writings,
particularly those of Galen, one can find a great deal of disagreement with the Hel-
lenistic sceptics and the global sceptical approach associated with them.34 However,
one may also find selective adoptions of sceptical positions on certain issues (schol-
ars sometimes call this attitude “local” or “mitigated scepticism” as opposed to
“global scepticism”). Although it would require much study – which has yet to be
carried out – to establish this hypothesis,35 it seems that the absence of an all-en-
compassing global scepticism from the writings of Arabic writers36 on the one hand
and the manifestations of selective scepticism among some of them on the other re-
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(apparently) Galen’s works.37
A second gap between ancient Hellenistic sceptical thought and that of the Ara-
bic philosophers, which is also related to the absence of global scepticism in the lat-
ter culture, is that of their religious worldviews. From the pagan perspective of the
Hellenistic culture in which the sceptics operated, the gods were an inseparable
part of the natural order. Therefore, discussing them was considered part of the sci-
ence of physics.38 By contrast, a religion based on revelation posits basic assump-
tions of a single God whose existence is separate, transcending that of the world
and nature, a God who reveals His word to His emissaries and prophets, a God
whose revelations are assembled in canonical writings with the binding validity of
sanctity. These assumptions, as foreign as they were to the conceptual climate of
the ancient Hellenistic world, were fundamental conventions that very few thinkers
defied in the ideological climate of the Arabic culture of the classical Islamic pe-
riod.39
The combination of these gaps – the Arabic writers’ lack of direct familiarity
with the writings and worldview of the sceptical tradition of Hellenistic culture and
the essential difference in the basic assumptions of the two cultures about the na-
ture of divinity and its relationship to the world and humanity – provides an expla-
nation as to why it is impossible to speak of a continuity of scepticism and its ex-
pressions in the transition from the classical world to the Muslim era. The world of
Arabic culture did not produce sceptical schools such as we find in Hellenistic an-
tiquity and, relatedly, did not produce sceptical thinkers like those of ancient
Greece. Nonetheless, this should not get in the way of a scholar searching the his-
tory of ideas for expressions of classical scepticism in the world of Arabic culture.
From the perspective of such a scholar, the phenomena most worthy of considera-
tion would be those that indicate a transformation rather than a mere replication.
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Gaps in knowledge and cultural climate function as catalysts in a transformative
process of adapting concepts and ideas in the transitions from one culture to an-
other. As I shall demonstrate below, Halevi’s thought provides us with highly in-
structive examples of the extent to which the transmission of sceptical concepts and
ways of thinking between eras and cultures can be productive and fascinating pre-
cisely because of the profound transformation they underwent from their classical
beginnings to The Kuzari. In this, too, Halevi is representative. Because of the
knowledge and culture gaps, the most interesting and fruitful part of the study of
sceptical manifestations in the Arabic culture of the classical Islamic period does
not lie in attempting to recreate or indicate signs of continuity in the transition from
antiquity to this period,40 but rather in clarifying the unique and creative ways in
which certain thinkers and schools of thought of Arabic culture used sceptical mo-
tifs that they derived from the Hellenistic sceptical tradition.41
As stated above, the development of scepticism in the context of Arabic culture,
including Halevi’s writings, differs from the way in which it developed in the an-
cient Hellenistic culture, as thinkers in Arabic culture generally relied on scepticism
more narrowly than thinkers of Hellenistic culture did. Hellenistic thinkers across
all schools of scepticism displayed a commitment to the global sceptical approach;
they applied it to all fields of intellectual inquiry. By contrast, for the thinkers in
Arabic culture, the sceptical approach was usually limited to the issues that preoc-
cupied them the most; that is, questions of theology.42 Moreover, Arabic thinkers
who did not systematically apply scepticism did not necessarily see themselves as
being obligated to adopt the sceptical approach. In their writings, sceptical motifs
were incorporated into an intellectual approach that was generally not sceptical.43
For many of these thinkers, including Halevi, the use of sceptical motifs was often
utilitarian and instrumental, and one of several polemical tools in their arguments
with ideological rivals. Their reliance on scepticism was characterised by flexibility
and selection, approaches that were lacking in the rigid and systematic application
of scepticism by its supporters in the Hellenistic world. Among the Arabic thinkers
who used a great deal of selectiveness in applying scepticism in their thought, the
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very integration of sceptical components into the course of their assertions is much
less expected compared to the consistent application of these components in the
thought of the Hellenistic sceptics. Accordingly, the appearance of sceptical motifs
in the writings of these Arabic thinkers is surprising for its daring, an element that
is absent from their routine appearance in the writings of the Hellenistic thinkers.
In the spirit of the emphases presented in this introductory chapter, the second
section of this study will focus on the presentation of fideism that characterises Ha-
levi’s thought in The Kuzari. Fideism is the concept that permitted ideas rooted in
the world of ancient Hellenistic scepticism into Halevi’s religious worldview. In this
section, I will also address the place of scepticism in the overall scheme of Halevi’s
thought. The third section of this study is dedicated to a detailed examination of
three examples demonstrating the incorporation of classical sceptical components
into important tactics of argumentation in The Kuzari. This section represents the
heart of this study. The fourth and last section will discuss the historical back-
ground of the Arabic culture to which Halevi belonged and address the relevant
contexts for the appearances of scepticism in his thought as a part of this culture.
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Chapter 2 Fideism and Scepticism in The Kuzari
Ancient Hellenistic scepticism was a thoroughly rational school of thought which
viewed intellectual questioning as the exclusive pathway for discussing theoretical
matters. Its basic definition – skepsis as constant searching1 – obligated sceptics to
take the path of rational discussion, the only method available to them in debates
with their dogmatic rationalist adversaries. In their discussions, the sceptics’ only
tool was rational philosophical debate. In the transition to cultures where religions
of revelation were a formative component, sceptical manifestations had lost the ho-
mogenous rational nature that they had possessed in the ancient Hellenistic tradi-
tion. Scepticism in such cultures became far more heterogeneous and multifaceted
with regard to rationalism. Unlike their predecessors in Hellenistic times, whose dis-
course was thoroughly rationalistic, thinkers with a tendency to scepticism who
were active in later cultures worked within multiple discourses simultaneously,
both rationalistic and non-rationalistic. In this context, the concept of fideism
played a major role. To generalise, fideism is a theory that maintains that faith is
independent of reason. As such, in the fideist approach, intellectual pursuit is con-
sidered to be an inappropriate foundation for religious belief.2 However, this atti-
tude to rationalism is not uniform. Pure or radical fideism denotes an approach that
utterly rejects the need for intellectual inquiry, giving faith an exclusive status in
terms of attaining and grounding positive knowledge of any kind, whereas moder-
ate fideism distinguishes and separates fields in which intellectual inquiry is valid
and leads to knowledge, and is therefore both legitimate and necessary, from fields
in which intellectual inquiry is invalid and fails to lead to knowledge, and is there-
fore illegitimate and unnecessary. The latter fields are those with significance and
relevance to religious belief.3
In recent decades, fideism has merited a revival in the study of manifestations of
scepticism in European Christian culture in the early modern period. Several schol-
ars, most notably Richard Popkin, have drawn attention to the great versatility of
fideism in understanding how sceptical lines of thought were adapted and incorpo-
rated into the thought of various thinkers from the end of the fifteenth century and
through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.4 The fideist component was in
large part responsible for the transformation of ancient scepticism and its adapta-
tion into a framework of thought for European Christian thinkers in the early mod-
Open Access. © 2020 Ehud Krinis, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664744-003
1 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 3 (I, 1–3), 4 (I, 7).
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ern period. For sceptics in classical antiquity, using the tools of scepticism was
meant to undermine the dogmatists’ pretensions to assent on certain positions. In
terms of the Christian European fideists during the early modern period, they often
engaged in a turn to sceptical thought as part of their confrontations with the ratio-
nalist dogmatic schools that were prevalent in this period. In this sense, the similar-
ity between the eras is only partial. Hellenistic sceptics did not stray beyond the lim-
its of rational arguments. This was not the case with the early modern fideists. From
their perspective, the use of the rationalistic tools of the sceptical approach merely
prepared the way for faith. The purpose of the debate with the rationalists was to
provide a foundation and backing for these thinkers’ appeal to religious belief as a
supra-rational outlook.
Compared to the development noted in research into sceptical manifestations in
European Christian thought in the modern era, where fideism played a central role,
research into sceptical manifestations in Arabic culture (which is at a much more
preliminary stage) has yet to recognise the importance of this concept. Patricia
Crone made a general remark about the potential inherent in studying the develop-
ment of scepticism in Arabic culture in the context of fideism;5 Paul L. Heck, in his
book on scepticism in classical Islam, mentioned the concept only a handful of
times, and on the few occasions that he brought it up, he attempted to absolve the
thinkers under discussion of the suspicion of it.6 In this study, I wish to meet
Crone’s challenge and, using Halevi’s thought as a case study, to demonstrate the
value of an analysis of sceptical manifestations in Arabic culture in the context of
the discussion of fideism.
When it comes to religious belief, fideism’s approach is, inter alia, a reaction to
the dogmatic rationalist approach. While the latter’s approach is to insert intellec-
tual inquiry into the field, the fideist approach works in the opposite direction: ex-
tricating religious beliefs from the tentacles of intellectual inquiry. Fideism seeks to
re-establish the superior, independent status of religious belief, liberated from the
intellectual quest. The classical Islamic period was the first period of time during
which dogmatic rationalism made a lasting impact on Judaism (unlike sporadic
precedents, such as Philo of Alexandria in the first century CE). This development
was one of the most important revolutions in the history of Judaism: its dogmatisa-
tion, which was simultaneously also a theologisation.7 This revolution was a direct
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5 Crone, Islam, the Ancient Near East and Varieties of Godlessness, 126.
6 Heck, Skepticism in Classical Islam, 28, 29, 52, 100. Fideism gained its pejorative connotation
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mand belief that certain propositions are true or false; it does demand belief in [emunah] or trust
outcome of the fact that from the ninth century onwards, Jewish thinkers within the
general Arabic culture encountered with dogmatic rationalist trends. First was the
encounter with Syriac- and Arab-speaking Christian theologians.8 Next came the en-
counter with the scholastic dogmatic rationalist trends developed within the Muʿta-
zilite and (to a lesser extent) Ashʿarite schools of the Muslim kalām (Islamic scholas-
tic theology), as well as with the dogmatic rationalism of falsafah, an Arab philoso-
phy that created an original synthesis between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic
concepts.
In The Kuzari, Halevi presented the first significant and enduring reaction to the
revolutionary step by which Judaism was defined in the spirit of dogmatic rational-
ism. The fact that this response was fideist in nature made Halevi the initiator of the
fideist tendency in Jewish thought.9 Halevi’s fideism is not based on radical anti-ra-
tionalism, which attached no value at all to the human intellect, but rather on mod-
erate fideism, which sought only to place limits on it. The catch in Halevi’s fideist
approach lay in the fact that important aspects of religious belief fall outside the
limits of the human intellect. Halevi’s moderate fideism was based on a series of
hierarchical distinctions whose order is inverse to the values of his era’s dogmatic
rationalism. In each of the distinctions, the rationalist aspect receiving emphasis
and preference in dogmatic systems loses this preference and becomes secondary to
its arationalistic aspect. Because the manifestations of scepticism in The Kuzari are
woven into the fabric of the work’s far-reaching fideist approach, it would be appro-
priate to precede the detailed presentation of these manifestations with a brief gen-
eral discussion about the hierarchical distinctions specific to The Kuzari.
One such hierarchical distinction is between “the rational political command-
ments” (al-šarāʾiʿ al-ʿaqliyyah wa-l-siyāsiyyah), commandments whose utilitarian as-
pects the human mind can comprehend, and “the divine commandments known
through revelation alone” (al-šarāʾiʿ al-ilāhiyyah al-samʿiyyah), those whose pur-
pose the human intellect cannot discern. Unlike the former, the latter are unique to
the religion of Israel and are the means of realising the special relationship between
the people of Israel and God. Halevi reopened the discussion of the distinction be-
tween the revealed-rational (ʿaqliyyah) and the revealed alone (samʿiyyah) com-
mandments, which originated in the kalām literature of the Muʿtazilite school of
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Giuseppe Veltri and Gianfranco Miletto (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 20.
thought.10 The identification of the revealed alone (samʿiyyah) commandments with
the divine (ilāhiyyah) commandments is evidence of a turning point in the spirit of
the fideist approach that Halevi was attempting to establish. The dogmatic rational
theology, whose prominent spokesmen in Judeo-Arabic culture were Saʿadia Gaon
and Maimonides, stressed the importance of rationalisation in the discussion of the
purpose of the commandments. This emphasis was manifested not only in the
greater significance that these thinkers attributed to the rational commandments,
but also in their efforts to provide rational explanations even for the revealed alone
commandments.11 Halevi, by contrast, stressed the importance of the category of the
revealed alone non-rationalistic commandments and placed it above that of the re-
vealed-rational commandments.12
Another hierarchical distinction Halevi took from dogmatic rationalist Arab lit-
erature is that between the adoption of practices and opinions through reliance or
imitation (taqlīd) and the establishment of practices and opinions through rational
intellectual considerations (qiyās, iǧtihād, raʾy). Just as Halevi inverted the usual hi-
erarchy in Judeo-Arabic dogmatic rationalism regarding the relationship between
revealed-rational and revealed alone commandments in the written Torah, he also
inverted the accepted hierarchy in this dogmatism regarding the application of imi-
tation and rational considerations in the oral law and core beliefs. Halevi speaks in
favour of imitation and the preference for the “intuitive natural believer” (al-saḏāǧ
al-maṭbūʿ) in whom the core beliefs are embedded and who is therefore exempt
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taken from the translation by Barry S. Kogan and Lawrence V. Berman scheduled to be published in
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from the rational intellectual effort needed to acquire them.13 These statements were
a clear challenge to the customary approach in the dogmatic rationalism of this era.
This approach, whose leading articulations appeared in the Ashʿarite school of
kalām, viewed tradition as the starting point of the naïve believer from which he
must liberate himself in the course of his spiritual/intellectual process of growth
when he reacquires the core beliefs by means of applying his own rational intellec-
tual considerations.14
Halevi presents a third distinction: one between human wisdom (al-ḥikmah al-
insāniyyah) and divine wisdom (al-ḥikmah al-ilāhiyyah). Human wisdom includes
the fields of knowledge that may be definitively ascertained through intellectual in-
quiry. In the dialogue in The Kuzari, the Jewish rabbi notes that the sciences of
mathematics and logic belong to this field of knowledge as in these sciences, intel-
lectual inquiry leads to universally valid results. As for the reduction of the fields in
which the human intellect is applicable in the distinction between human wisdom
and divine wisdom, this is the distinction par excellence by which Halevi places his
fideism on a collision course with the dominant dogmatic philosophy of his time:
falsafah. Halevi locates the matters under discussion in the two uppermost fields of
falsafah – much of physics (al-ṭabīʿah) and all of metaphysics (mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿah) –
in the realm of divine wisdom in which “the light of prophecy,” not intellectual in-
quiry, is relevant and determinant.15
A fourth hierarchical distinction Halevi makes is between the name elohim –
the name representing the general attributes of the divine regarding the connections
between the divine and the world; that is, properties that may be comprehended
through intellectual inquiry – and the Tetragrammaton, the name of the divine
whose attributes are connected to the special relationship between God and His
chosen, above all the chosen group of the people of Israel. Here, too, Halevi con-
jures up an inversion in the preferences established in Judeo-Arabic rationalist liter-
ature: the unique attributes of God in relation to His chosen are primary and supe-
rior to the general and universal.16 Epistemologically, the fideist catch in this inver-
sion lies in the fact that as far as Halevi is concerned, the verification of the unique
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properties of the divine has nothing to do with intellectual realisation. Rather, it is
connected to a sense experience (ʿiyān, mušāhadah) in the case of the mass of peo-
ple belonging to the chosen group,17 whereas in the case of the elites of the chosen
group, such as the prophets and the saints (awliyāʾ), the recognition is also non-in-
tellectual: a mystical, super-sensory experience. This recognition is described in
terms borrowed from Ṣūfī vocabulary, such as “spiritual insight” (baṣīrah), “vision”
(mušāhadah),18 “the spiritual eye” or “the internal eye” (al-ʿayn al-bāṭinah, al-ʿayn
al-ruḥāniyyah),19 and “mystical taste/experience” (ḏawq).20 The hierarchical distinc-
tion between the divine attributes of the name elohim and those of the Tetragram-
maton is incorporated into Halevi’s most significant fideist move in The Kuzari,
which is found in a large portion of part IV, starting at its beginning. In this part of
the book, Halevi’s line of argument points to the lack of precision and clarity in the
perception of God that relies on “the ways of seeking proof through inference” (ṭu-
ruq al-istidlāl). Any debate relying on the production of rational evidence, even at
its best, such as in philosophical deliberations, is incapable of achieving more than
a sketch of a distant, passive figure of God (the one manifested by the name elohim).
The way to achieve a clearer and deeper concept of God and His relationship with
the world, one that describes His active side in relation to His creatures and His spe-
cial connection to a chosen group of mankind (the one manifested by the Tetra-
grammaton), is only possible though non-rational, non-intellectual means. The
height and conclusion of this central fideist move in The Kuzari is formulated by
means of a distinction between the comprehension of God as “the God of Abraham”
and the comprehension of Him as “the God of Aristotle.” “The God of Abraham” is
attained through mystical means. This comprehension arouses feelings of longing
(šawq) and an experience of annihilation in His love (al-istihlāk fī ḥubbihi) in the
one who experiences it. Faced with this total comprehension, “the God of Aristo-
tle” – that is, comprehension attained through intellectual inquiry – is but a pale
shadow, as it is incapable of motivating the believer to accept a profound commit-
ment in his relationship with God.21
Alongside the hierarchical distinctions described above, Halevi’s fideist ap-
proach in The Kuzari is noted for its prominent ambivalent character. Together with
the many clear expressions of the inadequacy and inappropriateness of intellectual
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inquiry with regard to the essential matters of belief and religion in the work, the
author devotes much space to discussions that involve many rationalistic explana-
tions of these very matters. Below, I provide several examples of this ambivalent
character that accompanies Halevi’s fideist approach in The Kuzari.
In various places throughout the book, starting from its very first part, Halevi
insists that the commandments categorised as “divine” (al-šarāʾiʿ al-ilāhiyyah), the
most prominent of which are the commandments associated with the Temple ritu-
als, cannot be rationally explained. However, despite this clear-cut declaration, in
section 25 of the second part of the work, where the Khazar king is addressing his
rabbi and complaining that the sacrifices are a matter that is “difficult for the intel-
lects to accept” (yašuqqu ʿalā al-ʿuqūl qubūluhu), in section 26, the rabbi responds
by presenting a long explanation in which he attempts to provide explanations for
the Temple ritual commandments that are in the spirit of the rationalist approach.
He concludes his long discussion of the matter with an apology, according to which
the explanation he offered fails to plumb the depths of the matter being discussed,
but adds that it is unnecessary in any case from the perspective of the non-sophisti-
cated firm believer. The utility of such explanations is reserved for those who have
diverted from this level towards intellectual inquiry.22 Similarly, in a later section of
the second part of the work, the Khazar king addresses the rabbi again, asking for a
rational explanation of the Pentateuch’s laws of ṣaraʿat,23 included among the “di-
vine commandments.” In reply, the rabbi begins with a fundamental fideist declara-
tion about the impossibility of providing such explanations. He reminds the Khazar
king that he has already explained to him that “there is no correspondence between
our intellects and the divine order” (lā munāsabah bayna ʿuqūlina wa-l-amr al-ilāhī).
Afterwards, he apologises and begins to provide the Khazar king with rational ex-
planations for these laws.24
The ambivalence in Halevi’s fideism is perhaps most prominently displayed in
the long third section of part IV of the work. At the beginning, the author puts deci-
sive words into the rabbi’s mouth about the errors to which “seeking proof through
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inference” (istidlāl) is prone to lead when it is aimed at metaphysical matters. When
it comes to these, the rabbi extols the superiority of the knowledge acquired “by
prophetic vision and spiritual insight” (bi-l-mušāhadah al-nabawiyyah wa-bi-l-
baṣīrah).25 However, later in the same section, the rabbi opts for an explanation
which builds upon rational inferences (istidlāl) for the phenomenon of prophecy it-
self.26
In section 24 of part IV, the Khazar king addresses the rabbi and asks him to
present something about “the remnants of the natural sciences” (baqāyā al-ʿulūm
al-ṭabīʿiyyah) known to the Jews in ancient times and now mostly lost during the
various exiles.27 In response, the rabbi draws the Khazar king’s attention to the
short work Sefer Yeṣirah (Book of Creation/Formation), attributed to the patriarch
Abraham. Subsequently, in section 25, the rabbi presents the Khazar king with an
explanation of long passages of that work, relying mostly on the philosophical ter-
minology used in Arabic culture. The spirit of the explanation and certain attitudes
embedded in it are congruent with those of the philosophical rationalism common
to that era.28 When it comes to the words he places in the rabbi’s mouth to explain
Sefer Yeṣirah, Halevi’s general tendency is to show that this work, as one of the rem-
nants of the ancient Jewish sciences, proposes a kind of cosmology that is more per-
suasive than falsafah’s cosmology, which relies on the rebutted principle of the em-
anation of separate intellects.29 However, immediately thereafter, in a direct contin-
uation of the Khazar king and the rabbi’s dialogue about Sefer Yeṣirah, Halevi
manages another inversion, this time in the spirit of the fideist approach to the dis-
tinction between the sphere of “human wisdom” and the sphere of “divine wisdom”
included in it. According to what Halevi attributes to the rabbi at this stage of the
discussion (section 27), the cosmology of Sefer Yeṣirah, which he has already pre-
sented as being superior to that of falsafah, belongs to an early and immature stage
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in Abraham’s spiritual development, from which he distanced himself once divine
revelation was granted to him. At the higher stage of his spiritual development,
Abraham was instructed to stop engaging “with any doubtful natural science” (kull
ʿilm ṭabīʿī maškūk).30 Basing himself on a homiletical interpretation of the Talmudic
sages, Halevi backs up this instruction with an anecdote attributed to Plato which
contains a fideist message, according to which the path to the divine goes through
the prophets and their revealed laws rather than through philosophical inquiry.31
In the fifth and last part of The Kuzari, the tension between the dogmatic ratio-
nalist and fideist perspectives and the frequent shuttling from one to the other are
very obvious. At the beginning of this part, the Khazar king immediately confesses
that “since the exalted level of pure belief without investigation is simply beyond
me,” he cannot help asking to provide him with a dogmatic presentation of his reli-
gion. He asks this in the form of “the religion’s principles and core beliefs” (al-uṣūl
wa-l-ʿaqāʾid) in the manner of the masters of kalām.32 The rabbi diagnoses the
Khazar king’s desire for a dogmatic presentation of his religion as being caused by
the mentality spread by different dogmatic currents that has infected everyone in
present-day culture, except for a happy few.33 He assures the Khazar king that he is
ready to satisfy his dogmatic need, but then, instead of beginning a discussion in
the spirit of the masters of kalām, he chooses to engage in a discussion about the
concepts of the masters of falsafah. This discussion reaches its peak in section V, 12,
where the rabbi presents a dogmatic formulation of the philosophical doctrine of
the soul, a presentation that merely paraphrases several sections of Ibn Sīnā’s work
on the topic.34 Subsequently, in section V, 14, the author veers sharply and excori-
ates the doctrine of the soul and another doctrine of falsafah (the theory of the sepa-
rate intellects) in the name of a fideist distinction between “human wisdom” and
“divine wisdom.” Afterwards, in section V, 15, the Khazar king repeats the request
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30 IV, 26–27 (282, ll. 15–28 = Bashir, 498–99).
31 IV, 27 (282, l. 28–284, l. 3 = Bashir, 499): “[In this connection,] Plato has reported concerning the
prophet who lived at the time of King Marinus that he told the philosopher who prided himself on
[his] philosophy [the following] by means of a revelation from God: ‘You will not reach Me in this
way, but by means of whomever I have appointed as an intermediary between Me and My crea-
tures,’ meaning [here], the prophets and the true nomos.” See Pines, “Shīʿite Terms and Concep-
tions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” 236–39, for a parallel of this passage in the pseudo-Platonic Kitāb
al-nawāmīs. See also the discussion in Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 70–71.
32 V, 1.
33 V, 2 (294, ll. 11–15 = Bashir, 511–12): “But who among us has a steadfast soul that is not misled by
the opinions that pass through it, such as those of natural scientists, astrologists, believers in tal-
ismans, magicians, materialists, those who devote themselves to philosophy, and others? One ar-
rives at faith only after having come through many ranks of unbelievers. […] [By contrast, having]
faith by nature happens only to unique individuals.”
34 See Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā, Maqālah fī al-nafs, in Samuel Landauer, “Die Psychologie des Ibn Sina,”
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 29 (1875): 335–418.
he made at the beginning of this part, which has not yet been satisfied, for a presen-
tation of the fundamentals of the religion according to the masters of kalām. In an-
swering, the rabbi makes use of his fideist distinction regarding the superiority of
the intuitive or natural believer (al-saḏāǧ, al-maṭbūʿ) over the believer who acquires
his belief through an intellectual inquiry in the manner of the masters of kalām. He
concludes by averring that the path of kalām is useless, and perhaps even harmful,
from the perspective of those who are not intuitive believers.35 Nonetheless, as the
discussion continues, he accedes to the Khazar king and lays out a dogmatic pre-
sentation of the fundamentals of his religion in the spirit of kalām in section 18.36
Later on, in section 19, the Khazar king asks the rabbi to discuss “the question of
[divine] predestination and [human] free choice” (masʾalat al-qadar wa-l-iḫtiyār),
another of the issues of great concern to the masters of kalām and falsafah. In sec-
tion 20, the rabbi again acquiesces to the request and offers the king an argument
which, in its form and manner of presentation, is close to the argument over the
issue in the Ashʿarite school of kalām, especially the formulations found in several
of al-Ġazālī’s writings.37 The argument concludes with the rabbi’s words being sum-
marised in section 21 in the spirit of the fideist preference for the adoption of prac-
tices and opinions through faithful reliance or imitation (taqlīd) over inferences (is-
tidlāl) when it comes to the fundamentals of belief.38
The ambivalence characterising Halevi’s fideism, some representative examples
of which I have cited above, is a fascinating, albeit perplexing, element of The
Kuzari. This ambivalence is a central enigma in understanding the moves Halevi
makes as someone rebutting the dominant trends of dogmatic rationalism in the
Judeo-Arabic thought of his era. It has enabled some scholars to claim that despite
the declarative tone in which the rejection of dogmatic rationalism is made, Halevi
never succeeded in severing his own thought from it and remained caught in its
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35 V, 16. See the discussion in Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 76–77, 173–75.
36 In the presentation of the principles of theology (uṣūl) in section V, 18, Judah Halevi draws from
a kalām treatise by al-Ghazālī known as the Jerusalem Epistle (al-Risālah al-qudsiyyah). See Martin
Schreiner, Gesammelte Schriften: islamische und jüdisch-islamische Studien, ed. Moshe Perlmann
(Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1983), 105–9.
37 See Binyamin Abrahamov, “Will and Choice in the Kuzari” [Hebrew], in Alei Asor: Proceedings of
the Tenth Conference of the Society for Judeo-Arabic Studies, ed. Daniel J. Lasker and Haggai Ben-
Shammai (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2008): 11–19.
38 V, 21 (354, l. 27–356, l. 4 = Bashir, 564): “Therefore, you must also relinquish the Karaites’ [prac-
tice of] citing as a prooftext David’s charge, peace be upon him, to his son, And now, my son,
Solomon, know the God of your father and serve Him (1 Chron. 28:9), as well as the inference they
draw from it that one needs true knowledge of God [first], and [only] then does worshipping Him
become obligatory. On the contrary, he urged only faithful reliance upon the tradition of his father
and his ancestors with regard to belief in the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of
Jacob.”
web.39 The main source of this ambivalence is, in my opinion, to be found in the
fact that essentially, there is no connection between the experiential mystical “lan-
guage” expressing the experience of God’s revelations to His prophets and chosen –
that is, the language at which Halevi’s fideism mainly aims – and the discursive lan-
guage characterising rational thought. The presence and the proximity of the divine,
experienced by the prophets and saints (awliyāʾ), cannot be expressed or explained
by means of rational discursive language. It is also impossible to clarify such an ex-
perience to someone who has never been granted it. Halevi exemplifies this teach-
ing in a parable which stresses the fundamental difference between an expert in
prosody and a natural poet. Compared to the expert, the poet might be ignorant of
the science of prosody and unable to teach it to others. The poet’s ability to compose
a poem is based on his innate capacity, one that enables him to “taste” the required
meters, lacking theoretical knowledge about them. Thus, the skills of the prosody
expert and that of the poet are completely different from each other: one is theoreti-
cal and rational, the other is non-rational and impalpable. While the first relies on
his theoretical knowledge, spelt out in discursive language, the second relies on his
innate capacity for mystical perception (ḏawq)40 and communicates with others
who share the same capacity in an intuitive manner. Furthermore, for the poet, the
expert’s theoretical knowledge is superfluous. The same holds for the naturally in-
clined (al-maṭbūʿ) believer both individually and collectively, those people who are
naturally inclined to live by the Law (al-qawm al-maṭbūʿūn li-l-tašarruʿ).41
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39 This view is expressed in a straightforward and impressive manner by Herbert Davidson: see
Herbert A. Davidson, “The Active Intellect in the Cuzari and Halevi’s Theory of Causality,” Revue des
études juives 131 (1972): 381. See also Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Kuzari: Between the God of
Abraham and the God of Aristotle,” in Joodse filosofie tussen rede en traditie, ed. Reiner Munk and F.
J. Hoogewould (Kampen: Kok, 1993): 24–34.
40 See Denis Gril, “Dhawq,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer,
Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (consulted online on 06 February 2020. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_26001), art. 5 (Ṣūfism).
41 V, 16 (330, l. 22–332, l. 3 = Bashir, 541–42): “Like those we see in connection with people who
read treatises on prosody and pay close attention to their poetic meter. We hear [lots of] bluster and
frightful speeches about a [kind of] knowledge that comes easily to the person who is naturally
inclined to it (al-maṭbūʿ), who ‘tastes’ (yaḏūqu) the meter of the verses, and for whom crawling
along little by little just won’t do. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the former is to become like the
latter, who seems to be ignorant of prosody because he cannot teach it, while those others can teach
it. But, surely, this naturally inclined person can teach another naturally inclined person (al-maṭbūʿ
yuʿallimu maṭbūʿ āḫar) with the slightest hint. And it is the same with the people who are naturally
inclined to living by the Law (al-qawm al-maṭbūʿūn li-l-tašarruʿ) and drawing close to God, exalted
be He. Sparks are kindled within their souls by the words of outstanding people and [their words]
become lights for them within their hearts. But the person who is not naturally inclined (wa-ġayr al-
maṭbūʿ) is the very one who needs the science of theological disputation, although sometimes it
doesn’t benefit him. On the contrary, it frequently harms him.” See the discussion in Lobel, Between
Mysticism and Philosophy, 175–76.
From this parable and its moral, we learn that there is an epistemological
chasm between the fideist basing his belief on experiences of presence and the
proximity of the divine and the dogmatic rationalist founding his belief on verifiable
intellectual principles. This fundamental difference (al-farq) between the “God of
Abraham” and the “God of Aristotle,” which Halevi highlights in distinguishing be-
tween the divine name of the Tetragrammaton and the divine name elohim, cannot
be bridged.42 However, this consistent conclusion, derived from the fideist world-
view Halevi formulates in Ṣūfī experiential-mystical terms, which he scatters in
parts of The Kuzari, is a decree with which he himself cannot comply. The ambiva-
lence in The Kuzari is a direct outcome of what Halevi viewed as the unavoidable
necessity of maintaining a channel of discourse with his dogmatic rationalist col-
leagues. This necessity led him to give The Kuzari the most discursive literary format
possible: that of a dialogue. In turn, the discursive dialogue format is what exposes
this ambivalence and makes it so very explicit. As The Kuzari and its format make
clear, Halevi was unwilling to abandon the possibility of a dialogue with the dog-
matic rationalists, to whom most of his close associates and the Andalusian Jewish
intellectuals – his immediate audience of readers – belonged. He therefore opted to
enter the rationalist arena of debate and to argue with his colleagues and rivals in
their own discursive language.43 Moreover, the use of claims that are typical of scep-
tical philosophy is part of this way of confronting them. At the same time, Halevi
had another tool by which he could give proper expression to his innermost percep-
tions. His poetical genius allowed him to express his experience of proximity to God
and His presence in a language suited to that experience; namely, a lofty language
moulded in poetic forms.44
30  Chapter 2 Fideism and Scepticism in The Kuzari
42 IV, 16 (260, ll. 5–7 = Bashir, 473): “The difference (al-farq) between Elohim and YHVH has be-
come clear to me, and I have also understood the difference between the God of Abraham and the
God of Aristotle. One longs for YHVH, exalted be He, by tasting and witnessing for oneself (šawqan
ḏawqan wa-mušāhadatan), while one inclines towards Elohim by reasoning (qiyāsan).”
43 As part of this discourse, Halevi sometimes adopts the dialectic ad hominem (Arb. ilzām) method
of argumentation; i.e., refuting the opponent’s position by adopting his underlying assumptions for
the sake of the debate. This, for example, is the method by which Halevi argues against the falsafah
theory of separate intellects in IV, 25 (280, l. 22–282, l. 11 = Bashir, 497–98). As noted above, ad
hominem argumentation is typical of ancient scepticism. For further discussion of Halevi’s use of
this device, see chapter 4 below.
44 See, in particular, the translations and commentary in Judah Halevi, Ninety-Two Poems and
Hymns of Yehuda Halevi, orig. ed. Franz Rosenzweig, trans. Thomas Kovach, Eva Jospe, and Gilya
Gerda-Schmidt, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000): 12–13 (4. “At Night”), 18–19
(7. “All My Bones”), 24–25 (10. “The Lovers”), 38–39 (15. “Your God”), 52–57 (18. “The Remote and
Near One”), 70–73 (23. “Holy”), and 76–79 (24. “The Helper”). See also Isaac Heinemann, “The
Philosopher-Poet: Commentary on a Selection of Judah Halevi’s Poems” [Hebrew], in Rabbi Judah
Halevi – A Collection of Studies and Appraisals, ed. Israel Zemora (Tel-Aviv: Maḥbarot le-Safrut,
1950), 176–91; Aaron Komem, “Between Poetry and Prophecy: Studies in Judah Halevi’s Poems”
[Hebrew], Molad, n.s., 11–12 (1969): 676–97; Raymond P. Scheindlin, The Song of the Distant
Religious poetry was the most appropriate medium for Halevi to express him-
self: in this genre, he was liberated from the shackles of discursive discourse, free of
the need to speak in a way that would be intelligible to his learned dogmatic ratio-
nalist colleagues or to communicate with them using their concepts. Halevi was,
first and foremost, a poet.45 He composed his poetry in Hebrew, the only language
he acknowledged as the divine tongue.46 Halevi’s Hebrew religious poetry was the
tool he used to give free rein to his thought without compromising the full depth of
his faith. An integrative examination of his work, one that encompasses both the
discursive thought in The Kuzari and his poetry, engenders an understanding that
Halevi’s religious mentality is inclined to the non-intellectual, mystical, numinous
feeling of awe of the divine and proximity to it.47 Such an integrative perspective,
which lies beyond the scope of this study,48 would make it clear that Halevi was not
held captive by concepts of rational thought, as scholars who have only considered
his theoretical discursive thought have claimed.49 A comparison between the discur-
sive thought in The Kuzari and the non-discursive thought of Halevi’s religious po-
etry would provide us with a different perspective, one that would show that Halevi
aimed to elevate himself to heights of mystical proximity to God. From these
heights, he tried, as it were, to let down a ladder to his colleagues left “down there”
in the realm in which they are still tied to rational discourse.50 The lower and middle
rungs of that ladder are the ones manifested in The Kuzari. The lower rungs are the
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Dove: Judah Halevi’s Pilgrimage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 70–93; Menachem Lorber-
baum, Dazzled by Beauty: Theology as Poetics in Hispanic Jewish Culture [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Ben-
Zvi Institute, 2011), 176–200.
45 Writing poetry was a life-long occupation for Halevi, while theoretical writing occupied him only
towards the end of his life, at the time when he compiled The Kuzari.
46 II, 66–68. See Ilan Zim, “The ‘Divine Order’ in The Kuzari – Its Conceptual Meaning and Under-
standing” [Hebrew] (MA diss., Tel-Aviv University, 1989), 181–82.
47 For the theoretical background, see Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-
Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1923).
48 An integrative discussion of Halevi’s work will be presented in a forthcoming study of mine
devoted to Baḥya ibn Paqudah and Judah Halevi as radical thinkers (however, the treatment of
this subject there is different from the one hinted at here).
49 See, in this context, Lorberbaum, Dazzled by Beauty, 188–89.
50 For the symbol of the ladder (Heb. sullam) as a symbol of spiritual/mystical ascension to God in
Judah Halevi’s poetry, see Rosenzweig, Ninety-Two Poems and Hymns of Yehuda Halevi, 38 (“And
arise at midnight / to step into the footsteps of the great ones / Who, with a plethora of psalms on
their lips / with thoughtful steadfast feeling / Spent their day fasting / and their night praying / God
is a shaft in their heart / and they the planets who encircle His throne –/ May their way ascend
powerfully / to Him, Your God [darkam sullam laʿalot ʿad Adonai Elohekha]”). On the motif of the
“ladder of ascension” in the philosophically inclined literature of Halevi’s era, see Alexander Alt-
mann, “‘The Ladder of Ascension,’” in Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1969), 41–72.
stages of conversation in the dialogue where the rabbi responds to the king’s re-
quests and explains his positions to him in the spirit of the rationalist worldview.
The fideist side of The Kuzari, the one in which Halevi shifts the debate’s centre of
gravity from rationalist explanations to critical assertions levelled at the limits and
the second-tier status of intellectual inquiry when it comes to non-intellectual cog-
nition, constitutes the middle rungs of the ladder. The upper rungs – the domain of
the proximity to the divine – are to be found outside the scope of inquiry of The
Kuzari51 and belong to the non-discursive mystical experience that Halevi expressed
in his religious poetry. The ladder is a metaphor for the gradual effort Halevi makes
to help his colleagues – the members of his own circle – to escape their dogmatic
entrenchment in the field of intellectual inquiry and redirect them towards the mys-
tical non-intellectual proximity to the divine and the people who exemplify this
proximity.52
From such a comprehensive, integrative point of view, the ideological moves
into which Halevi weaves sceptical motifs, which I will discuss in the next part of
this book, are connected to a transition from the lower to the middle rungs of the
ladder of cognition. Halevi finds sceptical thought, as a rational alternative to dog-
matic thought, to be suited to a critical engagement with his colleagues’ dogmatic
rationalism. As a fideist, Halevi moves from the realm of rationalist debate to the
realm of arational belief, with the centre mass of his worldview being located in the
realm of belief. In this context, the use of sceptical arguments fulfils an intermediate
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51 See, in this context, Zim, “The ‘Divine Order’ in The Kuzari,” 270, 286–90.
52 Consider the following description in I, 103 (54, l. 28–56, l. 7 = Bashir, 219–20): “The children of
Jacob came on the scene as the choicest and best part [of their father]. They differ from the [other]
children of Adam by virtue of a special divine distinctiveness, which made them as though they
were a different species and a different, even angelic, substance. All of them sought the level of
prophecy, and most of them did attain it. Those who did not attain it nevertheless came close to it by
means of actions that are pleasing, and sanctification, purification, and meeting the prophets. Know
that a spiritual transformation comes over someone who meets a prophet at the time that he meets
him and hears his divine words. He separates himself from his kind through the purity of his soul,
its longing for those [prophetic] levels, and its adherence to humility and ritual purity.” The second
part of this description emphasises that those who do not attain the level of the prophets and who
do not receive divine revelation can still be lifted up and experience a spiritual transformation by
associating with the prophets and prophet-like people. The Ṣūfī background of this part is evident.
Compare, for example, the following description by al-Ġazālī: “This is a state which one following
the way leading to it will verify by fruitional experience. But one to whom such experience is not
granted can acquire certain knowledge of that state through experience of others and hearsay, if he
frequents the company of them [i.e., the prophets and the saints – E.K.] so as to have a sure under-
standing of that from observing the circumstances accompanying their ecstatic states. Whoever
associates with them will derive this faith from them, for they are the men whose associate is never
wretched.” Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī’s
al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazali, ed. and trans. Richard J. McCarthy
(Boston: Twayne, 1980), 82, sec. 98.
function: the author needs them because he is debating in the rationalist realm,
and, at the same time, their use is meant to strengthen and more firmly establish
the arationalist, believing side of his worldview.
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Chapter 3 Sceptical Motifs in The Kuzari
In this central section of the study, I will explore and explain Judah Halevi’s use of
motifs of the non-assent type of scepticism (i.e., the scepticism of the classical Hel-
lenistic tradition) in his book. I will do so by engaging in a close reading and discus-
sion of three sections of The Kuzari (I, 11–25; I, 67; V, 14) which, in my opinion, con-
tain important examples of this kind of scepticism.
A The Kuzari I, 11–25
The dialogue in I, 11–25, which I will discuss below, is the introductory conversation
between the Khazar king and the rabbi. The discussion between these two figures
forms the bulk of The Kuzari, starting in I, 11 and going all the way to the end of the
book. It is preceded by brief dialogues between the Khazar king and a philosopher
(I, 1–4), the Khazar king and a Christian scholar (I, 4–5), and the Khazar king and a
Muslim scholar (I, 5–10). As befits the beginning of an important dialogue, one that
will last for the rest of the text, the introduction in I, 11–25 constitutes a vital move.
In it, Halevi presents an initial and concentrated (though systematic) expression of
his fideist approach. This is one of the most interesting and important moves not
only in The Kuzari itself, but in medieval Jewish thought in general. Therefore, the
assumption presented below – namely, that Halevi relies heavily on sceptical
thought in formulating his opening move – may shine a new light on an important
aspect of Halevi’s thought.
Below, I will discuss the exchange between the Khazar king and the rabbi in I,
11–25, following the progression of the dialogue. Nonetheless, the discussion below
is also selective, with the attention focused on those details that are relevant to the
discussion of sceptical motifs. The starting point of the segment of dialogue in I, 11–
25 is the Khazar king’s earlier request that his new interlocutor provide a dogmatic
presentation of his religion. This question appears in the transition between the dia-
logues with the Muslim scholar and the Jewish rabbi: “He then summoned one of
the Rabbis of the Jews and asked him about his belief (wa-saʾalahu ʿan iʿtiqādihi).”
The Arabic term iʿtiqād (“belief”), based on the root ʿ.q.d. like equivalent terms such
as ʿaqīdah and muʿtaqad, concerns the dogmatic presentation of the religion’s core
principles.1 The introductory question that Halevi places into the Khazar king’s
mouth implicitly relies on the assumption that the common method of identifying
and understanding one religion in distinction to other religions is by means of a
dogmatic definition, which was prevalent in Arabic culture from a relatively early
stage of the development of Islam.2 In the rationalist streams of this culture, espe-
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1 See Frank, “Knowledge and Taqlīd,” 42 n. 15.
cially those of kalām, a dogmatic definition of a religion was one based on intellec-
tual inquiry.3
The rabbi responds to the Khazar king’s request for a dogmatic definition of his
religion with the following words:
I have faith (anā muʾmin) in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, who brought the children
of Israel out of Egypt with signs and miracles, provided for them in the wilderness, and gave
them the territory of the Levant (arḍ al-šām) after they had miraculously crossed the sea and
the Jordan. He sent Moses with His Law, and then thousands of prophets after him to support
His Law by means of promises [of reward] to whoever observed it and threats [of punishment]
to whoever disobeyed it. Our faith pertains to all that was included in the Torah, but the report
is long (wa-l-ḫabar ṭawīl). [I, 11]
Because the rabbi begins with the formulation “I have faith” (anā muʾmin), it may
be understood that what he is going to say next will include what he considers to be
the credo of his religion. The presentation of Jewish belief here is based on an accep-
tance of the narrative of the biblical history of the people of Israel, a narrative that
begins with the patriarchs and continues through the exodus from Egypt, the giving
of the Torah through the mission of Moses, and the mission of the prophets who
were faithful to it (whose estimated number here is far higher than the usual esti-
mate in the Jewish tradition)4 who succeeded him. The fact that the rabbi’s defini-
tion of Judaism in I, 11 makes reference to events cited in the Bible shows that
Halevi felt that it is the biblical narrative, rather than any dogmatic principles, that
provides us with the definition of Judaism. And the definition provided by the Bible
focuses on the relationship between God and His chosen: the patriarchs, the people
of Israel, and the prophets.
From an epistemological point of view, the end of the rabbi’s opening state-
ment – “but the report is long” (wa-l-ḫabr ṭawīl) – is the key expression. He draws
our attention to the fact that the epistemology of the concept of knowing, which un-
derpins the rabbi’s presentation of Judaism in I, 11 and the entire dialogue with the
Khazar king in I, 11–25, is the traditionalist Muslim epistemology; that is, the doc-
trine regarding reports (ḫabar, pl. aḫbār).5 The formative development of early Islam
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2 See Jon Hoover, “Creed,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis
Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (consulted online on 06 February 2020. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_25587). The Christian scholar in I, 4 and the Muslim scholar in I, 5
have already provided the Khazar king with dogmatic descriptions of their religions.
3 Frank, “Knowledge and Taqlīd,” 44–45.
4 See Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 14a: “Forty-eight prophets and seven prophetesses prophesied
to Israel.”
5 See Arent Jan Wensinck, “Khabar,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. 4, ed. Emeri
van Donzel, Bernard Lewis, and Charles Pellat (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 895. See also Aron Zysow,
The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta, GA:
Lockwood Press, 2013), 7–8; Shady Hekmat Nasser, The Transmission of the Variant Readings of
was extensively reliant on reports attributed to Muḥammad, the prophet of Islam.
These reports were passed orally through a chain of transmitters, the first of which
consisted of the witness who was physically present at the event being reported.
Such reports were the cornerstone that shaped the oral tradition of Islam: “the good
example of the prophet” (sunnat al-nabī).6 The traditionalist concept of knowledge,
at whose core lies the notion of the report (ḫabar), differs from the rationalist one.
The traditionalist concept emphasises the absolute commitment to reporting exactly
what can be apprehended by the senses in the case of the witness who is the first
link in the chain of the transmission of the report and absolute fidelity to the precise
verbal contents of the orally transmitted report in the case of the subsequent trans-
mitters. This fidelity to the contents of the report requires its transmitters to avoid
inserting their own opinions and judgments into the process of transmission, in-
cluding their own rational considerations.7 Significantly, the concept of traditional-
ist knowledge lacks the component of verification/assent (taṣdīq) in its rationalist
sense, in which the one who attains knowledge is required to verify it by means of
the procedures and considerations of intellectual inquiry.8 In the context of the tra-
ditionalist concept of the transmission of reports, the evidence of the senses, trans-
mitted orally at the highest level of transmission known as “concurrent transmis-
sion” (tawātur), ensures a certain and immediate knowledge, making assistance
from intellectual inquiry redundant.9 Confirmation that the dialogue in I, 11–25
refers to the traditionalist epistemology is provided by the manner in which Halevi
interweaves two terms that are typical of this approach into the rabbi’s words: ʿiyān,
which relates to the direct perception of the eyewitness of the report in which he is
the first link in the chain of transmission, and tawātur, which relates to the manner
of the report’s transmission at various other stages. In the traditionalist Muslim ap-
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the Qurʾān: The Problem of Tawātur and the Emergence of Shawādhdh (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 65. On
the traditionalist stream in Islam, see Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and
Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), chapters 1–3.
6 Gautier H.A. Juynboll, “Sunna,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. 9, ed. Clifford
Edmund Bosworth, Emeri van Donzel, Wolfhart P. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte (Leiden: Brill,
1997): 878–81.
7 Nasser, The Transmission of the Variant Readings of the Qurʾān, 68–69. Binyamin Abrahamov
classifies the Muslim traditionalists who denied any involvement of rational considerations in the
acquirement of religious knowledge as belonging to “pure traditionalism.” See Abrahamov, Islamic
Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism, x.
8 On taṣdīq in the rationalistic frameworks of kalām and falsafah, see Damien Janos, “Al-Fārābī,
Philosophy,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, John Nawan and
Everett Rowson (consulted online on February 6, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_-
COM_26962). Frank, “Knowledge and Taqlīd,” 38–42. See also Jonathan A.C. Brown, Hadith: Muham-
mad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World (Richmond: Oneworld, 2009), 177.
9 Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 14–15; Nasser, The Transmission of the Variant Readings of the
Qurʾān, 69–70.
proach, tawātur, as a process of transmission which relies on a large number of wit-
nesses and many chains of transmission, absolutely ensures the reliability of the re-
port.10 While “concurrent transmission” (tawātur) serves as a key term for the reli-
gious epistemological system as a whole in both the traditionalist Muslim approach
and Halevi’s approach, in the Muslim philosophical tradition, the role of this term is
secondary, as it is restricted to the verification of specific empirical pieces of geo-
graphical and historical information and not to general universal truths.11
At the theological level, this epistemological approach is, for Muslim tradition-
alists, an alternative to the rationalist approach of kalām. While kalām scholars
base the attributes of God on a rationalistic process centred on “inferences about
the concealed from the manifest” (al-istidlāl bi-l-šāhid ʿalā al-ġāʾib), traditionalist
scholars base the attributes of God on reports going back to the prophet of Islam
whose reliability is ensured by the oral process of “concurrent transmission” (tawā-
tur).12 Given all of this, the common assumption among many of the Muslim mu-
takallimūn scholars, sages of the kalām schools, that the knowledge acquired
through human intellectual inquiry and the knowledge acquired through revelation
and the transmission of tradition were congruent13 allowed them to assimilate the
epistemology posited by the traditionalist scholars into their own method as a chan-
nel of cognition that matched the intellectual one. According to these kalām schol-
ars, the two channels together cement “necessary knowledge” (ʿilm ḍarūrī); that is,
knowledge that is certain and binding from a rational perspective. This syntactic at-
titude was most conspicuously implemented by the mutakallimūn in the field of
“principles of jurisprudence” (uṣūl al-fiqh), as well as in the polemical genre of the
“signs of prophecy” (aʿlām/dalāʾil al-nubuwwah).14
This historical background regarding the essential gap between the traditional-
ist and rationalist epistemologies in Islam helps us to understand the Khazar king’s
disappointed reaction to how the rabbi presents the principles of Jewish belief:
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The Khazar said: I had originally decided not to ask a Jew because I knew about the destruc-
tion of their traditions and the inferiority of their opinions, since their misfortune has not left
them anything worth praising. Why, then, didn’t you say, O Jew, that you have faith in the Cre-
ator of the world, who orders it and governs it (wa-nāẓimihi wa-mudabbirihi), and in Him who
created you and provided for you, and [use] similar such descriptions, which constitute proof
for everyone who has a religion (al-awṣāf alatī hiya ḥuǧǧat kull ḏī dīn)? Because of descriptions
(awṣāf) like these, people pursue truth and justice in order to imitate the Creator with reference
to His wisdom and justice (li-l-tašabbuh bi-l-ḫāliq fī ḥikmatihi wa-ʿadlihi). [I, 12]
The Khazar king’s disappointment with the rabbi’s presentation of the Jewish faith
in I, 11 stems from the fact that it is based not on any of God’s universal descriptions
or attributes15 that touch on His relationship with the universe as the one who cre-
ated, orders, and governs the world, but rather on His particular attributes in a rela-
tionship with humanity’s chosen. The Khazar king’s assertion that the descriptions
of God as the one who created, orders, and governs the world “constitute proof for
everyone who has a religion” (al-awṣāf alatī hiya ḥuǧǧat kull ḏī dīn) is indeed borne
out by the earlier parts of The Kuzari. Both the Christian scholar and the Muslim
sage introduce their religions to the Khazar king with descriptions that are, to a
great extent, aligned with his claim about God’s universal attributes.16 This is partic-
ularly evident in the Christian’s credo:
[The Christian scholar] said to him: I have faith in the complete innovation of created things
and in the eternity of the Creator, exalted be He. He created the world in its entirety in six days.
[…] God has providential concern for creation, and contact with the rational beings (al-nāṭiqīn).
[I, 4]
The Khazar king’s assertion regarding “proof for everyone who has a religion” is not
only backed by the Christian and Muslim interlocutors in The Kuzari itself. The two
most systematic and influential rabbinic theological works in Judeo-Arabic culture
prior to Halevi’s era – The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (Kitāb [al-Muḫtār fī] al-
amānāt wa-l-iʿtiqādāt) by Saʿadia Gaon and The Book of Direction to the Duties of the
Heart (Kitāb al-hidāyah ilā farāʾiḍ al-qulūb) by Baḥya ibn Paqudah – also devote
much space to depicting the principles of Judaism as being founded on the univer-
sal link between God and the world with God as the one who created, orders, and
governs it.17 Therefore, the Khazar king’s disappointment reflects a similar disap-
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pointment that the typical readers of the book – the literates of the Judeo-Arabic
culture – would surely also have experienced.18 Such learned people would have
expected Halevi to present a description of Judaism whose introductory universal
principles were close to those of Saʿadia Gaon, Baḥya ibn Paqudah, and other dog-
matic rationalist Jewish thinkers of that time. This expectation demonstrates that in
the context of Arabic culture, the dogmatic discussions that writers put forth to ex-
plain their religions were close to and in the spirit of parallel discussion within the
other religions of the same culture. Despite their differing religious loyalties, writers
in this culture had much in common when it came to the manner in which they pro-
vided universal explanations for their different religions in the spirit of the dogmatic
rationalist approach.19
The exchange between the rabbi and the Khazar king in I, 11–12 is a preface to
the appearance of sceptical motifs in the discussion. From the Khazar king’s reac-
tion in I, 12, it is clear that the rabbi’s presentation of Judaism in I, 11 falls outside
the realm of understanding of those who, like the king, support the dogmatic ratio-
nalist attitude to religion. The rabbi’s subsequent manoeuvres bring him into the
orbit of rationalist discussion, which is critical in order to make a connection with
the Khazar king’s rationalist worldview. However, the rabbi shapes this manoeuvre
not in accordance with the perspective of the common dogmatic approach, but
rather from a perspective that is close to the sceptical version of rationalism:
The Rabbi said: What you are referring to is the syllogistic, governmental religion to which
speculation leads (al-dīn al-qiyāsī al-siyāsī yuʾaddī ilayhi al-naẓr), but it contains many {doubt-
ful points}.20 Ask the philosophers about it, and you will not find them agreeing on a single
action or a single belief because they are [merely] claims. Some of them, they can demonstrate
(yubarhinūʾ ʿalayhā). Some of them, they can support persuasively (mā yuqniʿūna fīhā); but
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some of them they cannot even support persuasively (mā laysa yuqniʿūna fīhā), let alone estab-
lish by demonstration (al-burhān). [I, 13]
The last words of the Khazar king in I, 12 – “people pursue truth and justice in order
to imitate the Creator with reference to His wisdom and justice” – provide the rabbi
with an opportunity to forge a link between the religion that relies (as the Khazar
king says) on those issues that “constitute proof for everyone who has a religion”
and the “syllogistic, governmental religion.” This religion is yoked to the structural
and planning interests of a socio-political body. A central source through which
Halevi could have become familiar with this interpretation of religion is the writings
of al-Fārābī and his and other writers’ interpretations of Plato’s doctrine of political
philosophy. In the politico-philosophical thought of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (Alfarabius,
d. 950), known as “the Second Teacher” (al-muʿallim al-ṯānī) after Aristotle in the
Arabic philosophical tradition and the father figure of the falsafah school, the imita-
tion ideal is a political and religious one. According to al-Fārābī, the philosopher is
simultaneously a legislator, a king, and the supreme religious leader (imām). As
such, he is commanded to institute a political society whose orders, which he sets,
are an imitation of God’s: the one who orders and governs the world. In al-Fārābī’s
view, expressed in his The Opinions of the Citizens of the Virtuous City (Ārā’ ahl al-
madīnah al-fāḍilah) and elsewhere, in the ideal regime where the philosopher-imām
legislates and governs, the orders of the political society and the orders of religion
are inextricably intertwined. Al-Fārābī sees the imām, the one whose perfect at-
tributes make him capable of leading the perfect politico-religious order, as being
eligible to govern the entire inhabited part of the world.21
This Arabic political philosophy, with its religious flavour as presented by al-
Fārābī, had a considerable influence. Within Judeo-Arabic thought, the work of Mai-
monides was especially affected by this doctrine.22 Moses ibn Ezra (d. c. 1138), the
noted poet and literatus who was the patron of the young Halevi, was familiar with
al-Fārābī’s above-mentioned work and cited it in his own work The Book of Conver-
sation and Discussion (Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah wa-l-muḏākarah).23 In that text, he
quoted passages from an essay attributed to Aristotle about a political vision of a
world-state in which the universal uniform law affords inhabitants such peace and
security that they are able to spend a great deal of time dealing with the ultimate
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purpose of wisdom.24 Ibn Ezra’s innovative addition, as someone who favoured a
political religion of this sort, is the identification of this philosophical vision of the
ideal future political and religious order with the eschatological messianic visions
of the biblical prophets.25
Halevi, who is opposed to the “the syllogistic, governmental religion,” has the
rabbi utter the classical sceptical claim regarding disagreements. In antiquity, Hel-
lenistic sceptics applied this claim against the dogmatic philosophers to virtually
every debate, regardless of the issue. Cicero, as the representative of Academic scep-
ticism, makes great use of it in his polemic against his Stoic dogmatic rivals as a
leitmotif in his speech in the Lucullus dialogue,26 while Pyrrhonian sceptics placed
this assertion into a systematic framework as the “mode” related to “dispute” or
“disagreement” (diaphōnia), the first of the five “modes” attributed to the sceptic
Agrippa.27
In the context of Arabic culture, a discourse incorporating components stem-
ming from scepticism generally tended to focus on the phenomenon of the disagree-
ment among religions and their followers and the sceptical ramifications arising
from this disagreement.28 In comparison, in the transition from I, 12 to I, 13, Halevi
approaches the spirit of classical Hellenistic sceptical discourse when he shifts the
weight of the argument related to dispute or disagreement from the religions to the
philosophers.29 This shift in the debate’s focus stems in part from the fact that
Halevi has already mentioned the lack of agreement among religions earlier in the
composition, in a section of the dialogue between the Khazar king and the philoso-
pher:
The Khazar said to him: […] Otherwise, [consider the fact] that the Christian and the Muslim,
who have divided up the whole world between themselves, wage war against one another, al-
though each of them has already directed his intention sincerely towards [pleasing] God. Each
has taken up the monastic life. Each has practiced asceticism. {Each} has fasted and prayed.
Yet each has gone off determined to kill his counterpart, believing that the greatest good and
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[the best way to achieve] closeness to God lies in killing the other. And so, they are both killed,
while each of them believes that his journey leads to the Garden [of Eden] and Paradise. But it
is rationally impossible for both of them to be right (wa-taṣdīquhumā muḥāl ʿind al-ʿaql). [I, 2]
The philosopher said: There is no killing of [either] one of these people according to the reli-
gion of the philosophers (dīn al-falāsifah), since they follow the intellect. [I, 3]
At the end of the Khazar king’s words in I, 2, Halevi inserts the assertion that wars
between the followers of the religions of revelation – Christianity and Islam, in this
case – in the name of their respective religions are absurd when considered from a
rationalist perspective. In response, the philosopher legitimises the Khazar king’s
argument, using the opportunity to point to the superiority of the “religion of the
philosophers” over the others mentioned, as it avoids the absurdity of those other
religions. The “religion of the philosophers” is here described as a religion whose
unifying intellectual foundation is capable of preventing violence and bloodshed
caused by loyalty to the religions of revelation such as Christianity and Islam.30
Now, if we return to the rabbi’s words in I, 13, we can interpret the shift of attention
to the lack of agreement among philosophers as a response to the philosopher’s
words in I, 3. The conclusion is that not only are the adherents of the revelatory reli-
gions unable to agree with one another, but also the philosophers, for whom the
human intellect is the only beacon that is worth following, are incapable of agree-
ment either on the general tenets of belief or on the specific commandments of their
religion. In the view of philosophy under discussion, the “syllogistic, governmental
religion,” like all other “intellectual nomoi” (al-nawāmīs al-ʿaqliyyah), is tied in a
Gordian knot to a political association: the primary factor in the use of organised
violence.31 The ramifications of the disagreement among philosophers when it
comes to both the generalities and the specifics of their religion on the possibility of
violent clashes among societies based on a rational political religious order are clear
(even though they are not spelt out here). In the absence of any such agreement
among philosophers, they are incapable of establishing a uniform or compatible po-
litical order that can resolve the intractable problem of violent clashes between dif-
ferent politico-religious societies, the problem noted by the Khazar king in I, 2. The
insertion of the classical sceptical assertion about disagreement among philoso-
phers allows Halevi to point to the false pretention embedded in the philosopher’s
words in I, 3. Indirectly, however, the use of the assertion here serves to point out
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the delusional dimension inherent in the vision of world peace that Moses ibn Ezra
cites in Aristotle’s name as a vision relying on a uniform consensual politico-intel-
lectual order. The inability of intellectual inquiry to establish such an order is re-
flected in the inability of philosophers – charged with a dogmatic rationalist ap-
proach – to reach an agreement on the components of the “syllogistic, governmen-
tal religion.”
Moreover, the second part of the statement that Halevi has the rabbi say in I, 13
is evidence of the limitations of the sceptical discourse in his thought. Here, the
rabbi is revealed as someone who does not favour scepticism in all things. Unlike
the Hellenistic sceptics, he does not question the capacity of philosophical logic to
prove demonstratively certain claims. Yet in the statement voiced by the rabbi in I,
13, Halevi, focusing on the issue of “the syllogistic, governmental religion,” claims
that the philosophers’ disagreement on the matter is a consequence of their inability
to base this religion solely on proofs of the demonstrative order, hence their need to
also establish it on proofs of the dialectical order as well as on the lessermost proofs
of the sophistic and rhetorical orders. The rabbi’s argumentation here is strictly ra-
tional and philosophical,32 yet behind it lurks a fideistic orientation. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, in Halevi’s fideistic approach, the philosophers’ fail-
ure is inherent because of the limitations of the human intellect. Their inability to
achieve an agreement regarding the rules of religion that is based on demonstrative
proof is a direct outcome of the fact that this matter lies outside the scope of “hu-
man wisdom” (al-ḥikmah al-insāniyyah), belonging instead to the realm of “divine
wisdom” (al-ḥikmah al-ilāhiyyah). Consequently, their inability to agree on the ac-
tions of a religion is a direct outcome of the fact that many of these actions belong
to the sphere of “the divine commandments known through revelation alone” (al-
šarāʾiʿ al-ilāhiyyah al-samʿiyyah), which also lie outside the scope of intellectual
considerations.
The positive tone of the Khazar king’s subsequent response (I, 14) to the rabbi’s
comments in I, 13 is conspicuous given the intensely negative tone that marked his
previous response (in I, 12) to the rabbi’s opening statement in I, 11:
The Khazar said: I think your speech now, O Jew, is more likely [to persuade me] than the
opening part of it was before, and I would like additional proof. [I, 14]
The basis for this more appreciative response lies in the fact that in I, 13, the rabbi
moved the debate onto a rationalist track. The Khazar king identifies the generally
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rationalist tone of the rabbi’s words and connects with it. The rationalism that the
rabbi presents in 1, 13, although it is a rationalism that involves a sceptical argu-
ment, sounds just familiar enough for the Khazar king to overcome his previous
reservations and awaken his interest in the rabbi’s course of argumentation.
The rabbi’s next words mark another turning point. Throughout the dialogue in
I, 11–25, the rabbi’s general orientation is not to gratify the Khazar king by demon-
strating a proclivity for rationalist discourse, but rather to challenge him by con-
fronting him with a definition of Judaism that is contrary to the way in which ratio-
nalist writers would tend to define it. Accordingly, the rabbi now acts to steer the
debate away from the rationalist direction:
The Rabbi said: On the contrary, the opening part of my speech is the demonstration (al-
burhān). What is more, it is [based on] eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān) and doesn’t need proof
and demonstration (dalīl wa-burhān). [I, 15]
In this brief passage, Halevi juxtaposes and contrasts the two epistemological tracks
through which he conducts the debate in I, 11–25, the main track being that of the
traditionalist Muslim epistemology based on the testimony recorded by the senses
and thereafter transmitted through a chain of transmission. The term ʿiyān (“eyewit-
ness perception”) is the key term of this epistemology which touches on this side of
the initial stage of sensory input. In addition, the rabbi makes two references to the
term burhān. These references are based on the dual significance of burhān in Ara-
bic literature in general and in Judeo-Arabic literature in particular: in the rational-
ist, philosophical track, the term burhān denotes the level of “demonstrative proof,”
the highest and most certain order of rational proofs.33 In the other track, that of the
translated literature and the Judeo-Arabic interpretations of the biblical text, such
as in the writings of Saʿadia Gaon, burhān is the Arabic term parallel to the biblical
divine “sign” (Heb. mofet) in the sense of a miraculous event perceived by the
senses. In Saʿadia Gaon’s thought, the two meanings of burhān join together as part
of a dogmatic rationalist approach that Harry Wolfson called the “double faith the-
ory”:34 the concrete miraculous “sign” is intended to strengthen belief in the princi-
ples of the religion given to a prophet through divine revelation, though these prin-
ciples are also validated through intellectual inquiry. However, in Halevi’s thought,
as someone taking a fideist approach, the relationship between the two meanings of
burhān takes a completely different form: burhān, as a sign of a concrete miracle
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perceived by those who were present, who experienced it as a direct sensory occur-
rence, removes those witnesses’ complementary need for burhān as a certain logical
proof: the highest achievement of intellectual inquiry. In a manner that is typical of
his fideist approach, in the context of the credo of the Jewish faith – that is, the
miraculous revelatory events of the people of Israel – Halevi grades cognition based
on direct sensory eyewitness perception (ʿiyān) far above cognition based on intel-
lectual inquiry. Furthermore, the rabbi’s words in 1, 15 are a refinement of what he
said in the second half of 1, 13. The earlier passage created the impression that the
philosophers’ problem in formulating their religion is based on the fact that philoso-
phers are incapable of validating the entirety of their religion by means of the high-
est order of proof, that of demonstrative proof (burhān). The rabbi’s words in I, 15
now come to clarify that when it comes to the credo of the Jewish faith – a credo
relying on direct sense perception – intellectual proofs, even of the demonstrative
order, are unnecessary.35
The following brief exchange between the Khazar king and the rabbi functions
as a transition which moves the discussion to the next stage:
The Khazar said: How is that possible? [I, 16]
The Rabbi said: Permit me to make some preliminary comments, because I see that you are
showing disdain for my statements and making light of them. [I, 17]
The Khazar said: Make your preliminary comments so that I may hear [them]. [I, 18]
The rabbi’s feeling, which he expresses in I, 17, that the Khazar king is scorning
what he said in I, 15 is the result of his assessment based on his experience with the
Khazar king’s response to I, 11; namely, that the Khazar king cannot tolerate the
rabbi’s statements when they deviate from rationalist discourse. This comment pre-
cedes and hints at the fact that the rabbi is putting the discussion back onto the
rationalist track, a move which he explains this time by means of a parable:
The sage said: If you were told that the ruler of India is a virtuous ruler, whom you should
revere, whose name you should praise, and whose signs (āṯārihi) you should recount because
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assertion, we learn that eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān) must be completed by concurrent tradition
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tionalists, avoids the procedures of conceptualisation (taṣawwur) and verification/assent (taṣdīq).
See Black, “Epistemology in Philosophy,” sec. 2.
of what had come to your attention about the justice (ʿadl) of the people of his country, [signi-
fying] both the excellence (faḍl) of their character traits and the justice (ʿadl) of their conduct
towards one another, would this oblige you [to obey him] (hal kāna haḏā yulzimuka)? [I, 19]
The words spoken by the rabbi in I, 15 were meant to create the impression that in-
tellectual proof of the demonstrative order (burhān) is unnecessary for the concrete,
observable, non-intellectual definition of Judaism, whereas in the next exchange
with the Khazar king (I, 19–20), Halevi returns the discussion to the rationalist track
to show that providing demonstrative proofs is beyond the ability of those who
claim to base their belief on intellectual inquiry. To do so, he focuses the discussion
in these lines on the proof that was most common and best known in dogmatic ra-
tionalist discourse in the reservoir of proofs for the existence of God. Historically,
this claim did in fact constitute the “proof for everyone who has a religion” that the
Khazar king had in mind in I, 12, and it was used by a very wide spectrum of ratio-
nalists in this and other periods.36 The popularity of the argument under discussion
and the widespread distribution it achieved forced Halevi to be especially careful in
presenting his own critical appraisal of it. We therefore find him discussing it by
means of a parable whose meaning is not spelt out. However, the reference is not to
anything esoteric; any intellectual of that time would immediately have grasped
what the parable was trying to communicate.37
The intellectual proof manoeuver at the basis of the parable of the king of India
in I, 19 is the one known in philosophical literature as the “argument from design”
or the teleological argument. In the list of attributes the Khazar king ascribes to God
in I, 12, the teleological argument relates to God being the one who designs and gov-
erns the world (wa-nāẓimihi wa-mudabbirihi). This argument is based on the claim
that the contemplation of the world and its intricacy impresses the observer with
the signs of design, coordination, and sophistication inherent in reality and the rela-
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where people who belong to the same milieu avoid criticising each other in a confrontational man-
ner. For another example of Halevi’s discreet attitude, see the discussion of his use of the figure of
Socrates in V, 14 below.
tionships and compositions of all its existents.38 This insight leads to the conclusion
that there is an external higher entity that dictates, directs, and preserves the order
of reality. In the monotheistic versions of this proof, this external higher entity is
identified with the one God of the monotheistic religions. The argument and its
many forms constituted an important link connecting ancient Hellenistic philoso-
phy with the thought of the church fathers and Muslim, Christian, and Jewish
thought in Arabic culture.39
Addressing the parable in I, 19, relating to its meaning level that is left non-ex-
plicit by the author, the ruler of India hints at God, the land of India hints at the
world in general, the people of India are the existents in the world, the justice (ʿadl)
and excellence (faḍl) of the people of India hint at the well-planned order of the
world’s existents that arranges their actions, and the ruler’s signs (āṯārihi) by which
the justice and excellence of his subjects are known stand for the explicit signs of
the divine intelligent design in the world available for contemplation by humans.
Based on such a contemplation or observation, all human beings can use their
minds to acknowledge God as the initiator and preserver of the design of the world’s
existents.40
The question the rabbi poses to the Khazar king at the end of the parable –
“would this oblige you?” (hal kāna haḏā yulzimuka) – is short for “would this oblige
you to obey him?”; namely, the ruler of India in the parable and God in the referent.
This is inferred from a comparison with the full parallel formulation of the conclud-
ing question in I, 21: “Would you be obligated to obey him?” (hal kunta taltazimu
ṭāʿatahu). The fact that the discussion between the rabbi and the Khazar king in I,
19–21 concentrates on a parable whose non-explicit referent is the teleological argu-
ment for the existence of God does not only stem from this proof being the most
commonplace in the rationalist discourse of the time, as The Kuzari contains other
rationalist arguments for the existence of God: in I, 1, the philosopher mentions the
cosmological argument, which concerns God as the first cause in the causal order of
existence.41 The rabbi hints at Ibn Sīnā’s ontological argument in IV, 25,42 and in V,
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18, he spells out the argument from the creation of the world.43 However, none of
these proofs stresses God’s involvement in the existence of the world found in the
argument referenced in the parable in I, 19. Therefore, the teleological argument,
more so than the others mentioned, is what seemingly provides a stable intellectual
foundation for the obligation to accept God’s dominion and worship Him.
The Khazar king’s reply to the question the rabbi posed at the end of I, 19 brings
the reader into the very heart of the sceptical manoeuvre in the discussion in the
dialogue of I, 11–25:
The Khazar said: How would it compel me, when there is doubt (wa-l-šakk) as to whether the
justice of India’s people (ʿadluhum) derives from themselves and they have no king, or
[whether in having one,] their justice (ʿadluhum) is due to their king, or [whether] the fact de-
rives from both causes taken together? [I, 20]
The key word in the parable of the ruler of India is the word “justice” (ʿadl). It ap-
pears twice in both the rabbi’s initial presentation in I, 19 and in the Khazar king’s
response in I, 20. The word, which relates to the justice prevailing in all Indian af-
fairs, is seen at the level of the (implicit) moral as referring to the design and order
that characterises the world and its existents from which one may infer the exis-
tence of the divine designer. The assertion that Halevi has the Khazar king voice in
I, 20 revolves around this term. The cause of this “justice” – that is, the design char-
acterising the existents of this world – could perhaps be the world’s existents them-
selves (the people of India in the parable), or God (the king in the parable), or the
existents and God together. Thus, according to the Khazar king’s assertion, the ar-
gument from design – that is, the claim that the order among the world’s existents
is the result of God’s organising and steering hand – is in fact only one of three pos-
sible ways to make logical inferences as to the existence of such a design. The three
possibilities are presented in the Khazar king’s words here as three possible alterna-
tives whereby none of the three seems to supersede or outweigh the others. The
doubt (wa-l-šakk) that the Khazar king casts on the rabbi’s explanation of the
world’s design here results from his arrival at two other equally compelling explana-
tions of the same phenomenon. This non-assent set-up fits the basic set-up of claims
in Hellenistic sceptical thought called the “equipollence of counter-arguments”
(isostheneia). During the Hellenistic period, the teleological proof was especially
prevalent among the Stoic thinkers. In response to the Stoics’ assertion that observ-
ing the world requires the observer to recognise God or divine thought as the pri-
mary mover of the design of nature, the sceptics quoted other Hellenistic thinkers
who claimed that the design perceived in the world is the result of the harmonious
relationships among the world’s existents. From the sceptics’ viewpoint, this form
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of arguing makes it clear that the claims are equivalent in weight.44 Compared to
this classical sceptical discussion, in Halevi’s writing, the weight of the teleological
argument and its presentation in the parable goes from the intellectual aspect of
proving the existence of God to the normative aspect of the obligation to obey God
and accept His dominion. Against this background, we can understand the addition
of the third combined possibility. From a viewpoint focused on proving the exis-
tence of God, which preoccupied the sceptics in their debates with the Stoics, the
first two possibilities that the Khazar king mentioned in I, 20 distil the issue into a
binary choice: the argument from design either can or cannot prove the existence of
God as the one who designed it. By contrast, in Halevi’s viewpoint here, the third
combined possibility the Khazar king offers also has its place, because the combina-
tion weakens the aspect of God’s sovereignty over the world and its existents,
thereby raising questions about the obligation to obey Him. This shift of emphasis
in the sceptical set-up of the argument from order is what enables Halevi to present
three equally weighted options for this subject in comparison to Cicero’s two.
From another comparative historical direction, one should note that in Hellenis-
tic culture, global sceptical thought had its niche as a recognised philosophical tra-
dition and was an integral part of that culture. The sceptical questioning of the tele-
ological argument reported in Cicero’s writings is unavoidable and is consequent to
its position as a niche of global scepticism. Compared to this, in Arabic culture – a
world that lacked a tradition of global scepticism, on the one hand, and in which
the teleological argument represented a rare consensus, on the other – the implied
sceptical critique Halevi levels against this proof is highly unusual and daring.45
The sceptical manoeuvre in I, 20 includes the central classical sceptical claim of
the “equipollence of counter-arguments” (isostheneia).46 In this passage, the pur-
pose of this sceptical assertion is to expose the pretensions to certainty in the teleo-
logical argument for the existence of God and the obligation to obey Him. The asser-
tion in the Khazar king’s statement that the indecision among the various claims,
which are neither complementary nor matching when it comes to the argument
from design, precludes the attribution of certainty to the proof of God’s existence
and the obligation to obey Him. In a historical context, it seems that Halevi’s polem-
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ical sting in this sceptical manoeuvre was particularly aimed against his elder con-
temporary, Baḥya ibn Paqudah.47
A comparison between the use of the “disagreement” (diaphōnia) sceptical ar-
gument in I, 13 and the use of another one, the “equipollence of counter-arguments”
(isostheneia) in I, 20, reveals that while the former is voiced by the rabbi, the latter
is voiced by the Khazar king. This is of great significance. In I, 20, the use of the
sceptical argument is a sort of self-liberating development. The Khazar king, in
speaking as he does, extricates himself from the grasp of dogmatic thought that
characterised his approach when he first embarked on the dialogue with his Jewish
interlocutor in I, 12. The placement of the sceptical position in terms of its validity
and the binding nature of “the argument from design” in the Khazar king’s speech
is a successful demonstration of the emancipatory quality inherent in the sceptics’
manner of argumentation. This quality is embedded in the argument’s capacity to
open the mind’s field of vision in several directions. This opening is characteristic
of sceptical thought, a development that frees its thinker from the hold of a reduc-
tionist tendency towards only one direction that is characteristic of the dogmatic ap-
proach.48 The Khazar king’s words in I, 20 are a fine example of the emancipatory
strength of classical scepticism. He abandons the dogmatic rationalism which re-
duces him to thinking that in every matter, there is one single assertion that may
exclusively be considered to be certain. He exchanges this reductionist rational
thought for sceptical rationalist thought, which recognises disparate or even contra-
dictory arguments as striving for the truth without taking the reductionist step of
trying to decide between them. This point also embodies the essential difference be-
tween Halevi’s fideist thought and the rationalist approach characterising the clas-
sical sceptic. For the latter, remaining with disparate claims and examining them is
his permanent intellectual state of being, the state of the sceptical “suspension of
judgment” (epochē). By contrast, in the dialogue in I, 11–25, the Khazar king’s tran-
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sition from dogmatic rationalism to sceptical rationalism is viewed as a desirable
intermediate step en route to the readers’ liberation from the need to define their
Jewish beliefs in rationalist terms altogether. This fact, which characterises Halevi’s
approach at this point, is elucidated in the following lines of dialogue:
The Rabbi said: But then, if his messenger came to you with [typically] Indian gifts, about
which you have no doubt (lā tašukku) that they are found only in India, in the palaces of kings,
along with a message in which it is attested that it is from him [i.e., the king] and accompanied
by medicines that cure you of your illnesses and preserve your health, as well as poisons for
your enemies and those who wage war against you, with which you may confront them and
kill them without preparation or [adequate] number [of soldiers], would you be obligated to
obey him (hal kunta taltazimu ṭāʿatahu)? [I, 21]
The rabbi does not respond to the sceptical exposition of the argument from design
expressed by the Khazar king in I, 20. Instead, in I, 21, he presents another parable.
The lack of response may indicate the rabbi’s silent agreement with the Khazar king
and that the rabbi considers the Khazar king’s exposition to be appropriate. At the
same time, in the transition to the parable in I, 21, Halevi parts ways with classical
scepticism. He overlooks the stage of “suspension of judgment” in favour of contin-
uing to develop the manoeuver whose starting point is the credo that the rabbi for-
mulated in his introduction in I, 11. The rabbi’s words in I, 21 are a reframing of the
credo in I, 11 in the form of a parable. The unstated referent of the parable in I, 21 is
closely tied to the assumptions underlying that credo: that the impressions of God
on which it is necessary to base and accept His dominion are not the impressions of
nature’s design or other designs pointing to a God leading the world as a whole, but
rather the impressions of God’s involvement as manifested in the unique history of
the people of Israel. The hypothetical experiences that could occur to the Khazar
king according to the parable’s literary descriptions in I, 21 are the real events expe-
rienced by the people of Israel during the biblical era according to the historical de-
scriptions in I, 11 and elsewhere in The Kuzari.49
Furthermore, the capacity of the parable in I, 21 to move and persuade relies on
the expressive, concrete descriptions that characterise it. The parable is a good ex-
ample of the fact that to Halevi’s mind, the power of a parable lies in its concrete
rather than its allegorical nature. His omission of the allegorical aspect of the para-
ble’s lessons in both I, 19 and I, 21 is therefore an advantage. This omission stresses
that the parable’s persuasive advantage lies in the concrete aspect of this genre and
dovetails with the definition of Judaism that the rabbi presented in I, 11 as a defini-
tion based on the concrete rather than the abstract. The parable in I, 21 echoes the
definition of Judaism provided in I, 11: what instils awe of God and acceptance of
52  A The Kuzari I, 11–25
49 See, for example, I, 109.
His word is direct experiences of His presence in history and the added value of the
benefits conferred on those who participated in those experiences.50
In these brief concrete parables, Halevi positioned two alternate options for
defining Judaism and its binding validity: the dogmatic rationalist option of intellec-
tual observation and inquiry and the historic option based on direct experience of
the unique events that occurred to the people of Israel. The Khazar king’s response
in I, 22 reflects progress away from the sceptical stance of non-assent in which he
placed himself in I, 20, moving towards the stance of the believing man, a position
requiring an assent, according to Halevi’s non-sceptical approach:
The Khazar said: Yes, of course. My previous doubt (al-šakk al-qadīm) as to whether India has
a king or not would have vanished, and I would believe (wa-kuntu aʿtaqidu) that his dominion
and his imperative (mulkahu wa-amraru) extend to me. [I, 22]
The Khazar king’s response here clearly demonstrates that the discussion, at the
level of the parable of the argument from design, is encompassing two matters. The
first is proving the existence of God, presented in the parable by the question of
whether India has a king or not. The second is the submission of oneself to God’s
authority, which is presented in the parable with the statement “his dominion and
his imperative (mulkahu wa-amraru) extend to me.” As I explained earlier, in the
context of Judeo-Arabic literature, the link between these two matters was ex-
pressed most forcefully in the opening rational-oriented parts of Baḥya ibn Paqu-
dah’s work.51
The Khazar king’s words in I, 22 represent the closing of a circle and his confir-
mation of the claim that the rabbi presented to him in I, 15. His sceptical response to
the argument from design that the rabbi presented in I, 19 led him to the exposition
of the “equipollence of counter-arguments” in I, 20, an exposition that contains
doubt regarding the definition and binding nature of a religion that relies on an ar-
gument of this sort. By contrast, the Khazar king’s response to the argument based
on the direct historical sense evidence that the rabbi presents to him in the parable
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in I, 21 removes the doubt and leads him to accept both God’s existence and the
yoke of His revealed religion.
The transition to the next exchange between the Khazar king and the rabbi in I,
23–24 focuses the discussion on the attributes of God. The rabbi steers the discus-
sion to this topic by means of the question he poses to the Khazar king in I, 23. In
his introduction to the dialogue with the rabbi, the Khazar king uses the more gen-
eral phrase “descriptions” (al-awṣāf) when referring to “descriptions, which consti-
tute proof for everyone who has a religion” (I, 12). However, in the present and
more advanced stage of the discussion between them, he uses the accepted techni-
cal term in the literature of Arabic culture – that of “attributes” (ṣifāt):52
The Rabbi said: If you were asked about him, how would you describe him? [I, 23]
The Khazar said: By means of those attributes (bi-l-ṣifāt) that, in my opinion, were well-estab-
lished on the basis of direct eyewitness perception (ʿiyānan). Then I would follow them up with
those that were doubtful (maškūka)53 for me and have become evident by means of these last
ones. [I, 24]
The attributes (al-ṣifāt) of God that the Khazar king refers to in I, 24 as being vali-
dated by “direct eyewitness perception” (ʿiyānan) – that is, by the direct evidence of
the senses – are the attributes of God’s sovereignty in His unique relationship with
the people of Israel, its patriarchs, and its prophets. These attributes were noted by
the rabbi in his credo in I, 11 – “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel” – and all
that was added to this description there, whereas the doubtful attributes
(maškūkah) are the descriptions of God’s sovereignty over the world and its exis-
tents, the same descriptions of the religion based on the dogmatic rationalist ap-
proach mentioned by the king in his first response to the rabbi’s credo in I, 12 (“you
have faith in the Creator of the world, who orders it and governs it, and in Him who
created you and provided for you, and [use] similar such descriptions”). In I, 24, the
Khazar king reaches a stage where he can acknowledge the primacy and superiority
of the unique attributes of God, which, epistemologically speaking, rely on direct
eyewitness perception (ʿiyānan), compared to God’s general-universal attributes,
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to his doubt (“when there is doubt” [wa-l-šakk] and “my previous doubt” [al-šakk al-qadīm] respec-
tively) in relation to the attributes of the people of India and their king on the allegorical level of the
fable. In I, 24, he refers to the same subject (i.e., God’s attributes in His relation to the world).
which have no verification by means of direct sense impressions. Furthermore, he
now considers the first kind of attributes to be the basis for the validity of the sec-
ond kind. This argument is only hinted at in I, 24; it receives detailed elucidation
later in the book, especially in the rabbi’s words in II, 54. There, the validation is
learned from an observation of history: the first historical era, which preceded the
emergence of the people of Israel, was characterised by the flawed and failed intel-
lectual attempts on the part of all groups and schools of thought (including the
philosophers) to reach a true acknowledgement of God’s attributes and His gover-
nance of the world.54 The change occurred with the emergence of the people of Is-
rael onto history’s stage. The unique history of the people of Israel, whose striking
events involved miracles and manifest changes to the natural order of things, was
the reason why the “entire inhabited world” began to correctly acknowledge God’s
general-universal attributes and how the way in which He governs the world be-
came known to all.55 Thus, Halevi’s claim, presented in full in II, 54, is that the dif-
ferent religions and groups attained the correct understanding of God’s attributes
and His governance of the world not by taking any intellectual measures, but by
surrendering themselves to the lessons of the unique history of the people of Israel.
The most interesting and important point in the context of our discussion re-
lates to the fact that the Khazar king’s conclusion in I, 24 regarding the verification
of God’s general-universal attributes based on His particular attributes was made
possible because of a move he made earlier, in I, 20, which expresses his shift from
dogmatic to sceptical rationalism. The dogmatic rationalist approach, which re-
quires deciding among contradictory arguments on any given issue, entails two im-
plications. The first is the validation of one of the arguments. The second is the refu-
tation of all the other arguments, thus bringing the discussion of the issue to its
conclusion. In contradistinction, in classical sceptical rationalism, there is an open-
ended lack of conclusion. Accordingly, just as it does not validate an argument on a
particular issue or adopt it as certain, nor does it reject the competing arguments or
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take them off the table. The sceptical rationalist approach is reflected in the Khazar
king’s assessment in I, 24 that the general-universal attributes “were doubtful for
me.” The doubt that the Khazar king is talking about here is the outcome of him
positioning the issue of God’s attributes in the sceptical arrangement of the
“equipollence of counter-arguments” in I, 20. The adoption of the sceptical stance
which neither validates nor disproves the claim regarding God’s attributes on the
rational level of argument is portrayed as a temporary and intermediate station in
the Khazar king’s reorientation. Taking off from the dogmatic stance in I, 12, where
the ability of the rational inquiry to establish God’s universal attributes was taken
for granted, in I, 24, he finally hits in on the conclusion that those attributes can
only be firmly based on God’s particular attributes (i.e., His attributes as “the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Israel,” etc.). So, according to the message conveyed by the
full-scale dynamic of the opening part of the dialogue between the rabbi and the
Khazar king, the reorientation of a dogmatic rationalist and his transformation into
a believer includes a midway stop at the sceptical station. Thus, while Halevi ac-
knowledged scepticism as a rationalistic remedy for the disease of the dogmatic ra-
tionalist (or as a measure needed to awake him from his “dogmatic slumber”), he
acknowledged it not from the point of view of the sceptic, but from that of the be-
liever.56
Turning to I, 25, the rabbi presents a broader epistemological criterion for the
Jewish credo: direct eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān), already acknowledged by the
Khazar king in I, 24, is here supplemented by “concurrent tradition” (al-tawātur):
The Rabbi said: Well, I answered you in the same way when you [first] questioned me; and
Moses began addressing Pharaoh in the same way, too, when he told him, “The God of the
Hebrews has sent me to you,”57 meaning, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, since their
story was well-known among the nations as well as [the fact] that a divine order accompanied
them, took interest in them, and performed wonders for them. He did not tell him, “The Lord
of heaven and earth” or “My Creator and your Creator sent me.” And God also began His ad-
dress to the multitude of the children of Israel in the same way: “I am [the] God, whom you
worship, who brought you out of the land of Egypt.”58 He did not say, “I am the Creator of the
world and your Creator.” Accordingly, I opened the conversation with you in this way, O com-
mander of the Khazars, when you asked me about my faith (imānī). I answered you in terms of
what is compelling for me and for the community of the children of Israel for whom that
[which I have described] is well-established on the basis of eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān)
and, subsequently, through concurrent tradition (al-tawātur), which is as valid as eyewitness
perception (ka-l-ʿiyān). [I, 25]
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This passage makes two references to the opening declaration of the rabbi’s credo
in I, 11 (“Well, I answered you in the same way when you [first] questioned me,”
“Accordingly, I opened the conversation with you in this way”). Yet the new formu-
lation Halevi gives that credo here takes into account the development of the discus-
sion from its starting point to its current position. It is therefore appropriate to view
this section as a conclusion of the opening part of the dialogue between the rabbi
and the Khazar king.
Below, I make no attempt to exhaust the discussion of this conclusion and its
richness of meaning and aspects. Instead, I shall concentrate on one aspect that is
central to the issue under discussion here: Halevi’s clash with the dogmatic ratio-
nalism of his Andalusian Jewish compatriots and the epistemological aspect that
constitutes the core of this clash.
Abraham ibn Ezra (d. 1164), a close colleague of Halevi, provided highly valu-
able evidence for this issue in a section of his exegesis of the first of the ten com-
mandments (Exodus 20:2). The section begins with a question that Ibn Ezra quotes
in Halevi’s name: “Rabbi Judah Halevi, of blessed memory, once asked me: Why did
[the Scripture] mention ‘I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of
Egypt’ rather than ‘who made the heavens and the earth and you’?” In the rabbi’s
words in I, 25, Halevi himself gives a completely different answer from Ibn Ezra’s
reply to the exegetical question Halevi posed to him. Ibn Ezra reduces the theologi-
cal importance of the direct sense experience perceived by the people of Israel to
signs of God’s governance of the people during the exodus from Egypt, evidence ex-
pressed in the Scripture as “who brought thee out of the land of Egypt.” According
to Ibn Ezra, this articulation is secondary in importance to the beginning of the
verse, “I am the Lord thy God.” He explains this opening phrase in the spirit of the
dogmatic rationalist approach as a reference to God’s general-universal attributes
that man can learn about or infer from an observation of His governance of the
world and its order and design (“from the ways of God can the learned man know
Him”). According to Ibn Ezra’s exegesis, the intellectual cognition of these general
attributes is beyond the grasp of the masses; it is available only to the learned
among them. Because of this fact, it was necessary to add “who brought thee out of
the land of Egypt,” an addition adapted to the limited sensory perception of the
masses.59
Compared to Ibn Ezra’s interpretation, Halevi – via the words he has the rabbi
speak in I, 25 (a conclusion of the dialogue in I, 11–25 as a whole) – turns the tables
on understanding the importance and advantage of the second half of Exodus 20:2.
According to him, the significance of the ending of the verse is that during the for-
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mative event in which God revealed Himself to the people of Israel at Mount Sinai,
He was made known to the people through His particular attributes as the one who
redeemed them from captivity and exile in Egypt. The formulation of the verse is
thus meant to stress the primacy of these attributes (here, Halevi includes “the God
of the Hebrews” and “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob”) over the general-uni-
versal attributes (here, he includes “the Lord of heaven and earth,” “my Creator and
your Creator,” and “I am the Creator of the world and your Creator”) as part of the
credo that is binding on “the community of the children of Israel.”
Epistemologically, in Halevi’s approach, the first commandment is formulated
this way to show that cognition of God in Jewish belief is based on the eyewitness
perception (ʿiyān) of those who left Egypt and stood at Mount Sinai. The alternate
formulation of the commandment – “I am the Creator of the world and your Cre-
ator” – is disqualified because it is based not on this unique historical sense experi-
ence, but rather on general intellectual observation and inference. From the episte-
mological perspective, the concluding sentence of I, 25 is very important: “[This]is
well-established on the basis of eyewitness perception (al-ʿiyān) and, subsequently,
through concurrent tradition (al-tawātur), which is as valid as eyewitness percep-
tion (ka-l-ʿiyān).” The rabbi repeats this idea using different language elsewhere in
the book.60 In the concluding claim, Halevi points to the close connection between
iyān and tawātur, which shows that Halevi is relying on the epistemological termi-
nology of traditionalist Islam throughout the opening dialogue between the rabbi
and the Khazar king in I, 11–25. In that traditionalism, ʿiyān as direct eyewitness
perception never stands on its own. It is connected to and understood through
tawātur, a procedure ensuring the trustworthiness of the transmission of the wit-
nessing to those who did not directly experience it with their own senses.61
While the rabbi has repeatedly referred to the term ʿiyān in parts of the dialogue
(I, 15; I, 24), this is the first time that the term tawātur is used. This term is so unique
to the special doctrine of cognition in the Muslim tradition that it cannot be ade-
quately translated from Arabic into other languages. The main sense of tawātur is
the reporting of a large number of witnesses (ḫabar mutāwatir) about an event at
which they were present and which they experienced first-hand through their
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senses (bi-l-ʿiyān, bi-l-mušāhadah). Subsequently, many of those witnesses, each on
his own, report the event to others who did not witness it. Further still, the same
report is transmitted from one generation to the next by a large number of reporters
in many separate chains of transmission, each of which is independent of the oth-
ers.62 The epistemological assumption underpinning the certainty of tawātur is that
the many witnesses to the original event and the many separate chains of transmis-
sion by which the report of it is transmitted from one individual to another and
from one generation to another preclude the possibility of distortion or falsification
of that knowledge conveyed in that report.63 As I have noted, while the matter of the
doctrine of rationalist awareness concerns the extraction of new knowledge from
the knowledge of the senses, the doctrine of traditionalist Muslim awareness is op-
posed to any addition to what the witnesses to the event experienced with their
senses. As a consequence, tawātur does not integrate any intellectual consideration
requiring the use of the rules of logical inference. When the (evidentiary) choices of
knowledge are validated by tawātur, the knowledge immediately and sponta-
neously becomes fixed in the recipient’s consciousness, making it independent of
the conditions of the rules of logic.64 The rabbi’s claim at the end of his statement in
I, 25, according to which the epistemological status of knowledge received through
“concurrent tradition” (tawātur) is equal to the epistemological status of the “eye-
witness perception” (ʿiyān) of the witness to the reported event (al-tawātur alaḏī
huwa ka-l-ʿiyān), is a claim that is congruent with the traditionalist Muslim ap-
proach, according to which the acceptance of knowledge with tawātur status about
tradition from the prophet of Islam is equal to that of direct sense experience. Epis-
temologically, there is no difference. Through tawātur, the recipient of the tradition
is in direct contact with the prophet, parallel to the direct connection of the wit-
nesses who were near him and who transmitted their testimony of his words and
deeds.65 This concluding assertion Halevi has the rabbi voice at the end of I, 25,
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which is repeated at the end of V, 14, is a clear indication that an epistemology that
is unique to the worldview of traditionalist Islam forms the foundation of the dia-
logue in I, 11–25.66
From a fideist point of view, the use of scepticism – in its classical version, that
of non-assent – in the overall manoeuvre of I, 11–25 allows Halevi to maintain God’s
general-universal attributes. He thereby avoids falling into an extreme version of
fideism, one that tends to invalidate any assumption upheld by the dogmatic ratio-
nalists. On the one hand, his sceptical non-assent enables Halevi to deny the cer-
tainty of God’s general-universal attributes insofar as they rely on dogmatic ratio-
nalistic arguments such as the “argument from design” (I, 20). On the other hand,
the same sceptical non-assent enables Halevi to restore those same attributes: be-
cause sceptical non-assent does not invalidate any argument (insofar as it does not
validate it either), it does not prevent Halevi, the moderate fideist, from re-establish-
ing those general-universal attributes on a given arational epistemological basis as
secondary and subordinate to the particular attributes (I, 21–25).
To conclude the discussion in this sub-chapter, I would like to emphasise Hale-
vi’s originality in his conflation of traditionalist Islamic epistemology with fideist
scepticism in I, 11–25. In their summae theologicae, the two most important rabbinic
mutakallimūn, Dāwūd al-Muqammaṣ (fl. first half of the ninth century) and Saʿadia
Gaon, stressed the issue of the reliability of tradition by incorporating some of the
assumptions and terms that were prevalent in the traditional Islamic epistemologi-
cal framework. Yet for both writers, tradition is defined as knowledge based upon
revelation as recorded and transmitted in Scripture. The aim of al-Muqammaṣ’s and
Saʿadia’s adaptations of this epistemological framework is to secure the reliability
of God’s revelation to the Hebrew prophets (first and foremost to Moses) against the
Muslim anti-Jewish (and anti-Christian) accusations of the falsification (taḥrīf) of
God’s revelation in the Jewish tradition of the Scripture (i.e., the Hebrew Bible). In
this framework, which is closely related to the genre of the “signs of prophecy”
(aʿlām/dalʾāil al-nubuwwah) typical of the Arabic culture of this period, the comple-
mentary condition for “eyewitness perception” (ʿiyān) is not “concurrent tradition”
(tawātur), but rather immunity from conspiracy to falsification (tawāṭūʾ) in the pro-
cess of documenting the revelation in the Scripture.67 Thus, the centrality of orality
in the transmission of revelatory events and contents forms a cornerstone of the Is-
lamic traditionalist worldview and is accepted and adapted by Halevi in I, 11–25.
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However, it is of negligible importance in the adaptations of the traditional ap-
proach in al-Muqammaṣ’s and Saʿadia’s summae.68 Another notable Jewish mu-
takallim, Samuel Ben Ḥofni Gaon (d. 1013), did present an elaborate discussion of
the concept of “concurrent tradition” (tawātur). He did so as part of his effort to de-
velop a rabbinic science of “the principles of jurisprudence” (uṣūl al-fiqh). In
Samuel Ben Ḥofni Gaon’s case, this development went hand in hand with his anti-
Karaite polemic.69 Yet these cases are in accordance with the rationalistic Muʿtazilite
kalām’s usage of the traditionalist framework: in al-Muqammaṣ’s and Saʿadia’s
cases, the direction is that of the genre of the “signs of prophecy”; in Samuel Ben
Ḥofni Gaon’s case, it is that of the science of “the principles of jurisprudence” (uṣūl
al-fiqh). Halevi’s case is altogether different. The insertion of components of fideist
scepticism into I, 11–25 enabled Halevi to turn the traditionalist framework against
the rationalistic Muʿtazilite assumption regarding the compatibility of knowledge
acquired through human intellectual inquiry and the knowledge acquired through
revelation and the transmission of tradition.70
B The Kuzari I, 67
I devoted the previous sub-chapter of this study to a discussion of the appearance
of sceptical motifs in The Kuzari by analysing all of the dialogue in I, 11–25. By con-
trast, in the current sub-chapter, I shall focus on a single section: the rabbi’s state-
ment in I, 67, which constitutes a conclusion and summary of another section of
dialogue between the rabbi and the Khazar king beginning with the rabbi’s state-
ments in I, 43. To this end, I must first say a few words about the contents and de-
velopment of the dialogue in I, 43–67 and how it relates to the contents of I, 67, the
focus of this sub-chapter of the study.
At the heart of the dialogue in I, 43–67 is the Arabic term taʾrīḫ, a word with dif-
ferent denotations: one refers to the date, a particular point in time, another to the
enumeration of time from a certain starting point, and a third refers to the chrono-
logical or historical span of time. In the exchange that develops between the rabbi
and the Khazar king in I, 43–44, Halevi uses the semantic field between two of the
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above-mentioned meanings of the word taʾrīḫ. In the concluding sentence of I, 43,
the rabbi speaks of the chronology [of the human race] from Adam onward (wa-l-
taʾrīḫ min Ādam ilā halumma ǧarā). Here, it seems correct to read taʾrīḫ as referring
to history and its events, given the overall context of the rabbi’s words in this sec-
tion, which concern historical events and aspects of the development of humanity
since the inception of time, as known to the people of Israel through the words of
the prophet (i.e., Moses). The Khazar king’s response in I, 44 – “It would be extraor-
dinary if you had a reliable date (taʾrīḫ mutaḥaqqaq) for the creation of the world” –
shifts the readers to another meaning of taʾrīḫ and the issue that is going to be the
focus of the discussions between the Khazar king and the rabbi in the dialogue in I,
43–67: the issue of the specific enumeration of time from a certain starting point,
which forms the reckoning of time in the Jewish tradition, and the reliability of this
reckoning.
The epistemological foundation for the dialogue in I, 43–67 is generally the
same as the foundation for the rabbi’s statements in I, 11, which was the starting
point of the dialogue in I, 11–25 discussed above. This is an epistemology that is typ-
ical of Muslim traditionalism, at whose core is the concept of reporting (ḫabar, pl.
aḫbār) and the conditions for word-of-mouth transmission. This epistemological
foundation links two meanings of taʾrīḫ, that of the date of the beginning of the
world (i.e., how long the world had existed) and that of historical events. The classi-
cal works of the early Muslim historiographical tradition began with the creation of
the world and Adam as their starting point and continued with a description of his-
torical events in chronological order up to the author’s own time.71 In this Muslim
historiographical tradition, a common genre was patterned in correlation with the
accepted form of the oral tradition of Muslim literature; that is, a form consisting of
reports (aḫbār) passed on from transmitter to transmitter as stand-alone units of
separate, independent items, each of which was devoted to one particular historical
episode.72
From the starting point of the connection between these two meanings of taʾrīḫ
and the traditionalist Muslim epistemology that characterises it, the debate in this
section of the dialogue moves towards an issue that is also of great relevance from
the dogmatic rationalist perspective. This is a clash of two contradictory claims
about the origin of the world: the claim that the world has always existed and is
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eternal, a claim known as the claim of eternity a parte ante (qidam),73 versus the
claim that God created the world ex nihilo at the point when time and its counting
began. This claim was known as the claim of innovation (ḥadaṯ). In I, 60, the dia-
logue shifts to the eternity-versus-innovation issue when the Khazar king asks the
rabbi, as someone defending the Jewish chronology of the world, about “what is re-
ported (mā yuḫbar) in the name of the people of India to the effect that they have
historical relics and buildings that they determine to be a million years old?” When
it is the Khazar king’s turn to speak again in I, 62, he continues to press the rabbi on
the issue, this time from the philosophers’ point of view, saying “they have reached
agreement on the eternity of the world a parte post (al-azaliyyah) as well as its eter-
nity a parte ante (wa-l-qidam).” In his next statement in I, 64, the Khazar king as-
sumes a more focused approach, identifying the eternity claim not only with
philosophers in general, but also with Aristotle in particular, the philosopher par
excellence in the rationalist tradition of Arabic culture. Responding to the Khazar
king’s comment on Aristotle in I, 65, the rabbi says that Aristotle “in his rational
deliberations, decided in favour of the claim of eternity by means of his thinking
alone” (raǧaḥ qiyāsātahu al-qāʾilah bi-l-qidam bi-muǧarrad fikrihi). Later in the same
section, the rabbi complains that Aristotle focused his intellectual inquiry on prov-
ing the claim of eternity, thus inevitably neglecting to study the opposite claim of
innovation. This criticism implies an underlying assumption identified with scepti-
cal intellectual inquiry according to which it is possible and necessary to provide
proofs of all the conflicting claims on the issue at hand. Just as it is possible to focus
intellectual efforts to establish one claim, so is it possible to focus them on other
contradictory claims. In his response in I, 66, the Khazar king wants to know if the
rabbi can present a demonstrative proof (al-burhān) that would enable one to as-
sent (tarǧīḥ) to one of the opposite arguments concerning the origin of the world.
This request for an assent offers the rabbi the opportunity to provide what Halevi
considers to be the summarising and concluding answer to the debate:
The sage said: Who, indeed, could provide us with the demonstration (al-burhān) on this ques-
tion (al-masʾalah)? God forbid that the Law should teach something that repudiates [the testi-
mony of] eyewitness perception (ʿiyānan) or [the conclusion of] a demonstration (burhānan)!
However, it does report miracles and the disruption of the customary workings [of things] (bi-
muʿizāt wa-ḫarq ʿādāt) by the creation of [entirely new] substances (bi-iḫtirāʿ aʿyān) or by turn-
ing one substance into another (qalb ʿayn ilā ʿayn) to furnish proof for the [existence of the]
Creator of the world (muḫtariʿ al-ʿālam) and His power to do whatever He wishes, whenever He
wishes. The question (masʾalat) of the [world’s] eternity a parte ante (al-qidam) and of [its] in-
novation (al-ḥadaṯ) is profound (ġāmiḍah), and the proofs [in favour] of the two counter-argu-
ments are equipollent/equivalent (wa-dalāʾil al-ḥuǧǧatayin mutakāfiʾah). In that case, then, the
tradition (al-naql) from Adam, Noah, and Moses, peace be upon them, based on prophecy,
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which is more trustworthy than reasoning (al-qiyās), tips the balance in favour of [its] innova-
tion (yuraǧiḥu al-ḥadaṯ). But even if (wa-baʿda an)74 an adherent of the Law (al-mutašarriʿ) is
forced to concede and acknowledge the existence of prime matter (hayūlā qadīma) and many
worlds prior to this world, this should not count as a deficiency in his belief (laysa fī ḏalika
maṭʿan fī iʿtiqādihi) [as long as he holds] that this world came into new existence (ḥādiṯ) at a
specific time in the past (munḏu muddah muḥaṣṣalah) and that its first human inhabitants (wa-
awwal nāsuhu) were Adam and Noah (var. Adam and Eve). [I, 67]75
The rabbi’s words are notable for their density and complexity. This is, in fact, one
of the most problematic passages in The Kuzari. Scholars have found it difficult to
parse and have proposed different, even contradictory explanations for it. I shall
hereby present my own attempt to provide an understanding of it. It differs from
previous explanations in that it sees the sceptical component as a key to under-
standing Halevi’s intention in the words he has the rabbi speak.
The rabbi begins with a question: “Who, indeed, could provide us with the
demonstration (al-burhān) on this question (al-masʾalah)?” The question (al-masʾa-
lah) is unspecified here, being elucidated only later on: “The question (masʾalat) of
the [world’s] eternity in the past (al-qidam) and of [its] innovation (al-ḥadaṯ).” The
rabbi is answering the question the Khazar king posed in the previous section,
which included the request for a demonstrative proof (al-burhān) allowing for an
assent (tarǧīḥ) and the settlement of the issue. The question that the rabbi posits in
response to the Khazar king’s query is rhetorical. In the discussion of the rabbi’s
words in I, 15 above, I noted the double meaning of the term burhān: it can mean a
sign, in the sense of a concrete miraculous occurrence, but it can also mean an in-
tellectual proof of the highest order of logic. The two meanings of burhān relate to
two separate epistemological channels: in the sense of a miraculous occurrence,
burhān relates to the recognition of an eyewitness perception (ʿiyān), whereas
burhān in the sense of logical proof relates to abstract intellectual cognition. The
formulation of the opening question in I, 67 as a rhetorical question hints at the an-
swer: no one can provide demonstrative intellectual proof (burhān) that provides as-
sent (tarǧīḥ) to one of the positions in the question of the origin of the world. In
other words, the rabbi’s opening statement in I, 67, phrased as a rhetorical ques-
tion, hints at the sceptical answer to this particular question which he will explicitly
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74 See Joshua Blau, Dictionary of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic Texts [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The
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(s.v. baʿda).
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Hebrew Versions of the Same Books,” in Pesher Nahum: Texts and Studies in Jewish History and
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declare further on: it is impossible to provide demonstrative proof for either the eter-
nity or the innovation of the world.
The major Judeo-Arabic writers distinguished between three sources of human
cognition: the senses (ḥawāss), the intellect (al-ʿaql), and “a faithful tradition/report
and truthful transmission” (al-ḫabar al-ṣādiq wa-l-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ). This division can
be traced back to Saʿadia Gaon’s The Book of Beliefs and Opinions ([al-Muḫtār fī] al-
amānāt wa-l-iʿtiqādāt), a model of dogmatic rationalism. But Saʿadia spoke of four
sources, the third of which he called “necessary knowledge” (ʿilm al-ḍarūriyyāt).76
The more relevant formulation relating to the three-part division above appears in
Baḥya ibn Paqudah’s The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart (Kitāb al-
hidāyah ilā farāʾiḍ al-qulūb)77 and forms the framework for the rabbi’s inquiry into
the origin of the world in I, 67. The inquiry begins by examining the two epistemolo-
gies related to the word burhān – the experience of the senses and the cognition of
the mind – and only then arrives at the third source of knowledge, that of tradition.
Unlike the answer embedded in the rhetorical question Halevi formulates at the
outset of the rabbi’s words in I, 67, the declaration he makes immediately there-
after – “God forbid that the Law should teach something that repudiates [the testi-
mony of] eyewitness perception (ʿiyānan) or [the conclusion of] a demonstration
(burhānan)” – leaves an immediate impression of a dogmatic rationalist line. Ac-
cording to this widespread approach, the opinions expressed in the Torah, includ-
ing the innovation of the world, are corroborated by sources of human cognition.78
However, as mentioned earlier in our discussion of The Kuzari I, 11–25, while ratio-
nalists of Saʿadia Gaon’s type recognise the legitimacy of only one type of rational-
ism – the dogmatic kind – Halevi recognises the legitimacy of an additional form of
rationalism: the sceptical kind.79 As I demonstrate below, the rabbi’s remonstra-
tion – “God forbid” – must be read not in a dogmatic rationalist context, but in a
sceptical rationalist one.
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Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 85 n. 18.
The rabbi first addresses the part of his assertion, which says that the Torah’s
claim about the innovation of the world is not denied by human eyewitness percep-
tion (ʿiyānan). Continuing on this point, the rabbi speaks of the “miracles (muʿǧizāt)
and the disruption of the customary workings [of things] (muʿǧizāt wa-ḫarq ʿādāt)
by the creation of [entirely new] substances (bi-iḫtirāʿ aʿyān) or by turning one sub-
stance into another (qalb ʿayn ilā ʿayn) to furnish proof for the [existence of the] Cre-
ator of the world (muḫtariʿ al-ʿālam).” In Halevi’s thought, the Arabic terminology
based on the verb iḫtaraʿ, which appears twice in this section (bi-iḫtirāʿ aʿyān, muḫ-
tariʿ al-ʿālam), is closely related to creation ex nihilo and the concept of innovation
(al-ḥadaṯ).80 In Saʿadia Gaon’s introduction to his discussion of the origin of the
world, God’s miracles – signs and [miraculous] demonstrations (bi-l-āyāt wa-l-
barāhīn), as he calls them – are considered to be decisive proof of the Torah’s claim
that the world was created (as well as of all the other claims in the Torah).81 The sit-
uation for Halevi is different because of the special importance he attributes, both
here and elsewhere, to the criterion of eyewitness perception (ʿiyān) as something
belonging to a separate arational epistemological order.82 From this perspective,
there is an essential difference between the innovation of the world and miracles:
while miracles can be accessed by the channel receiving direct sense experience,
the innovation of the world cannot.83 This is why the rabbi, in I, 67, cannot satisfy
the request he has the Khazar king make in I, 66 on the basis of miracles. Thus, for
Halevi, miracles are corroboration for the Torah’s claim of the innovation of the
world, but not decisive proof of it.
Halevi now proceeds to the second source of knowledge of human cognition –
the intellect – in which assent to one position is attained on the basis of demonstra-
tive proof (al-burhān). When the rabbi speaks of this source, the congruence with
the sceptical method surfaces. The rabbi’s statement – “The question (masʾalat) of
the [world’s] eternity a parte ante (al-qidam) and of [its] innovation (al-ḥadaṯ) is pro-
found (ġāmiḍah), and the proofs [in favour] of the two counter-arguments are
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83 Saʿadia Gaon had already dealt with the impossibility of there having been an eyewitness ac-
count of the innovation of the world (ʿiyān) in The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 38 (= al-Muḫtār fī al-
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less ascertain by means of rational inferences (yarūmu iṯbātahu min ṭarīq al-istidlāl).”
equipollent/equivalent (wa-dalāʾil al-ḥuǧǧatayin mutakāfʾiah)” – is the most con-
spicuous evidence in all of The Kuzari of Halevi’s familiarity with sceptical terminol-
ogy. The beginning of the statement – “The question of the [world’s] eternity a parte
ante (al-qidam) and of [its] innovation is profound (ġāmiḍah)” – is an entrée to clas-
sical scepticism, a way of thought that stresses the difficulties facing anyone at-
tempting to deal with theoretical questions.84 Accordingly, sceptical thinkers often
point to the quality of rashness – propeteia – as being typical of the method of argu-
ment used by their dogmatic rivals.85 The dogmatic thinkers’ tendencies to prefer
one claim over others and to take a side on any given issue is considered frivolous
by the sceptical thinkers, given the difficulties that these questions pose. The end of
the rabbi’s speech – “the proofs [in favour] of the two counter-arguments are
equipollent/equivalent” (wa-dalāʾil al-ḥuǧǧatayin mutakāfiʾah) – brings us directly
to the heart of classical scepticism. Here, Halevi also inserts a variation on a funda-
mental concept of sceptical thought, the most prominent concept (and one of only a
few) to have received a clear and consistent translation in Arabic literature of the
classical Islamic period: isostheneia (the equipollence/equivalence of counter-argu-
ments), rendered in Arabic literature as takāfuʾ al-adillah.86
As for the historical background of the rabbi’s statement, it is especially impor-
tant to point to its similarity, both in content and in formulation, to the claim which,
in Arabic culture, was recognised as having been made by Galen, the famous Hel-
lenistic physician and writer. In his writing, Galen argued a great deal with sceptics
and medical schools that applied the sceptical approach to the practice of
medicine.87 At the same time, in several places, Galen himself adopted a sceptical
approach to the question of the world’s innovation or eternity.88 The importance of
these facts is linked to the possibility that Galen, many of whose voluminous medi-
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87 See De Lacy, “Galen’s Response to Skepticism.”
88 De Lacy, 304; Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism, 4–5.
cal and philosophical tracts were translated into Arabic,89 served as a channel
whereby those familiar with Arabic culture were exposed to the opinions of the Hel-
lenistic sceptics. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, al-Fārābī (d. 950) noted
the connection between Aristotle’s discussion of the difficulty posed by a question
such as the world’s innovation or eternity (Topics 104b) and Galen’s comments on
the same.90 In this context, al-Fārābī polemically argued that Galen’s own failure to
reach a demonstrative proof in this question was the reason why he had argued for
the equipollence/equivalence of the counter-arguments in this case.91 Unlike al-
Fārābī, al-Ġazālī, in The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifah), notes
the possibility that Galen arrived at the state of non-assent regarding the innova-
tion/eternity question not because of his lack of intellectual capacity, but because
the question itself lies outside the scope of the intellect’s grasp.92 Halevi, who was a
physician by trade, was familiar with Galen’s scientific works, which had been
translated into Arabic, and he mentions him and a few of his works and opinions in
The Kuzari.93 All of the above would indicate that it is very possible that Halevi was
either directly or indirectly relying on Galen in his sceptical assessment of the
equipollence/equivalence of counter-arguments in the question of the world’s eter-
nity or innovation, which he places in the rabbi’s mouth in I, 67.
From the apologetic perspective, whose starting point would be the rabbi’s ear-
lier declaration “God forbid that the Law should teach something that repudiates
[the testimony of] eyewitness perception (ʿiyānan) or [the conclusion of] a demon-
stration (burhānan),” we see that the defence Halevi chose to give the Torah –
which, according to him, maintains the world’s innovation – does not rely on the
dogmatic rationalist approach. A detailed example of the way in which a dogmatic
rationalist would tackle this issue may be found in the first chapter of Saʿadia
Gaon’s dogmatic work The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, where the author defends
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the opinion that the world was innovated as a claim asserted by the Torah using the
apodictic mode of argumentation; namely, using proofs that he considered to be de-
cisive for the innovation argument. Later in the chapter, Saʿadia Gaon refutes all
variations of the opposite claim of the world’s eternity. Unlike that approach, Hale-
vi’s concise argumentation defending the rationalism of the ex nihilo claim in I, 67
is aligned with the classical sceptical approach, according to which, as a result of
being equipollent, the innovation argument has, rationally speaking, an identical
status to the eternity argument. The possibility that the innovation argument is true
holds, though not because its veracity has been demonstratively proven, but rather
because it remains undetermined by the competing eternity argument and has
therefore also not been refuted.
In defending the rational status of the innovation of the world in the spirit of
sceptical rationalism by declaring the rationality of non-assent to any conflicted po-
sition instead of defending it apodictically as dogmatic rationalists would, Halevi
placed himself in an essentially different position from the dominant stance in
Judeo-Arabic thought. In the aftermath of Saʿadia Gaon, the apodictic mode of argu-
mentation was also adopted by Andalusian Jewish writers who were contemporaries
of Halevi, including Baḥya ibn Paqudah and Joseph ibn Ṣaddiq (d. 1149).94 This po-
sition provided unequivocal backing for the human intellect’s ability to provide de-
cisive proofs in favour of the claim that the world was created ex nihilo, which si-
multaneously also served to refute the claim of the world’s eternity. The statement
Halevi has the rabbi voice regarding the equipollence of proofs on the eternity-ver-
sus-innovation question is meant, with one terse, carefully considered expression,
to land a stunning blow on the optimistic climate of Judeo-Arabic dogmatic rational-
ism that preceded the author’s era. This dogmatic rationalism generally sought to
find the cornerstone for its theological method precisely in such intellectual proofs
for the innovation of the world. Thus, by undermining this cornerstone, Halevi was
in fact undermining the entire theological structure built upon it. In doing so, he
anticipated Maimonides, who, two generations later, would turn the claim of a lack
of decisive proofs in the eternity-versus-innovation question (a claim which he ex-
plicitly linked to Galen via al-Fārābī)95 into the focus of his discussion of the issue
in his Guide of the Perplexed.96
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From the second source of human knowledge, the intellect, Halevi transitions
to the third – tradition (al-naql):
In that case, then, the tradition (al-naql) from Adam, Noah, and Moses, peace be upon them,
based on prophecy, which is more trustworthy than reasoning (al-qiyās), tips the balance in
favour of [its] innovation (yuraǧǧiḥu al-ḥadaṯ).
This assertion – that the issue under discussion is to be settled by tradition based
on prophecy – bears an explicit fideist message. With this fideist judgment, stress-
ing the superiority of tradition over reasoning, Halevi sets his approach apart from
the common approach in the Judeo-Arabic dogmatic rationalism of his time. The lat-
ter championed a harmonistic approach whereby tradition backs and supports the
findings of reasoning and intellectual inquiry, and vice versa. The rabbi’s words in
I, 67 make it clear that of the three sources of knowledge he mentions in this para-
graph – namely, proofs from miracles, proofs from reasoning, and proofs from tradi-
tion – in this case, he considers the decisive source of cognition in the theological
question at stake to be tradition (al-naql): the transmission of reports about the
event by those who experienced it first-hand through their senses in a chain of oral
history. In the case at hand, the transmission started with Adam and continued
through other transmitters, including Noah and Moses.
The message we may elicit from the rabbi’s statement regarding the decisive
role reserved for tradition in determining the question of the world’s innovation ver-
sus its eternity makes it suitable to serve as the rabbi’s final concluding statement
in this affair. It seems that the answer to the Khazar king’s request for assent (tarǧīḥ)
in I, 66 has finally been satisfied. But instead of ending here, the rabbi continues
and adds the following clarification to this seemingly decisive message:
But even if an adherent of the Law (al-mutašarriʿ) is forced to concede and acknowledge the
existence of prime matter (hayūlā qadīma) and many worlds prior to this world, this should
not count as a deficiency in his belief (laysa fī ḏalika maṭʿan fī iʿtiqādihi) [as long as he holds]
that this world came into new existence at a specific time in the past and that its first human
inhabitants (wa-awwal nāsuhu) were Adam and Noah (var. Adam and Eve).
The rabbi’s clarification seems to remove much of the sting from his earlier words
on the decisive role reserved for tradition. The difficulty in understanding what he
is getting at here and in bringing these words into line with his previous statement
lies in the meaning of the term “came into new existence” (ḥādiṯ). According to
Saʿadia Gaon’s approach, which greatly influenced Judeo-Arabic thought, “new ex-
istence” in the sense of God’s innovation of the contents of the world necessarily
implied creation ex nihilo. To quote Saʿadia: “Our Lord, exalted be He, made it
known to us that all things were created (muḥdiṯah), and that He had created them
out of nothing (aḥdaṯahā lā min šayʾ). Thus Scripture says: In the beginning God cre-
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ated the heaven and the earth (Gen. 1:1).”97 According to this standard understand-
ing, it is impossible to agree with what the rabbi says here; that is, that it does not
constitute a flaw in a fundamental tenet of belief (iʿtiqād) of “an adherent of the
Law” (al-mutašarriʿ) if he only partially adheres to the meaning of the term “came
into new existence” (ḥādiṯ), in a way that incorporates an assumption of eternity
into the concept of innovation, even though this eternity is not consisted with the
best-known philosophical sense to which the Khazar king referred earlier in I, 62.
From the perspective of a rationalist theological understanding à la Saʿadia Gaon,
any stance that does not include an unequivocal recognition of creation ex nihilo
represents a major flaw in the beliefs of that “adherent of the Law.”
However, even in this case, as in others, Halevi shows himself to be conceptu-
ally independent, paving his own way when it comes to the phrase “innovation,” a
way that significantly differs from the understanding of Saʿadia Gaon and the Jew-
ish dogmatic rationalists who followed in his wake. The creation of the world, in the
sense Halevi gives it, means “that this world came into new existence (ḥādiṯ) at a
specific time in the past and that its first human inhabitants (wa-awwal nāsuhu)
were Adam and Noah (var. Adam and Eve).” This original definition Halevi provides
via the rabbi is notable for the fact that its chronological aspect overshadows its on-
tological-cosmological one. In the standard definition of “came into new existence,”
that of the world having been created ex nihilo, the ontological-cosmological aspect
is essential, whereas in the rabbi’s definition – one that tolerates the possibility of
the existence of a prior substance and/or previous worlds – the ontological-cosmo-
logical aspect loses its essential core status. In this definition, the centre of gravity
is shifted to the stance whereby the world “came into existence at a specific time in
the past (ḥādiṯ munḏu muddah muḥaṣṣalah)” – that is, in accordance with the reck-
oning of years in the traditional Jewish sources – and “that its first human inhabi-
tants (wa-awwal nāsuhu) were Adam and Noah”; that is, the figures the rabbi men-
tioned earlier in the section as having played a key role in the transmission of the
tradition (al-naql) reaching to Moses. From a broader perspective, we see that the
rabbi’s definition at the end of I, 67 is an apt conclusion and summary of the dia-
logue between the rabbi and the Kuzari in I, 43–67, because with this definition of
“came into new existence,” the rabbi returns the discussion to his central issue of
this section: that of the chronology and reckoning of years (taʾrīḫ) in the Jewish tra-
dition and its reliability.
The novel definition of “came into new existence” with which Halevi concludes
the rabbi’s words in I, 67 sheds light on the meaning of the rabbi’s previous declara-
tion about the decisive role reserved for tradition (al-naql) in the context of the inno-
vation/eternity debate. The kind of decisive role that the rabbi mentioned is valid
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only for the chronological definition presented in his subsequent statement and is
an assent equivalent to a decision in favour of the veracity of the reckoning of years
in the Jewish tradition.98 At the same time, this assent does not apply to the ontolog-
ical-cosmological definition of “came into new existence” ex nihilo. Consequently,
an assent that is dependent on tradition rules out only one particular understanding
of eternality, one whose chronological aspect contradicts the chronological charac-
terisation of the reckoning of years in the Jewish tradition. Through the words he
places in the rabbi’s mouth at the end of I, 67, Halevi is willing to accommodate
some versions of the eternity argument, such as the one assuming the existence of a
prime matter, whose assumptions do not necessarily lead to a clash with the funda-
mental assumptions of Jewish chronology. However, he cannot show a similar flexi-
bility towards the version of eternity espoused by falsafah, which denies innovation
before “a specific time in the past” and also the existence of “first human inhabi-
tants” (i.e., the biblical Adam and Noah [var. Adam and Eve]). This is the version of
eternity that Halevi put into the mouth of the philosophers’ spokesperson who pre-
sented his view to the king in I, 1: “In fact, He did not create man at all because the
world is eternal; and man has never ceased coming into being out of a man before
him.”99
Various statements in The Kuzari would seem to indicate that Halevi himself
tended towards the ex nihilo view, seeing it as a most proper and desirable opin-
ion.100 Thus, his willingness to compromise with some other positions at the end of
I, 67 implies that even though the ex nihilo understanding of the world’s innovation
is correct and desirable, it is not, in Halevi’s approach, a core tenet of Jewish belief.
This is backed by the rabbi’s last words in I, 67 and the connection Halevi makes
between the “adherent of the Law” (al-mutašarriʿ) and what should be regarded as
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98 From the context in I, 67, it seems that it is the component of prophecy mentioned here (“the
tradition from Adam, Noah, and Moses, peace be upon them, based on prophecy”) that safeguards
the veracity of the tradition of the chronology of the world. However, elsewhere in The Kuzari, both
in I, 47 and I, 95, Halevi makes it clear that the veracity of this chronology derives from the special
status of its transmitters, the “unique individuals” (afrād).
99 I, 1 (4, ll. 5–6 = Bashir, 154). See also V, 14 (324, l. 20–21 = Bashir, 535). Compare with the rabbi’s
words at the end of I, 61, where the universal chronology reflected in the Book of the Nabatean
Agriculture (Kitāb al-falāḥah al-nabaṭiyyah) is rejected on the grounds that it specifies the names
of people who were Adam’s predecessors.
100 See IV, 3 (228, l. 24 = Bashir, 436): “This confirms for him that He is the one who created the
world after its [prior] non-existence”; V, 14 (324, ll. 24–28 = Bashir, 535): “As for the opinion of the
Law, it is that God created the world as it is, with its animals and plants fully formed so that there is
no need for the pre-existence of simple elements and the formation of compounds. By affirming the
complete innovation of the world every difficulty becomes easy [to resolve]. Moreover, every impos-
sibility can be removed, if you were to imagine that this world did not exist and then came to be
through God’s wish, at the time He wished and in the manner He wished.” See also I, 91 (42, ll. 13–
18 = Bashir, 205); V, 18 (332, ll. 7–27 = Bashir, 542–43).
a core tenet (iʿtiqādihi) of one such “adherent of the Law.” The “adherent of the
Law” – in this case, an adherent of the Mosaic Law101 – is bound by the credo of his
religion. The fact Halevi states here that it is possible for an “adherent of the Law”
to accept the existence of a prime matter or that other worlds preceded this one and
that “this should not count as a deficiency in his belief” (laysa fī ḏalika maṭʿan fī
iʿtiqādihi) teaches us that from his perspective, the belief in the world’s innovation
ex nihilo is not a core tenet of the Jewish credo, one that is incumbent upon a Jewish
“adherent of the Law” without any exceptions. By contrast, a binding belief that
does reach the level of a core tenet is the belief in the chronological facts “that this
world came into new existence at a specific time in the past and that its first human
inhabitants (wa-awwal nāsuhu) were Adam and Noah.”
The conclusion that Halevi draws at the end of I, 67 that belief in the world’s
innovation ex nihilo is excluded from the Jewish credo is completely in keeping with
the course of the dialogue in I, 11–25 analysed above. Innovation ex nihilo – that is,
the innovation of the world in the ontological-cosmological sense – cannot be di-
rectly apprehended by the human senses and therefore fails the criterion of eyewit-
ness perception (ʿiyān) which the rabbi introduced in I, 11–25 as the fundamental
epistemological criterion upon which the core tenets of the Jewish credo rest. By
contrast, belief in innovation in the chronological sense – that is, “the belief that
this world came into new existence at a specific time in the past and that its first
human inhabitants were Adam and Noah” – does meet the fundamental epistemo-
logical criterion of eyewitness perception (ʿiyān). This direct sense experience is
then transmitted in a chain of transmitters from those who directly experienced the
innovation of the world (i.e., Adam and Noah), being, in a sense, each in his own
era, its “first human inhabitants (awwal nāsuhu).”102 Thus, this core tenet dovetails
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101 This can be adduced from the fact that the tradition (al-naql) to which the rabbi is referring here
is a tradition that goes as far as Moses (“the tradition from Adam, Noah, and Moses”).
102 Consider the earlier exchange between the rabbi and the Khazar king in the same section of
dialogue (I, 43–67): “The sage said: Have you heard of a nation that diverges from the well-known
week, which begins with Sunday and ends with the Sabbath? Is it possible, then, that the inhab-
itants of China could agree with the inhabitants of the western islands on that [seven-day week]
without a [common] beginning as well as meeting together and [reaching] an agreement? The
Khazar said: That [kind of common institution] is possible only with the agreement of everyone.
But this is unlikely, unless all people are descendants of Adam, or descendants of Noah, or of some-
one else. Then, the [seven-day] week would be transmitted, according to them, from their [common]
ancestor. The sage said: This is what I meant. Furthermore, men in the East and the West agree on
[the mathematical importance of] the number ten. What peculiar feature prompts their stopping at
ten, if not the fact that it was taken from a [common] beginning?” (I, 57–59). Halevi’s arguments in I,
57–59 about the universal usage of the seven-day week and the decimal system are in line with his
argument in I, 67. All of them are directed to establish the innovation of the world in the sense of
Adam and Noah’s position as the “first human inhabitants.”
with the second and complementary criterion that Halevi posited in I, 25, that of
trustworthy tradition.103
In Halevi’s approach, the description of God in I, 25 as “the Creator of the
world” (ḫāliq al-ʿālam) is certainly correct and true, yet he did not make it in the
rabbi’s credo in I, 11. In I, 25, he also explained why this description was not in-
cluded when God introduced Himself in the first of the ten commandments. Those
articulations explain why the belief in creation ex nihilo, despite the fact that it is
true and correct, is not obligatory for an “adherent of the Law” as a core tenet of
belief (iʿtiqād). Halevi uses the same arguments and the same theological innova-
tion in both I, 11–25 and I, 67. In both discussions, this daring innovation relies on
Halevi’s acceptance of a sceptical distinction which dogmatic rationalists, bound by
the search for determination, are incapable of accepting. In both discussions, Halevi
uses the unique sceptical rationale of non-assent as a tactical tool for uprooting the
pretensions of dogmatism from certain key principles that the dogmatic rationalists
viewed as Judaism’s most intrinsic doctrines. As part of the discussion in I, 67, Hale-
vi’s tactical use of sceptical rationalism helps him to place creation ex nihilo in a
sort of midway position: this opinion has not been refuted by the counter-argument
of the world’s eternity, allowing the Jewish believer to point to its rationalism, even
though it does not meet the sensual epistemological criteria that would make it into
a core tenet of belief, making it absolutely binding on a Jewish “adherent of the
Law.”104
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103 The absence of a tenet concerning the reliability of the Jewish chronology and reckoning of
years (taʾrīḫ) from the rabbi’s credo in I, 11 can be explained (from an epistemological point of view)
by the fact that it is backed by the transmission of only one chain of transmitters and not by the
concurrent transmission (tawātur) of many chains of transmitters required by the rabbi in I, 25.
However (as already noted), the rabbi’s assertions in I, 47, and I, 95 (22, ll. 10–18; 44, ll. 11–19 =
Bashir, 181–81; 208–9) gives the impression that the reliability of the Jewish chronology and reck-
oning of years is guaranteed by the fact that each of its transmitters belongs to the chosen unique
individuals (afrād) of the early historical eras.
104 The failure of previous scholars to fully address the nuances in Judah Halevi’s treatment of the
question at hand in I, 67, nuances that included the ad hoc implementation of the sceptical version
of rationalism, has yielded misinterpretations such as the two conflicting interpretations by David
Kaufmann and David Neumark. These interpretations are both built on the incorrect assumption
that Halevi is dogmatically committed to one of the two positions under discussion in I, 67: either
he is committed to the position of the innovation of the world ex nihilo (as Kaufmann interprets it) or
he is committed to the position of the existence of prime matter (as Neumark interprets it). The
possibility that Halevi avoids the trap of being dogmatically committed to one of those conflicting
positions by incorporating a sceptical stance was left unnoted by those two scholars (as well as by
many others). See David Kaufmann, Studies in the Hebrew Literature of the Middle Ages, trans. Israel
Eldad (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1962), 208–11 [Hebrew]; David Neumark, Judah Hallevi’s
Philosophy in Its Principles (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1908), 24–25.
Finally, when we turn to the Khazar king’s immediate reaction to the rabbi’s
discussion of the question of the world’s innovation versus its eternity, we find it to
be very illuminated:
The Khazar said: These persuasive arguments (al-ḥuǧaǧ al-muqniʿah) are enough for me on the
subject [for now]. If my companionship with you should last, I will assign you the task of pre-
senting me with arguments that are conclusive (al-ḥuǧaǧ al-qāṭiʿah). [I, 68]
Above, we saw that in the dialogue between the Khazar king and the rabbi in I, 11–
25, the insertion of the sceptical exposition of the issue under discussion there (the
argument from design) serves as a turning point in the discussion between the two
interlocutors. This is particularly striking because in this part of the dialogue, the
sceptical exposition was spelt out by the Khazar king (I, 20) and met with tacit ap-
proval from the rabbi (I, 21). On the other hand, in the course of the discussion be-
tween these two interlocutors, when they turn to the question of the world’s innova-
tion or eternity, the sceptical argumentation is articulated by the rabbi. In this case,
the Khazar king finds himself unable to internalise it. His expectation that he will
later receive “arguments that are conclusive” (al-ḥuǧaǧ al-qāṭiʿah) from the rabbi in
I, 68 stands as a stark misunderstanding or rejection of the rabbi’s straightforward
sceptical clarification that no such conclusive arguments can be adduced on behalf
of either side of the innovation/eternity conundrum. Therefore, when it comes to
the Khazar king (as an imaginative representative of Halevi’s real interlocutors in
his circle of friends and associates), we can locate two very different scenarios re-
garding his ability to absorb and accept the sceptical mode of argumentation. The
first is the optimistic scenario in I, 11–25, where the king takes an active role in the
process of deliberation aiming to shake up dogmatic rationalistic assumptions with
the aid of sceptical rationalistic ones. The second is the pessimistic (albeit more re-
alistic) scenario in which this kind of process fails as a result of the Khazar king’s
inability to acknowledge the emancipatory power of sceptical argumentation to
awake him from his “dogmatic slumber.” The Khazar king’s response in the opening
of I, 68 exposes him as someone who is still very much immersed in the state of
“dogmatic slumber,” unable to awake in spite of the rabbi exposing him to a scepti-
cal argument about the issue at hand.
C The Kuzari V, 14
The passage near the end of V, 14, the focus of my discussion now,105 is one of the
most important passages of The Kuzari in terms of understanding the fideist trend
that characterises Halevi’s thought throughout this work, a general feature that I
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105 V, 14 (328, ll. 5–26 = Bashir, 538–39).
discussed in the previous chapter of this study. The passage is unique in that it pro-
vides excellent support for the fact that despite the significant changes Halevi made
to these sceptical motifs, their origins in the world of ancient Hellenistic philosophy
are more explicit here than in any other part in The Kuzari.
At the beginning of the passage under discussion, Halevi briefly restates one of
the conspicuous assertions of his thought, according to which our world – as God
created and organised it – contains an unchangeable and unbridgeable essential
ontological difference between humans who are “flesh and blood” (al-bašar) and
those who are of a level called “the choicest of creation” (ṣafwat al-ḫalq). In addi-
tion to their normal human nature, the chosen ones were also given a supra-human
nature. This supra-human nature is what allows the existence of a special channel
of communication between God and the chosen. The historical revelations of this
special channel of communication exclusively occurred in the sphere of the history
of the chosen group – the people of Israel – and in the sphere of unique individuals
(afrād) in the era that preceded the appearance of the people of Israel. The revela-
tions from this channel apply to the individuals receiving this divine inspiration,
first and foremost the prophets. These individuals arose from the ranks of the peo-
ple of Israel, a nation whose individuals were all granted a supra-human nature in
potentia. Halevi presents this assertion in detail at different points earlier in The
Kuzari, especially in its first and second parts. Here, in a passage from the last part
of the work, he repeats it in a concise, instructive manner:
Surely, you have let yourself be deceived by corrupt imaginings and sought what your Creator
did not make it possible for you [to grasp]. Neither was the ability to apprehend it by reasoning
put within the natural disposition of flesh-and-blood (ġarīzat al-bašar). However, that [kind of
ability] was put within the natural disposition of those who are chosen from among the choic-
est of creation (ġarīzat al-muṣṭafīn min ṣafwat al-ḫalq) in keeping with the conditions we have
mentioned. They come to have those very {souls} that conceive of the world in its entirety.
They see their Lord and His angels. They see one another, and they know one another’s inner-
most thoughts, just as it says, I know it, too; be silent (2 Kings 2:3, 5). [V, 14 (328, ll. 5–11 =
Bashir, 538)]
In another study, I dealt extensively with the hierarchical-ontological claim to
which Halevi briefly returns here.106 For the current study, this claim is relevant in
that it serves as an introduction and foundation for presenting the central fideist
distinction in Halevi’s thought: the distinction between divine wisdom and human
wisdom to which I alluded earlier. Focusing the discussion on this part of the rab-
bi’s statement in V, 14 allows me to add a clarification on this topic. Halevi’s fideism
contains the unusual assertion that prophecy and divine inspiration are not funda-
mentally human phenomena. The prophets and the divinely inspired were those
who were granted a supra-human nature from birth that is distinct to the chosen
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106 Krinis, God’s Chosen People (especially 137–39, 169–70, 175–76, 295–96).
group (al-ṣafwah) and therefore, they cannot help but emerge from the ranks of this
group. Accordingly, the rabbi, directly continuing his earlier speech on the hierar-
chical-ontological distinction between the chosen and the non-chosen, takes pains
to stress the ontologically lower status of the philosophers (identified with the Hel-
lenistic ethnic group) as ones who share “the natural disposition of flesh-and-
blood” (ġarīzat al-bašar) compared to the elevated “natural disposition of those
who are chosen from among the choicest of creation” (ġarīzat al-muṣṭafin min
ṣafwat al-ḫalq), such as the prophets:
We do not understand how that happens or by what means, except that it comes to us by way
of prophecy. If the philosophers’ knowledge regarding that was true, they would surely have
attained it themselves, since they talk about souls and prophecy [a great deal], but they are like
the rest of flesh-and-blood (ka-sāʾir al-bašar). To be sure, they have excelled in human wisdom
(bi-l-ḥikmah al-insāniyyah), as Socrates used to say to the people of Athens, “O people! I do not
deny your divine wisdom (ḥikmatakum al-ilāhiyyah); rather, I say that I am not conversant
with it (lastu aḥsunuhā). On the other hand, I am wise with regard to human wisdom (bi-
ḥikmah insāniyyah).” Actually, they should be excused because they took refuge in their rea-
soning due to the absence of prophecy and the divine light among them (li-ʿadam al-nubuwwah
wa-l-nūr al-ilāhī ʿindahum). Even so, they brought the demonstrative sciences (al-ʿulūm al-
burhāniyyah) to a [level of] perfection that cannot be surpassed, and in that respect they were
unique. There is no difference [of opinion] between any two individuals concerning those sci-
ences; but there is almost no agreement between any two individuals about what they under-
took [to explain] beyond that with respect to [their divergent] opinions concerning metaphysics
(mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿah) and, yes, concerning many things in physics (al-ṭabīʿa) as well. [V, 14
(328, ll. 11–21 = Bashir, 538–39)]
The transition from the introduction that Halevi places in the rabbi’s mouth, based
on the above-described hierarchical-ontological claim, to what follows in this pas-
sage is a transition from a claim that has absolutely nothing to do with a sceptical
discourse to several further claims in which the classical sceptical discourse plays a
central role.107
In terms of its sceptical background, in these lines, Halevi once again inter-
weaves the argument about the lack of agreement among the philosophers. We
have already seen him making this point in the opening dialogue between the rabbi
and the Khazar king in I, 13. According to this classical sceptical claim of “dispute”
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107 The two parts of this passage do not fit together convincingly. If, as emphasised in the first part
of it, “divine wisdom” is restricted to those with the “natural disposition of those who are chosen
from among the choicest of creation,” how can it be ascribed to a non-chosen group such as the
“people of Athens”: the addressees of Socrates’s speech here? One may agree with Leo Strauss that
“Halevi noticed Socrates’ irony” and that saying “that he does not grasp the divine wisdom of the
people to whom he is talking […] is evidently a polite expression of his rejection of that wisdom.” Yet
when it comes to divine wisdom as Halevi perceives it – i.e., as a revelatory knowledge bestowed
upon the chosen group – Halevi himself is far from being ironic. See Leo Strauss, Persecution and
the Art of Writing, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 107 n. 23.
or “disagreement” (diaphônia), the philosophers’ lack of agreement is a clear sign
of their lack of knowledge: the absence of an agreement among those debating a
certain issue reflects their inability to reach true knowledge of that issue.108 In I, 13,
the rabbi applies this claim to the philosophers who cannot agree “on a single ac-
tion or a single belief” of a “syllogistic, governmental religion.” Moreover, in V, 14,
the rabbi applies it to metaphysics (mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿah) as a scientific discipline in
which “there is almost no agreement between any two individuals” (i.e., philoso-
phers). Immediately afterwards, he also applies the claim of the lack of agreement
among philosophers, though in a more reserved manner, to the discipline of physics
(al-ṭabīʿah). Although he relies heavily on the sceptical claim of the philosophers’
lack of agreement, the rabbi’s manoeuver here does not reflect the global sceptical
approach typical of the Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics of antiquity. Beforehand,
the rabbi invokes a non-sceptical claim that in “the demonstrative sciences” (al-
ʿulūm al-burhāniyya) – that is, the disciplines the rabbi identifies with mathematics
and logic (al-riyāḍiyya wa-l-manṭiq) at the start of V, 14109 – there actually is agree-
ment among the philosophers and scientists engaged in them (“There is no differ-
ence [of opinion] between any two individuals concerning those sciences”).
In this context, it is highly instructive to compare these statements with some
statements made by the famous Hellenistic scientist Claudius Ptolemy in the intro-
duction to the most important Hellenistic scientific treatise on astronomy, the Al-
magest:
From all this we concluded, that the first two divisions of theoretical philosophy should rather
be called guesswork than knowledge, theology because of its completely invisible and ungras-
pable nature, physics because of the unstable and unclear nature of matter; hence there is no
hope that philosophers will ever be agreed about them; and that only mathematics can provide
sure and unshakeable knowledge to its devotees, provided one approaches it rigorously.110
In its broad strokes, Halevi’s claim parallels that of Ptolemy. It is not inconceivable
that he relied on the Almagest outright, either directly or indirectly through some
mediating text.111 In fact, it is highly likely that Halevi knew Ptolemy’s ideas and
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108 Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism, 6.
109 V, 14 (322, ll. 22–25 = Bashir, 533–34).
110 Ptolemy, Ptolemy’s Almagest, trans. Gerald. J. Toomer (New York: Springer, 1984), 36.
111 Consider the rabbi’s immediate response to the Khazar king’s praise of the philosophers in V, 13
(322, ll. 22–25 = Bashir, 533–34): “This is exactly what I was afraid of concerning you – that you
would let yourself be deceived and calmly accede to their opinions. After their demonstrations in
the mathematical sciences and logic turned out to be sound, according to them, people willingly
accepted everything they said about physics and metaphysics.” This response at the very beginning
of V, 14 is in the spirit of al-Ġazālī’s critique of metaphysics. However, al-Ġazālī, unlike Halevi,
treated physics as a largely valid science. See al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, 65–66 (sec. 45–
46); al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 4. See also Griffel, “Taqlīd of the Philosophers,”
288–89, 290 n. 55.
used them, because the Almagest was one of the best-known and most common an-
cient texts in Arabic culture.112 In the statements he voices through the rabbi in V,
14, Halevi follows the selective scepticism that Ptolemy articulated in the introduc-
tion to the Almagest. According to both authors, the lack of agreement among
philosophers in matters of a field of cognition as ungraspable as metaphysics (the
parallel to theology in Ptolemy) and in a somewhat clearer, though still difficult to
grasp field such as physics is proof that these fields lie beyond the scope of human
intellectual perception, whereas the mathematical fields lie within the grasp of the
human mind. The main difference between the two authors is that for Ptolemy, this
selective sceptical approach serves as a justification for focusing his scientific work
on mathematics, which “can provide sure and unshakeable knowledge to its devo-
tees.” By contrast, for Halevi, the selective sceptical approach serves a very different
purpose; namely, a fideist purpose that stresses that the superior knowledge that
the philosophers include in the disciplines of metaphysics and physics falls outside
of their intellectual scope “due to the absence of prophecy and the divine light
among them” (li-ʿadam al-nubuwwah wa-l-nūr al-ilāhī ʿindahum). This knowledge
falls within the scope of the “divine wisdom” attained by God’s chosen, who mer-
ited prophecy and the divine light. Thus, according to Halevi, the knowledge that
belongs to this realm of wisdom is not unavailable to mankind, as one might think
when reading Ptolemy’s thoughts on the matter. Mankind reaches this type of
knowledge through the mediation of those prophets whose knowledge is a divinely
inspired, non-intellectual knowledge. Elsewhere in The Kuzari, Halevi stresses this
lesson, which, in his fideist approach, requires that one abandon “doubtful natural
science” (ʿilm ṭabīʿī maškūk)113 by means of an anecdote that he attributes to
Plato:114
Now Plato had already spoken [in this connection] about the prophet who lived at the time of
King Marinus [reporting] that he told the philosopher who let himself be deceived by false hope
about philosophy [the following] by means of a revelation from God: “You will not reach Me in
this way, but only through those whom I have made intermediary between Myself and My crea-
tures,” meaning, the prophets and the true nomos [IV, 27 (282, l. 28–284, l. 3 = Bashir, 499)]
To the incisive claim he makes in V, 14 about the lack of agreement among philoso-
phers in metaphysics and physics, the rabbi immediately adds a second claim ex-
plaining the formation of philosophical schools of thought, a phenomenon whose
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112 On the reception of the Almagest in Arabic culture, see Paul Kunitzsch, “Almagest: Its Reception
and Transmission in the Islamic World,” in Encyclopaedia of the History of Science, Technology, and
Medicine in Non-Western Cultures, ed. Helaine Seler, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008): 1:140–41.
113 IV, 27 (282, ll. 27–28 = Bashir, 499).
114 See Pines, “Shīʿite Terms and Conceptions,” 236–39, for a parallel of this anecdote in the
Pseudo-Platonic Kitāb al-nawāmīs.
existence would seem to require at least a measure of agreement among some of
them:
Even if you did find a group [of philosophers] agreeing on a single opinion, that is not due to
an investigation [they conducted] and a conclusion at which their [collective] opinion arrived.
On the contrary, the fact is that they are followers of one of the dialecticians (al-mutakallimīn)
who engaged in such discussions, whom they follow in the way of imitation (yuqallidūnahu),
like the followers of Pythagoras, the followers of Empedocles, the followers of Aristotle, the fol-
lowers of Plato, and others, as well as the Stoics (aṣḥāb al-miẓallah), and the Peripatetics (al-
maššāʾīn), namely, those who belong to the followers of Aristotle. [V, 14 (326, ll. 21–26 = Bashir,
539)]
Earlier in the dialogue of The Kuzari, in the conclusion to the long section IV, 25,
Halevi had already had the rabbi say something similar, though more concise. The
rabbi’s previous statement points to the same explanation of the transition from a
lack of agreement among the philosophers to the emergence of schools of philo-
sophical thought:
Beyond that, there is no agreement between any two of them, except for the imitators who sub-
ordinated themselves (al-muqallidūn alaḏīna yuqallidūn) to a single master, whether that be
Empedocles, or Pythagoras, or Aristotle, or Plato, as well as numerous others besides them.
Not one of them [fully] agrees with his fellow. [IV, 25 (282, ll. 11–14 = Bashir, 498)]
The way in which Halevi uses conjugations of the Arabic root q.l.d. in the second
verbal form in these two segments to mean “imitation,” “conformism,” or “subordi-
nating oneself to the opinion of” is reminiscent of a claim al-Ġazālī directs at con-
temporaneous adherents of philosophy in several places in his writings where he
asserts that the successful apodictic foundation of the mathematical sciences on
logical proofs has made such an impression on these adherents that it causes them
to adopt the philosophers’ opinions on metaphysics as well. However, they do this
not through independent, unbiased intellectual inquiry, as rationalism would de-
mand, but rather through taqlīd: blind reliance lacking examination or study.115
This corrupt path taken by the adherents of philosophy prevents them from realis-
ing that when it comes to metaphysics, the knowledge that the philosophers purport
to have lacks any of the demonstrative, apodictic foundations that they achieved in
the mathematical sciences.116 Al-Ġazālī’s assertion here and the assertion that
Halevi formulates in IV, 25 and V, 14 are similar both in terms of content and in their
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115 For the background to Al-Ghazālī’s approach to taqlīd in Ashʿarite theology, see Richard M.
Frank, “Al-Ghazālī on Taqlīd: Scholars, Theologians and Philosophers,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte
der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften 7 (1991/92): 246 n. 76; Frank, “Knowledge and Taqlīd,”
44 n. 19.
116 Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, 63–64 (sec. 38–39); Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of
the Philosophers, 2–3, 8.
use of terminology based on the root q.l.d. At the same time, there is a striking dif-
ference between the two thinkers: Halevi uses the root q.l.d. to explain the emer-
gence of ancient Hellenistic philosophical schools of thought, whereas al-Ġazālī
uses it to explain why some of his contemporaries follow the philosophers’ conclu-
sions in the realm of metaphysics in general, without reference to divisions into
schools.117 Thus, al-Ġazālī’s statements on taqlīd in the philosophical context lack
the stress that is so central to the use Halevi makes of the word’s root in the same
context, the stress regarding the connection between the philosophers’ disagree-
ments and their groupings into schools of thought.118
In addition to the connection between the rabbi’s words in the parallel seg-
ments of IV, 25 and V, 14 and the assertions of al-Ġazālī, it is necessary to note the
connection between the rabbi’s claims and the claims made by Cicero in his intro-
duction to Lucullus, his major Academic sceptical dialogue. In a passage of this in-
troduction, Cicero notes the advantages of the sceptics compared to the followers of
the dogmatic philosophical methods. According to him, the sceptics are freer in
their opinions than the dogmatics, because the sceptics, as people who always rely
on their independent considerations, are exempt from the burden of obligation
borne by the dogmatics to defend a set of positions imposed on them by someone
else, that someone else being the founder or teacher of the school of thought to
which they belong. Later on, Cicero provides a somewhat sociological explanation
of the circumstances in which the dogmatic schools of thought came into being: at
the outset of their intellectual path, people tend to be influenced by the doctrine
and authority of the particular scholar that they happen to encounter first. From
that stage onwards, they simply continue to subordinate themselves to that particu-
lar scholar and doctrine, without independently investigating any other opinions or
positions.119 With these claims, reflecting a sceptical, anti-dogmatic point of view,
Cicero provides a polemical explanation for the existence of different philosophical
schools that is quite similar to Halevi’s polemical explanation embedded in the rab-
bi’s statement on the matter. Both authors criticise the philosophers and their sup-
porters for having aligned themselves with one school or another not as the result
of a process of intellectual inquiry on their part, but simply as the result of their
inclination to subordinate their own opinions to the authority of a figure represent-
ing one of these schools. Using this polemical explanation, Cicero seeks to highlight
the advantage of the sceptical path. He describes the sceptics’ conduct as consistent
and rationalistic, which, unlike that of the dogmatists, does not negate the spirit of
independent inquiry in the face of an obligation to the principles of the doctrine of
a teacher or the founder of a school of thought. For Halevi, however, the same type
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of polemical explanation is meant to clarify that the groupings and agreements
among philosophers and their supporters around consensual positions in physics
and metaphysics do not constitute a counter-argument to the claim of the lack of
agreement among philosophers that he noted earlier. Subsequently, it cannot pro-
vide authentication for the philosophers’ claims in these fields. Their groupings do
not constitute a full agreement of the kind found among the prophets, according to
Halevi;120 they are merely factional groupings around schools of thought. Further-
more, these groupings are, rationalistically speaking, the result of an invalid act of
subordination to the authority of a teacher or the founder of a school lacking the
basic rationalistic condition of independent thought or consideration. With this ra-
tionalistic claim, the criticism that Halevi levels against the philosophical schools of
thought overlaps with the rationalistic claim that Cicero, the spokesman of scepti-
cism, levels against them.
The third component of the passage of the rabbi’s words in V, 14 under discus-
sion that relates to Hellenistic scepticism is how the character of Socrates is intro-
duced. The words attributed to Socrates – which also appear, with slight variations,
in IV, 13 – are a paraphrase of a passage from Plato’s Apology (20d–e).121 In both
places, Socrates’s words support the fideist stance that Halevi’s rabbi takes; namely,
the stance according to which the most elevated fields of knowledge considered di-
vine wisdom (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) lie outside the scope of cognition of the philosophers,
who, when addressing these fields, rely on “the way of reason” (ṭarīq al-qiyās).122
The fideist component is stressed here by how Socrates distinguishes himself from
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the rest of the people of Athens as someone who remains within the scope of human
wisdom without pretensions to the divine wisdom that they supposedly possess.123
The Socrates of V, 14 differs from the other philosophers mentioned in the passage
by not having founded or belonged to any school of thought. The fact that Socrates
did not found a school is consistent with the humble, limited philosophical ap-
proach to which he was committed, according to the words attributed to him.
Socrates, as someone who did not claim to have divine wisdom, avoided the path of
the other Greek philosophers listed (Pythagoras, Empedocles, Aristotle, Plato, and
the Stoics) who attempted to formulate systematic, orderly philosophies that in-
cluded the higher fields of science; namely, physics and metaphysics. The impres-
sion created by the rabbi’s statements in V, 14 is that Socrates, in his humble philo-
sophical approach, kept his thought from becoming an authoritative pole of attrac-
tion for adherents and followers through whom he would have become the founder
of a school. This would seem to indicate that Socrates is exempt from the charge
aimed at the founders of the philosophical schools whose adherents follow them
through imitation and self-subordination to their founders’ authority instead of
making their own way through independent thought.124
In the context of the Arabic culture in which Halevi lived and worked, his em-
phasis on the uniqueness of Socrates who, as a Greek philosopher, nonetheless
steered clear of divine wisdom and did not found a school of thought, is quite strik-
ing and differs markedly from the common characterisation of Socrates as a philoso-
pher in the Arabic literature of that era.125 For example, al-Ġazālī included Socrates,
along with Plato and Aristotle, among the philosophers whom he called the al-
ilāhīyun, those philosophers who devoted a central part of their thought to the field
of al-ilāhīyat, metaphysics,126 and he also counts Socrates among those philoso-
phers who founded schools of thought.127 Halevi himself was aware that the rabbi’s
description of Socrates differed from the way he was usually seen in the rationalist
philosophical discourse of his time. This is evident from the words he has the
philosophers’ representative speak in the first section of The Kuzari. This represen-
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tative does not hesitate to include Socrates in the group of well-known Greek
philosophers to whom he attributes a perfection that elevates them to the metaphys-
ical level of the active intellect.128
An examination of the distance between the presentation of Socrates in Arabic
philosophical literature and the description of him in the rabbi’s words in V, 14 re-
veals a similarity to the understanding of the figure of Socrates in the Hellenistic
school of Academic scepticism. Socrates was revered in the tradition of Academic
sceptical thought. He was respected not as a sceptic,129 but rather as an anti-dog-
matic philosopher, in the sense of one who avoided presenting a systematic philo-
sophical doctrine, opting instead to remain true to dialectical philosophising, avoid-
ing determinations and ultimate conclusions on the issue under discussion.130 In
the tradition of Academic scepticism – and other traditions as well – Socrates was
seen as a model philosopher for focusing on everyday ethical matters rather than on
vague theoretical issues that were divorced from human cognition and inaccessible
to the human mind, such as the nature of the supreme beings and other matters out-
side the scope of physics. Socrates thus distinguished himself from other philoso-
phers who tended to preoccupy themselves with such questions.131 The congruence
between the way in which Socrates was held up as a model of a non-dogmatic
philosopher in the Academic sceptical tradition and the way in which he is pre-
sented as such a model in the rabbi’s words in V, 14 may not be absolute, but it is
quite significant nonetheless. This partial but important congruence is especially
striking given what I noted above regarding the very different image of Socrates
fashioned in the Arabic literature of Halevi’s era.
To conclude the discussion, it bears noting that in V, 14, Halevi uses one of his
favourite literary devices, that of historicisation.132 In the dialogical context, V, 14 is
a polemic against dogmatic philosophical doctrine and its stance on the human
soul and its purpose in life, a topic on which the rabbi expounds in V, 12. This doc-
trine belongs to none other than Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), and the words in V, 12
are nothing but a paraphrase of many of Ibn Sīnā’s statements on the topic in his
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Compendium on the Soul (al-Maqālah fī al-nafs).133 The intense polemical note in the
rabbi’s words against the philosophers in V, 14 – “they talk about souls and
prophecy [a great deal], but they are like the rest of flesh-and-blood”134 – is chiefly
aimed at Ibn Sīnā, whose doctrines on these matters Halevi had the rabbi voice in
V, 12, without attribution. The fact that immediately afterwards, in V, 14, Halevi
speaks of Socrates and the Greek philosophers and their schools of thought in antiq-
uity, who belonged to an era that had long since passed, is a clear example of his-
toricisation, which serves as an important literary device in Halevi’s discreet rela-
tion to his immediate circle of readers (which was more or less identical with his
social circle). Here, Halevi means to provide those readers with an obvious hint con-
cerning the balance of power between the adherents of dogmatic rationalism and
their opponents: at the time when philosophy was flourishing in ancient Hellenistic
culture, this type of dogmatism set the tone for and gave rise to many schools of
thought, whereas its opponents, such as Socrates, were few and were considered
atypical. Similarly, at the time when Halevi wrote The Kuzari, when rationalistic the-
ology and philosophy were flourishing in Arabic culture, the dogmatic rationalist
approach had the upper hand, whereas its opponents were few and were considered
outliers.135 As we shall see in our next chapter in this study, when it comes to the
Judeo-Arabic culture of his era, Halevi played the role of a one-man opposition to
the dominant dogmatic rationalist approach.
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Chapter 4 Judah Halevi’s Fideistic Scepticism
against the Backdrop of Developments in
the Arabic Culture of His Time
From the analysis in the previous chapter, the trends of dogmatic rationalism in
Arabic culture have emerged as the most relevant background to the appearance of
sceptical manifestations in The Kuzari. Thus, it seems fitting to point to a general
historical parallel between the circumstances under which scepticism appeared in
Hellenistic antiquity and the circumstances under which sceptical manifestations
emerged in Judah Halevi’s thought. The Hellenistic sceptical trend formed in reac-
tion to the establishment of the dogmatic rationalist schools, first and foremost the
Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian schools of thought in the fourth and third cen-
turies BCE, while the sceptical manifestations in Halevi’s thought are a response to
and a means of countering the establishment of the dogmatic rationalist schools of
Arabic culture, above all the kalām and falsafah schools. For Halevi himself, as a
thinker and writer active in the late eleventh and first half of the twelfth centuries, a
period when the Arabic variations of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism were preva-
lent among Jewish and Muslim writers in al-Andalus, the challenge posed by dog-
matic rationalism as processed by the falsafah trends was greater than that posed
by the thought of the kalām trends.1 In his works, Ibn Sīnā, active in the first
decades of the eleventh century, presented a systematic philosophical synthesis
that covered all scientific disciplines, including metaphysics, which he called “the
divine sciences” (al-ilāhiyāt), which, theologically speaking, is the most significant.
Ibn Sīnā’s tremendous philosophical achievement made a very profound impression
on Arabic rationalists in the following generations.2 Ibn Sīnā’s thought reverberates
throughout The Kuzari more strongly than that of al-Fārābī, falsafah’s important
representative in the generations preceding Ibn Sīnā’s time.3 In the specific context
of Halevi as an Andalusian thinker, the thought of the contemporaneous Andalu-
sian philosopher Abū Bakr ibn Bāǧǧah (d. 1139), the first important representative
of falsafah in Andalusia, also left a significant imprint on The Kuzari.4
In addition to noting the general parallel of circumstances in which classical
Hellenistic scepticism appeared and the appearance of scepticism in Halevi’s
thought, it is also necessary to discuss the specific historical circumstances under
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which Halevi formulated his thought as a response to the dogmatic rationalism of
his time. As Halevi was operating within the context of Arabic culture, it is neces-
sary to consider the unique circumstances of the development of dogmatic rational-
ism in Judeo-Arabic thought. Early in the development of dogmatic rationalism in
the Muslim-Arabic context, the representatives of Muslim rationalism were con-
fronted by the representatives of Muslim traditionalism.5 This confrontation formed
an ideological anti-rationalist opposition to rationalist approaches from their very
inception. The argument between the traditionalist and rationalist trends continued
unabated throughout the classical Islamic period and beyond.6 Compared to these
circumstances, the conditions of the development of Judeo-Arabic thought are par-
ticularly striking, because the emergence and development of dogmatic rationalism
in Judeo-Arabic culture was not accompanied by the parallel development of a tra-
ditionalist counter-option. All the Jewish thinkers working within Judeo-Arabic
thought until Halevi’s time – or at least those whose thought is known to us – were
of some dogmatic rationalist orientation or another.7
This historical fact is important in the construction of Halevi’s thought and clar-
ifies Halevi’s “splendid isolation” in the social and intellectual setting in which he
operated.8 Above, in the second chapter, I discussed one well-known ramification
of Halevi’s intellectual isolation: when he attempted to formulate a polemical re-
sponse to dogmatic rationalism, he was inclined to explain his position to his col-
leagues and readers – all of whom were dogmatic rationalists – by using their own
terms. In this discussion, I want to focus on another ramification of this situation.
In his attempt to articulate a polemical response to dogmatic rationalism, Halevi
did not have a convenient traditionalist or other ideological doctrine in the context
of Judeo-Arabic thought at his disposal. In the context of Judeo-Arabic thought, Ha-
levi’s choice to present an ideological alternative to dogmatic rationalism was there-
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fore a pioneering endeavour. In doing so, Halevi could not build on precedents in
Judeo-Arabic thought. No wonder, therefore, that his main sources of inspiration for
formulating this alternative were rooted in non-Jewish Arabic thought. To follow on
from the earlier discussion, where I indicated the Hellenistic sources that had been
translated into Arabic from which Halevi could have extracted sceptical assertions
to use in articulating his own alternative to the dominant dogmatic rationalist
thought, I shall at this point address a complementary discussion of trends in Mus-
lim-Arabic thought that are of particular relevance for the articulation of such an
alternative.
As noted, the dominance of dogmatic rationalism in various formulations in
Judeo-Arabic thought was more evident and obvious than in the parallel Muslim-
Arabic thought. As a Judeo-Arabic thinker, Halevi, who sought to present an ideo-
logical alternative to the dominant trend, also made use of components of the tradi-
tionalist Muslim approach. In the earlier discussion about the dialogue in I, 11–25, I
analysed Halevi’s epistemological manoeuvre in this section of the text and his re-
liance on the traditionalist Muslim epistemological conceptualisation which is cen-
tred around the notion of reports (aḫbār) of the past, verifying these reports by rely-
ing on direct sense perception (ʿiyān) and also on concurrent tradition based on
multiple chains of transmitters (tawātur). Later on, in the dialogue in I, 43–67,
which centres on the veracity of the Jewish chronology (taʾrīḫ), he also relies on tra-
ditionalist Muslim epistemology. As noted, the section concludes with a reference to
the oral tradition (al-naql) being decisive on the matter under discussion. Thus, we
may identify an important contribution to The Kuzari from traditionalist Muslim
thought when it comes to creating an alternative to the dogmatic rationalist ap-
proach. Halevi was not the first Jewish author to utilise traditionalist Muslim terms
and patterns in a polemical context, yet he seems to have been the first of them to
utilise them in an anti-rationalistic polemical context.9 Halevi’s use of the terminol-
ogy and way of thinking that was typical of Muslim traditionalists in these sections
allowed him to present a definition of knowledge based on the concept of reporting
(ḫabar), which differs in essence from the concept of knowledge in dogmatic ratio-
nalism, especially that of falsafah.
In addition to using traditionalist Muslim terminology, which was generally dis-
tinct from the terminology of falsafah’s dogmatic rationalism, we also see Halevi, in
his polemics against his philosophical opponents, arguing with them by using the
terminology and way of thinking that was typical of rationalist thought. Two such
manoeuvres are notable: first, disputing them using the rationalist approach that is
unique to scepticism, which I analysed at length above, a productive way of creat-
ing the alternative that Halevi sought to present in The Kuzari. The major contribu-
tion here lies in the specific internal logic of sceptical rationalism; namely, in avoid-
Chapter 4 Judah Halevi’s Fideistic Scepticism against the Backdrop of Developments  89
9 See the discussion in chapter 3 above.
ing either the verification or the refutation of certain positions by the use of the
“equipollence of counter-arguments” (isostheneia). During the dialogical exchanges
in I, 11–25 and I, 66–67, Halevi makes tactical use of this logic as an alternative to
the internal logic of dogmatic rationalism, in which assent, verification, and refuta-
tion serve as basic components. Second, Halevi disputes the dogmatic rationalism
of falsafah by engaging in ad hominem (ilzām) arguments; namely, by tactically
adopting his opponents’ assumptions only to demonstrate how, further down the
line, they fail the test of correlation between these assumptions and the conclusions
they derive from them for issues with theological implications. In his ad hominem
argumentation, Halevi relies to a considerable extent on al-Ġazālī’s precedent in
The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifah), in which al-Ġazālī used
this approach to broadly undermine the core claims of falsafah.10 The ad hominem
argumentation is essentially negative, making do with undermining one’s oppo-
nent’s stances; it provides nothing on which it is possible to construct an alterna-
tive.11 Of interest in this regard is Halevi’s attempt to append his negative assertions,
which he posits against falsafah’s notion of emanation (most of which he borrowed
from al-Ġazālī),12 with his own unique positive non-sceptical theory, which revolves
around the notion of “the divine order” (al-amr al-ilāhī) as an alternative to falsa-
fah’s concept of emanation.13
In terms of presenting an alternative to dogmatic rationalism in general, and
that of falsafah in particular, the most significant contribution Halevi found in al-
Ġazālī’s thought is related to fideism. Al-Ġazālī articulated this approach with help
from the mystical Muslim Ṣūfī tradition and the terminology associated with it. Al-
though al-Ġazālī was initially a student and then a teacher of dogmatic rationalism
in the Ashʿarite school of kalām, he rediscovered – or reinvented – himself as a Ṣūfī
mentor at a later stage of his spiritual development. The appearance of fideism in
al-Ġazālī’s thought is a function of his transition from an early stage of dogmatic
rationalism to a later stage of Ṣūfism. Undergoing a mystical experience and de-
scribing it in Ṣūfī terms provided al-Ġazālī with an arationalist mystical foundation.
In one of his late works, The Deliverance from Error (al-Munqiḏ min al-ḍalāl), al-
Ġazālī provided a concise and persuasive account of how attaining mystical experi-
ences allowed him to reevaluate the various articulations of dogmatic rationalism in
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both the kalām and the falsafah schools. Relying on mystical experiences, al-Ġazālī
identified rationalism’s limitations in terms of the knowledge of the divine, which
are inherent to rationalism because of its essence; namely, as an approach which
privileges human intellectual inquiry even when it comes to divine knowledge. In-
depth knowledge of the divine, in the sense of a supra-sensory experience of God’s
presence and proximity, is possible only by means of the non-intellectual mystical
experience of the prophets and Ṣūfī saints.14 Halevi was deeply affected by al-Ġazā-
lī’s fideist message as primarily spelt out in The Deliverance from Error and how it
denied dogmatic rationalism its pre-eminence in defining and attaining knowledge
in the realm of belief in the name of the mystical experience and the Ṣūfī means of
cognition characterising it.15 As a result, the dialogue between the rabbi and the
Khazar king throughout much of The Kuzari’s fourth book and in several places in
the fifth, such as V, 14, is aimed at the experiential epistemological alternative and
the supra-sensory mystical ways of cognition that typify it. In this case, too, the
polemical sting of the presentation of an alternative is aimed at dogmatic rational-
ism, not only that of falsafah, but also that of kalām.16
We can therefore discern that at the epistemological level, the traditionalist ap-
proach and the mystical Ṣūfī approach as processed by al-Ġazālī served as the two
main pillars which supported Halevi’s anti-rationalist alternative in The Kuzari.
Both of these Muslim traditions were historically important and influential in cri-
tiquing the dogmatic rationalist trends in Arabic culture.17 It is therefore not surpris-
ing that Halevi found these particular Muslim traditions helpful for creating an al-
ternative to dogmatic rationalism in Judeo-Arabic thought.
To conclude this chapter, it behoves us to compare the way that Halevi used the
sceptical tradition with the way it was used by other Judeo-Arabic thinkers. At this
point of the study, such a comparison can only be made with one thinker, whose
connection to scepticism has been substantially studied: Maimonides, the most im-
portant thinker to emerge from Judeo-Arabic culture, who was active in the second
half of the twelfth century, some decades after Halevi’s death. For the sake of this
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comparison, I shall start by presenting some background about Maimonides and his
philosophical development.
Early in his development, Maimonides’s thinking was quite obviously affected
by falsafah’s dogmatic rationalist approach. He only sought out scepticism at a later
stage, when he wrote The Guide of the Perplexed (Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn).18 In his earlier
years, Maimonides was the great dogmatic Jewish thinker whose first major compo-
sition, The Commentary on the Mishnah (Šarḥ al-mišnah), articulated what became
the most influential version of the Jewish catechism: a list of thirteen dogmatic prin-
ciples of the Jewish faith.19 His second great composition, Mishneh Torah (The Code
of Maimonides), is constructed according to the format of an apodictic code of law
and as such is imbued with an overall dogmatisation that is completely at odds with
the open and non-conclusive legal discourse of the Talmud. The early Maimonides
of The Commentary on the Mishnah and Mishneh Torah is also the thinker who made
the dramatic interpretation, in the spirit of dogmatic rationalism, of identifying fal-
safah’s physics and metaphysics with the Talmudic “work of Creation” (maʿaśeh
berešit) and “work of the Chariot” (maʿaśeh merkavah) respectively.20 With this
highly original and controversial move, Maimonides bestowed the dogmatic seal of
approval of the supreme scientific spheres of Aristotelian philosophy on two highly
esoteric Jewish traditional themes. So, in Maimonides’s case, his achievements as a
codifier in The Commentary on the Mishnah and especially in Mishneh Torah, which
made him the greatest codifier of Jewish law, went hand in hand with his position
as the one who contributed more than any other to the dogmatisation of the Jewish
faith. Hence, the possibility that a thinker with a strong predilection for dogmatism
like Maimonides could have incorporated sceptical elements into his Guide of the
Perplexed later in his life, as suggested by few scholars in the last generation, is
both remarkable and fascinating.
Equally remarkable and notable is the fact that almost at the same time, this
kind of unexpected development was taking place in the thought of Faḫr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī (d. 1210), a thinker whose centrality to Muslim-Arabic culture is comparable in
some ways to Maimonides’s place in Jewish literature in terms of reputation and in-
fluence. Al-Rāzī’s thought is notable for its transition from rigid dogmatic rational-
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18 Halbertal, Maimonides: Life and Thought, 302.
19 Moses Maimonides, Šarḥ al-mišnah, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook,
1963–68), 4:210–17 (Judeo-Arabic original and Hebrew translation); Maimonides, Mishneh Torah,
vol. 1, Sefer ha-Maddaʿ, Hilekhot Yesodei ha-Torah, ed. Mordechai Dov Rabinowitz, chapters 1–4
(Jerusalem, Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1993), 3–24.
20 Šarḥ al-mišnah, 2:377. The impact of Maimonides’s catechism has been so profound that a con-
densed version of it is included in virtually every Jewish daily prayer book (Siddur). For the possible
relation between Maimonides’s catechism and the Almohad catechism (Maimonides lived under
Almohad rule when he began work on his Šarḥ al-mišnah), see Sarah Stroumsa, “Was Maimonides
an Almohad Thinker?” [Hebrew], in Alei Asor, 162–63.
ism in the spirit of Ashʿarite kalām in his early writings to the sceptical pessimism
typical of his later works. For al-Rāzī, the transition seems to have been even more
radical than the one experienced by Maimonides.21 It seems quite certain that Faḫr
al-Dīn al-Rāzī was a key figure in the development of scepticism in Arabic culture.22
Further progress in this field, which might include a comparative study between al-
Rāzī and Maimonides, is likely to advance our understanding of the manifestations
of scepticism in this cultural realm.
As already noted above, the possibility that Maimonides embraced a sceptical
approach in The Guide of the Perplexed has been most forcibly and thoroughly elab-
orated and analysed in the studies of Josef Stern. According to Stern, the starting
point of scepticism in the Guide of the Perplexed is its emphasis on the basic datum
that the human intellect is seated in materiality. This fact is a severe limitation on
the intellect’s ability to comprehend the purely intellectual beings, the separate in-
tellects, let alone God, a supra-intellectual entity. In other words, the human intel-
lect encounters its most constraining limits in understanding any entity from the
metaphysical realms.23 The problem is that the aspect of metaphysics that deals
with God and the separate intellects is precisely what most intrigues those who are
charged with using their intellects and who strive for intellectual perfection;
namely, philosophers, those for whom the siren’s song of metaphysics is strongest,
a temptation they cannot withstand, even if this is also the very field in which their
intellects – as is true of all humans, whose minds are mired in the material – are
most limited.24 Here is where the sceptical approach meets Maimonides. For him,
the sceptical approach is a useful tool for making philosophers rein in ther impulse
towards dogmatic philosophising in the field of metaphysics. The use of scepticism
exposes the fact that the philosophers’ pretensions of being able to present clear
demonstrative proofs and to reach certain knowledge of metaphysics are lacking a
real basis.25 Maimonides’s transition towards philosophical metaphysics in the
Guide of the Perplexed – from the apodictic rationale of dogmatic philosophy to the
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21 Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 181–99; Shihadeh, “From al-Ghazālī to
al-Rāzī,” 163–77. One should note that Saul Horovitz was the first to point to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s
place in the context of the development of scepticism in Arabic literature in his pioneering studies
from the beginning of the twentieth century. See Horovitz, “Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis,”
10–13, 23, 29–30, 43–44, 46.
22 It seems that more than any other writer, it was al-Rāzī and his version of rationalism that pro-
voked the monumental anti-rational response from Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) and served as a
trigger for the inclusion of sceptical components in the thought of this prominent thinker. See, in
this context, Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 198–99; Heck, Skepticism in
Classical Islam, 17, 153–92.
23 Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 76–77, 80, 124–31, 334, 337.
24 Stern, 81–82, 86–89, 178–79, 186.
25 See, in this context, Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World: Portrait of a Mediterranean
Thinker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 44–45, 137–38.
rationale of sceptical philosophy’s non-assent and suspension of judgment – pre-
served for him the possibility of philosophising about metaphysical matters in light
of his growing tendency in his later writings to make a pessimistic epistemological
assessment of the human intellect’s ability to reach certain knowledge on these mat-
ters.26
In the discussion of manifestations of scepticism in Halevi’s thought earlier in
this study, I examined the possibility that the writings of Galen and Ptolemy served
as the conduit for selective sceptical stances from Hellenism to Arabic culture in
general and The Kuzari in particular. In The Guide of the Perplexed, this is more
than a probability, as Maimonides explicitly cites both Galen and Ptolemy in the
long discussion devoted to the question of the world’s eternity versus its innovation.
These citations appear in contexts that are extremely relevant for the argument that
Maimonides was forging a selective sceptical approach in his work. Maimonides
quotes Galen’s sceptical stance on the eternity-versus-innovation question in the
context of the aforementioned dismissive appraisal of al-Fārābī’s position, an ap-
praisal that Maimonides does not share.27 As for Ptolemy’s Almagest, Maimonides
quotes a section of it in The Guide of the Perplexed II, 24, a chapter of special signif-
icance for the forging of his scepticism. While the ideas from the Almagest are taken
from the body of the book, they are congruent with the spirit of Ptolemy’s above-
mentioned statement from the book’s introduction speaking about his sceptical as-
sessment of the human intellect’s cognitive ability in the realm of ungraspable, “un-
stable and unclear” matters.28
If we subsequently compare section V, 14 of The Kuzari with the claims that
Maimonides made in The Guide of the Perplexed, we will find that the assertion
about the limitations of the human intellect in the realm of metaphysics is made in
the context of both authors’ mitigated use of scepticism.29 However, while Halevi
incorporates its use into a fideist framework in whose name he wished to demolish
philosophical preoccupation with metaphysics as a legitimate science, Maimonides
forgoes the fideist context. In adopting and applying this assertion, Maimonides’s
intention is not to deny the adherents of philosophy any intellectual investigation
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26 Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 85–86, 90–96, 184–85, 189–90, 311.
27 Maimonides, Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn, II, 15 (203, l. 29–204, l. 2 = The Guide of the Perplexed, 292).
28 Maimonides, Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn, II, 24 (227, ll. 13–17 = The Guide of the Perplexed, 325). Maimoni-
des’s reference here can be found in Ptolemy, Almagest, 600.
29 For the characterisation of Maimonides’s scepticism as mitigated, see Stern, The Matter and
Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 5–6, 132, 136–38, 146. Halevi’s sceptical attitude, unlike that of Mai-
monides, expands beyond metaphysics to include fundamental components of Aristotelian physics,
such as the doctrine of the four elements of the sub-lunar world (V, 14 [322, l. 25–324, l. 24]). Mai-
monides, on the other hand, more than once asserts the complete credibility of Aristotelian physics
regarding the sub-lunar world. See Maimonides, Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn, II, 22 (223, ll. 17–19), II, 24 (228,
ll. 15–16 = The Guide of the Perplexed, 319, 326).
of metaphysics. Rather, he uses the sceptical approach as a methodological tool to
guide them in that investigation. In The Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides
presents Aristotle, the father figure of falsafah, as a model of the cautious scholar,
taking a selective sceptical approach in all matters pertaining to metaphysics.30 The
Aristotle of The Guide of the Perplexed, the careful philosopher making sure not to
cross the limits of intellectual cognition, is the counterpart to the figure of Socrates
that Halevi sketches in The Kuzari.31 But the two authors describe this intellectual
caution in completely different terms. For Halevi, it is related to the distinction be-
tween “human wisdom” and “divine wisdom.” Socrates’s caution prevents him, as
a philosopher, from attempting to go beyond the realm of “human wisdom” and in-
fringing on the realm of “divine wisdom.” According to him, the latter is closed to
most humans, who are endowed only with their intellect, and only open to those
who possess mystical, inspirational cognition. Maimonides’s approach, which he
projects onto Aristotle, emerges as the approach that is truest to the constant ratio-
nalist demand for inquiry – skepsis – in the spirit of the classical sceptical ap-
proach.32 Maimonides avoids making a clear distinction, as Halevi does, between
human and divine wisdom, thus leaving the question of whether intellectual inquiry
into metaphysics is appropriate without a clear-cut answer. This non-assent attitude
provides further legitimacy of the sceptical kind for the possibility of studying meta-
physics; that is, its inquiry as an ongoing exercise. Aristotle’s caution in The Guide
of the Perplexed is therefore what allows the philosopher to move in the realm of
“divine wisdom” and to continue conducting intellectual inquiries in matters per-
taining to it.
If we turn to the question of proving the existence of God using the teleological
argument in Halevi and Maimonides, we find that both are in proximity to the scep-
tical approach despite their differing articulations on the subject. In The Guide of
the Perplexed I, 72, Maimonides formulates the subject as an antinomy: the two op-
posing claims – that God is remote and separate from the world and that God is
manifest in His providence and governance of every last part of the world – are both
backed by demonstrative proofs.33 By contrast, for Halevi, in the statement he has
the Khazar king speak in I, 20, the three different and antithetical claims on the sub-
ject do not have the status of claims that are backed by demonstrative proofs; they
are merely questionable assertions. Despite their differences, Maimonides’s and Ha-
levi’s formulations both bring the issue to the point of the “equipollence of counter-
arguments” (isostheneia) that is desirable from the sceptical perspective.
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31 Danzig, “Socrates in Hellenistic and Medieval Jewish Literature,” 156 n. 36.
32 Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 242, 246–49, 284–85, 294, 303–4, 312–13.
33 See Maimonides, Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn, I, 72 (133, l. 27–134, l. 3 = The Guide of the Perplexed, 192–93)
and the discussion in Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, 245, 278–79.
If we now turn to a comparison between Halevi’s and Maimonides’s positions
on the debate over the world’s eternity versus its innovation ex nihilo, we see that
Maimonides presents a dogmatic conclusion that Halevi avoids. Theoretically, the
two thinkers are close to one another in their fundamentally sceptical understand-
ing that in this issue, intellectual inquiry is incapable of deciding between the two
contradictory claims. Based on this understanding, in I, 67 of The Kuzari, Halevi
reaches the non-dogmatic conclusion that an “adherent of the Law” (al-mutašarriʿ)
is not obligated to believe in innovation ex nihilo. An “adherent of the Law” is also
allowed to have opinions that do not contradict the belief “that this world came into
new existence at a specific time in the past,” including the belief that assumes the
existence of a prime matter or the opinion that other worlds existed prior to this
one.34 Compared to Halevi’s position here, Maimonides presents a much more rigid
stance on the issue: “an adherent of the Law” is bound by a dogmatic obligation to
believe in innovation ex nihilo. Consequently, he must reject other positions, even
those that are found in the writings of the Talmudic sages about the existence of a
prior “order of time” (seder zemanim) to the chronology of our present world.35
The approach of rationalist mitigated scepticism thus plays a significant role
both in Maimonides’s late thought (in the way in which Stern interprets it) and in
Halevi’s thought (in the way in which it is interpreted here), though for Mai-
monides – unlike Halevi – its role seems to be more essential. For him, it embodies
a rationalistic alternative to dogmatism thanks to which he was able to continue to
philosophise about metaphysical issues. Halevi, on the other hand, did not need a
sceptical alternative to “save” philosophical metaphysics; from his perspective,
seeking to know God and the upper world is not a quest dependent on the capacity
of the human intellect, but rather on the capacity of the sensory and mystical per-
ception of humanity’s choicest members.
Finally, let me briefly point to what seems to me to be an interesting phe-
nomenon that needs to be studied and clarified. In the course of a period of approx-
imately one hundred years, from around 1100 until around 1200, the two Judeo-Ara-
bic thinkers with lasting influence –Halevi and Maimonides – and the two Muslim-
Arabic thinkers with an equally profound impact – al-Ġazālī and al-Rāzī – became
increasingly critical, each in his own unique manner, of their dogmatic rationalistic
upbringing. As mentioned above, starting from the ninth century onwards, dog-
matic rationalist schools thrived among the educated elites in Arabic culture. Yet at
a later historical stage, during the twelfth century, we find the most serious students
of this kind of rationalism becoming critical of it, seeking different ways to free
themselves from its dogmatic grip. This critical challenging of dogmatic rationalism
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posed by the leading thinkers of the era served as an important background to the
integration of sceptical motifs in works by those thinkers.
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Classical scepticism sets an example of a global, systematic, anti-dogmatic ap-
proach. At the same time, it was a product of the Hellenistic culture in which it de-
veloped and was deeply rooted in this culture, absorbing its typical mentalities and
modes of expression. Thus, it is not surprising that classical scepticism ceased to
exist with the vanishing of Hellenistic culture. The reappearance of claims and mo-
tifs originating from the classical sceptical heritage in post-Hellenistic cultures can
be explained by the lasting historical phenomenon of tension between rationalistic
dogmatic trends and other trends of thought. This lasting tension seems to be the
main reason why classical sceptical motifs continued to appear and to be utilised
and reshaped in the transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages and the modern
period by thinkers who challenged the rationalistic dogmatic assumptions of their
period.
In the history of western civilisation, the assumptions of dogmatic thought are
those that have usually gained dominance and hegemony. In contradistinction to
the qualities reflected in dominant dogmatic tendencies, the lasting qualities of
sceptical thought are the ones that fostered critical, nonconformist, unconventional,
creative, flexible, tolerating, daring, sober, and realistic modes of thinking. These
kinds of qualities were exhibited by some of the most original and exceptional
thinkers of various cultures. In what follows, I will try to show how they appear in
the passages in The Kuzari where Judah Halevi utilised classical sceptical motifs,
passages that I discussed extensively in the main part of this study.
Central to dogmatic rationalism is the claim that human reason is humanity’s
best guide. Since Plato’s Politeia, this claim has served some dogmatic philosophers
as the foundation of all kinds of rationalistic utopian visions (with totalitarian rami-
fications) regarding the philosophers’ ability to construct a “perfect state.”1 In The
Kuzari, this claim appears in the dialogue between the Khazar king and the philoso-
pher in I, 2–3, where the dogmatic philosopher states (in I, 3) that the “religion of
the philosophers” is the preferred religious and civil order since it respects all those
who follow reason. The dogmatic philosopher seems to imply here that such a reli-
gion can correct the current state of affairs, in which (as stated by the Khazar king
in I, 2) the relations between the political entities guided by the two dominant re-
vealed religions – Christianity and Islam – are marred by ongoing mutual blood-
shed. In I, 13, the Jewish rabbi counters this claim from the dogmatic philosopher
by implementing the sceptical mode of disagreement regarding the “religion of the
philosophers,” or “the syllogistic, governmental religion to which speculation
leads,” as it is presented here. The disagreements between the philosophers regard-
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ing the beliefs and practices of this religion attest to the limitations of human reason
in the domain of political theory and practice. The implicit conclusion from the rab-
bi’s use of the sceptical mode of disagreement in this case is that political entities
based on the “religion of the philosophers” are expected to fare no better than the
ones based on non-philosophical religious laws: disagreement and bloodshed will
prevail in both cases. Thus, the indirect clash between the philosopher of The Kuzari
I, 3 and the rabbi of I, 13 represents a clash between the utopian idealistic quality of
the dogmatic rationalistic tendency and the sober realistic quality of sceptical
thought.2 The sceptical measure that Halevi uses here is the tempering of the exag-
gerated trust that the rational dogmatists tend to put in human reasoning.
The Khazar king’s formulation of the sceptical “equipollence of counter-argu-
ments” in The Kuzari I, 20 demonstrates the sceptical quality of nonconformism.
Halevi was certainly swimming against the current when he made his Khazar king
doubt what was perhaps the most common and widely accepted argument through-
out the ages: the teleological argument for God’s existence, aka “the argument from
design.” Halevi did not adhere to global scepticism as the Hellenistic sceptics did.
His use of sceptical measures was selective and tactical. As I pointed out above,
calling into question “the argument from design” for God’s existence was such a
daring and unusual step that Halevi chose to give it only a parabolic articulation.
Yet within the framework of this parabolic articulation, Halevi saw fit to use a scep-
tical measure to express his unconventional, nonconformist stance.
The qualities distinguishing Halevi’s discussion of the question of the world’s
innovation versus its eternity in I, 67 are the qualities of creativity, originality, and
tolerance. His predecessors in medieval Jewish thought chose to defend the ratio-
nality of the Torah’s adherence to the doctrine of the innovation of the world by
adopting the approach of dogmatic rationalism, which seeks to demonstrate the va-
lidity of one argument while refuting rival arguments (in this case, the argument of
eternity). Halevi, on the other hand, chose to defend the rationality of the Torah’s
position by applying sceptical rationalism: the Torah’s position does not negate hu-
man reason because the innovation argument has not been refuted, and its relation-
ship to the rival argument of eternity is that of the “equipollence of counter-argu-
ments.” In I, 67, Halevi shows himself to be not only less dogmatic, but also more
tolerant than his Jewish predecessors. Unlike them, Halevi was able to tolerate
some beliefs that are incompatible with the belief in the world’s innovation ex ni-
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concise analysis of the collective humility that currently characterises the behaviour of the Jewish
people into the mouth of the Khazar king. According to the king’s analysis, this desirable behaviour
(as portrayed in the rabbi’s words in I, 113) is conditioned by their current inferiority and their
dependence on other nations. In the event that the Jewish people achieve political independence
and sovereignty, their political behaviour is not expected to be different from the violent behaviour
that characterises the Christian and Muslim nations.
hilo; namely, belief in the existence of eternal matter and in many worlds prior to
this world. For his part, Halevi allows the holder of these incompatible beliefs to be
counted as “an adherent of the Law,” like the holder of the belief in the world’s in-
novation ex nihilo.3 Halevi achieved this considerable measure of tolerance by
adding a new dimension to the issue under discussion. While his predecessors in
medieval Jewish thought considered the question of the world’s innovation versus
its eternity only from its ontological-cosmological dimension, Halevi demonstrates
the flexibility of his thought by adding and even giving the upper hand to another,
new dimension of this question: the chronology of the world.
Finally, we reach the rabbi’s speech in V, 14, where Halevi distinguishes
Socrates as the one who set an example of a critical undogmatic philosopher. As
such, Socrates stands as an exceptional figure among the host of dogmatic philoso-
phers and their schools in the Hellenistic world. Here, Halevi seems to go beyond
even the Hellenistic sceptics who formed their own schools. In characterising
Socrates as he does in V, 14, as an exceptional figure in his time and culture, Halevi
seems to suggest that the original undogmatic thinker is someone who swims
strongly against the intellectual current of his age, someone who tends to be a sui
generis figure, someone whose place in the history of thought is unique and inim-
itable.4
In sum, The Kuzari supplies its readers with a few, albeit illuminating, examples
of some of the qualities responsible for the enduring contribution of scepticism to
the history of philosophy in the transition from the Hellenistic to the post-Hellenis-
tic period.
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